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Abstract: Moral Obligations to Non-Humans
My PhD thesis provides an account of the moral obligations we have to non-humans. 
The project is divided into two sections: the theoretical and the applied. In the first 
section I examine the foundations of our moral obligations, answering two key questions: 
what types of thing have moral status, and how can we delineate our obligations to 
them? I maintain that those entities with the capacity for ‘well-being’ have moral status. 
I refute the claim made by some that all living organisms have well-being, and argue that 
only beings with ‘phenomenal consciousness’ (sentience) have lives that can go well or 
badly for themselves. At this point then, the thesis turns its focus towards sentient 
animals. Next I consider just how we should structure our moral obligations. I argue that 
a utilitarian or aggregative framework fails to individuate entities with moral status, 
treating them as mere ‘receptacles’ of value. I thus propose that an interest-based rights 
theory provides the appropriate means for delineating our obligations to non-human 
animals.
The second part of the thesis involves teasing out the implications of this interest-based 
rights theory for the ways in which we treat animals. To this end, I evaluate four different 
contexts in which we use non-human animals: in experiments, in agriculture, in 
entertainment, and by cultural groups. During these considerations, I argue that animals’ 
interests in avoiding pain and continued life ground prima facie animal rights not to be 
made to suffer and not to be killed. This renders many of the ways we currently use 
animals impermissible, particularly with regards to factory farming and experimentation. 
However, unlike other proponents of animal rights, I do not see the use of animals as 
impermissible in itself. This is because I claim that animals have no intrinsic interest in 
liberty, whether liberty is construed as the absence of interference or as the ability to 
govern one’s own life. Since animals h a ^ n o  interest in liberty for its own sake, this 
means that they ordinarily have no right not\> be used or interfered with by humans. 
Thus, the ultimate conclusion of my thesis is that the moral obligations we have to 
animals do not involve liberating them from zoos, farms and our homes. Rather, they 
necessitate putting an end to the suffering and death that animals endure at our hands.
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1. Introduction
The history of what we might loosely refer to as ‘Western moral philosophy’ has been 
dominated by one species: Homo sapiens. In one sense, this should be of little surprise, 
since human beings are the only species we know of that can both reason about 
morality, and act morally. However, in another sense, this domination is a bit more 
puzzling. For within this tradition, not only have human beings been considered the sole 
moral agents, but they have also been the exclusive moral subjects. That is to say, 
moral philosophy has exclusively centred on what we owe to human beings. In the last 
40 years or so, however, this domination has come under question.1 While few have 
questioned whether human beings are the sole moral agents, many have questioned 
whether they are the exclusive moral subjects. Simply put, it has been argued by some 
that we not only have obligations to our fellow human beings, but also to non-human 
entities such as plants, trees, animals, species, ecosystems and even the Earth itself.
While it is extremely difficult to pin down the exact reason for this shift, no doubt part of 
it can be put down to the increasing awareness in the 1960s of the impact that 
technology, industry, economic expansion and human population growth were having on 
the normal functioning of the environment and on animal welfare. Whatever the 
historical reasons behind it, we now find ourselves in a position where concern for non­
humans is very much mainstream. For example, states like the UK have extensive 
animal welfare legislation, and debate over how best to tackle the potential 
environmental crisis appears to be at the top of the political agenda.
However, the shift in attitude towards non-humans should not be exaggerated. 
Animals may have achieved some welfare protections under most states’ legislation, but 
they are still experimented upon in laboratories, displayed in zoos and circuses for 
human amusement, used in sport for our entertainment, and of course killed so that we 
may eat their flesh, perfectly legally in almost every country in the world. Moreover, it is 
surely fair to say that the primary impetus behind recent moves to protect the 
environment has not been any sudden realisation that we possess moral obligations to 
the environment itself; rather, it has been based on our desire to save ourselves from the
1 Rod Preece would question my historical account here. He argues that there has been a strong tradition o f 
concern for animals in Western morality, including Christianity. See, Rod Preece, Brute Souls, Happy 
Beasts and Evolution: The Historical Status o f  Animals, (Vancouver: University o f British Columbia Press, 
2005). While Preece’s arguments are interesting and well-informed, I do believe that they exaggerate the 
levels o f concern shown to non-humans in Western thought.
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serious harms threatened by the environmental crisis. Accordingly, many advocates for 
non-humans argue that a much more substantial set of obligations to non-human entities 
should be recognised morally, and enforced politically. This thesis contributes to this 
debate by providing an original account of our moral obligations to non-humans.
1.1 The Contribution of the Thesis
Clearly, several different accounts of our obligations to non-human entities have been 
proposed since these issues have implanted themselves in the public consciousness. 
Indeed, ‘environmental ethics’ and ‘animal ethics’ are fairly well established disciplines in 
moral and political philosophy. Given this, it is necessary to place the claims of this 
thesis in context, and defend their contribution to the discipline. First off then, this thesis 
rejects recognising all living things as moral subjects, and instead provides a defence 
and application of a scheme of animal rights. Since theories of animal rights have been 
developed before, it can legitimately be asked why a new one is needed.
In the first place, rigorous philosophical defences of animal rights are in actual fact very 
thin on the ground. For example, the most famous philosophical advocate of ‘animal 
liberation’, Peter Singer, does not in actual fact argue for animal rights at all, but sees 
them only as a, “...convenient political shorthand.”2 This, of course, is of little surprise 
when one considers Singer’s utilitarianism. However, one does not have to be a 
utilitarian to reject the appeal of rights. Indeed, many non-utilitarian philosophical 
proponents of ‘justice for animals’ or ‘animal liberation’, unreservedly reject defending 
their arguments in terms of rights.3 Of course, it should be emphasised that this 
rejection is down to their scepticism about rights discourse as a whole, rather than a 
rejection of the idea that animals are moral subjects.
Accordingly then, my thesis is in the company of those philosophers who do explicitly 
propose a scheme of animal rights.4 What sets my thesis apart from them? First of all,
2 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, (London: 2nd ed., Pimlico, 1995), p. 8.
3 For examples, see Ted Benton, Natural Relations: Ecology, Social Justice and Animal Rights, (London: 
Verso, 1993); Mary Midgley, Animals and Why they Matter, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1984); 
David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and M oral Status, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); and Mark Rowlands, Animals Like Us, (London: Verso, 2002).
4 For examples, see Tom Regan, The Case fo r  Animal Rights, (Berkeley: 2nd ed., University o f California 
Press, 2004); Gary L. Francione, Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology o f  the Animal Rights Movement, 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996); Paola Cavalieri, The Animal Question: Why Nonhuman 
Animals Deserve Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Bernard E. Rollin, Animal 
Rights and Human Morality, (Buffalo N Y: revised ed., Prometheus Books, 1992); James Rachels, Created 
from  Animals: The Moral Implications o f  Darwinism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); S.F. 
Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Steven M . Wise,
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most other schemes of animal rights have been under-theorised. What I mean by this is 
that most schemes of animal rights fail to address in detail just what type of things rights 
are, and just how and on what basis we can assign rights.5 Instead, rights are often 
used in a rather loose way, accepting that they impose limits on our actions, but without 
fully explaining why they impose such limits, and on what basis such limits are grounded. 
This thesis attempts to offer a much more thorough account and analysis of animal 
rights.
In fact, the specifics of this analysis form the second distinctive element of the scheme 
of animal rights defended in this thesis. That is, I adopt a Razian interest-based 
conception of rights and apply it to animals. Simply put, I argue that rights are based on 
interests, but for a right to be grounded it must be based on an interest that is sufficient 
to impose a duty on another.6 On the one hand, this approach is uncontroversial, since 
many rights-theorists have pointed out that for animal rights to even be coherent, they 
will have to be based on something like interests.7 However, on the other hand, this 
approach is novel, because no-one before has taken Joseph Raz’s famous analysis of 
what it means to have a right and systematically applied it to animals.
The final element of my scheme of animal rights that sets it part from others stems from 
the application of this Razian account of rights. In short, I argue that animals have no 
prima facie moral right to liberty, because they have no intrinsic interest in liberty. 
Undoubtedly, for other proponents of animal rights, this is the most controversial aspect 
of my thesis. This is because most advocates of animal rights regard freedom as 
fundamental to animal well-being. I, however, disagree and claim that to have an 
intrinsic interest in liberty, one must have the capacity for autonomy: the ability to frame, 
revise and pursue a conception of the good. Because animals have no intrinsic interest 
in liberty, and thus no moral right to liberty, I claim that there is nothing wrong in itself 
with interfering with animals and using them for certain purposes. This leads me to 
make quite different claims than other proponents of animal rights concerning the
Rattling the Cage -  Towards Legal Rights fo r  Animals, (London: Profile Books, 2000); Julian H. Franklin, 
Animal Rights and M oral Philosophy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); and Evelyn B.
Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice: The M oral Significance o f  Human and Nonhuman Animals, (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 1995).
5 Notable exceptions include, Tom Regan, The Case fo r  Animal Rights; Evelyn B. Pluhar, Beyond 
Prejudice; and Paola Cavalieri, The Animal Question.
6 Joseph Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 166.
7 For examples, see Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations" in William T. 
Blackstone (ed.), Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1974), 
pp. 49-51; Peter Jones, Rights, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p. 35; and Hillel Steiner, “Working 
Rights” in Matthew H. Kramer et al., A Debate Over Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 259.
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permissibility of such things as using animals in experiments, keeping them in zoos, 
raising them on farms and so on.
1.2 The Method and Assumptions of the Thesis
I hope then, that this thesis makes a novel and original contribution to the debate 
concerning our obligations to non-humans. However, this begs a crucial question: how 
does the thesis show that we do in actual fact have these obligations? In other words, 
what is the methodology of the argument to be presented? This is an important and 
difficult question for any enterprise in normative philosophy. For ethical enquiry is quite 
unlike other modes of intellectual investigation. Take for example the natural sciences, 
where hypotheses can be tested as true or false based on observations and empirical 
data. Such a process is unavailable to the moral philosopher. For just what in the world 
could we point to in order to prove that torture, murder and rape are morally wrong? At 
the same time, however, work in normative philosophy aims to be something more than 
mere rhetoric. Thus, the aim of this thesis is not simply to persuade others that they 
should treat animals in this way, but not in that way. Rather, it is to show that these 
obligations to non-humans actually exist in some sense. But just how is this to be 
shown? Since there is huge controversy and debate concerning the plausibility and best 
means of constructing normative arguments, the method I outline in this section cannot 
be defended in sufficient depth. In spite of this, my methodological assumptions warrant 
being made explicit and given some limited justification.
1.2.1 Analytical Philosophy
First of all then, I wish to point out that this thesis is a work of analytical philosophy. 
What this means exactly is up for debate, but I take normative analytical philosophy at 
least, to have two main features: a certain style, and a certain set of assumptions. The 
particular style of analytical philosophy is straightforward enough. Essentially it involves 
addressing complex problems by breaking them down into and analysing them in terms 
of their simpler elements. Put directly then, one might argue that the method of analysis 
is piecemeal rather than holistic. That is not to say that analytical philosophy eschews 
the study of big ideas, but simply that it will tackle those big ideas by breaking them 
down into their constituent parts and analysing them systematically.
More controversially, perhaps, I also take normative analytical philosophy to embody 
what we might refer to as certain ‘Enlightenment assumptions’:
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1. There is a reality independent of human knowledge of which we human beings 
are a part.
2. Reason and method, particularly as exemplified in science, offer us the proper 
way to explore that reality and our relationship to it.
3. In this exploration traditional preconceptions -  in particular, traditional 
evaluative preconceptions -  should be suspended and the facts allowed to 
speak for themselves.8
This emphasis on using reason to understand an objective reality can thus be contrasted 
with the anti-Enlightenment branches of philosophy, such as continental philosophy and 
postmodernism.
However, the fact that I am working within the analytical tradition should not be taken to 
mean that the question of our obligations to non-humans cannot be delineated within 
alternative approaches.9 Of course, I have a preference for the analytical style and its 
assumptions. Moreover, I am inclined to believe that these features make it a better 
means with which to conduct normative philosophy. However, there is nowhere near 
sufficient room to substantiate this preference and belief. For this reason, I simply want 
to make it explicit that this thesis is a piece of analytical philosophy.
1.2.2 Reflective Equilibrium
It will be noted of course, that analytical philosophy is a broad church. For while we 
might agree to its piecemeal style and its search for objectivity through the use of 
reason, that still leaves open several different methods for reaching our ethical 
conclusions. The one I adopt and wish to endorse is the method of ‘reflective 
equilibrium', also sometimes referred to as the ‘coherence model’, which has been 
famously outlined by John Rawls and Norman Daniels.10 The basic notion is that we 
start our enquiry with a set of moral judgements that we consider to be reliable. That is 
to say, these judgements are not unreflective intuitions, nor are they mere personal 
preferences. Rather, they are considered judgements that we feel to be reasonable and
8 Philip Pettit, “The contribution o f analytical philosophy” in Robert E. Goodin, and Philip Pettit (eds.), A 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 7.
9 For examples of work in animal ethics outside of the analytical approach, see Matthew Calarco and Peter 
Atterton (eds.), Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought, (New York: Continuum, 
2004); and Peter H. Steeves (ed.), Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life, (Albany, N Y :
State University of New York Press, 1999).
10 John Rawls, “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics”, Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No. 2, April 
1951: 177-197 and, A Theory o f  Justice, (Oxford: revised ed., Oxford University Press, 1999); and Norman 
Daniels, “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics”, The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 
76, No. 5, May 1979: 256-282.
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shorn of personal self-interest, societal convention and simple gut instinct. We then 
seek to devise a general set of principles which account for these judgements. 
However, these principles are not simply constructed in such a complex and detailed 
way so as to match each and every one of our judgements. Rather, these principles 
must display the virtues of simplicity, parsimony, generality and logical consistency. We 
then face a two-way system of revision and alteration. It is likely that some principles 
have such explanatory power that they will require the revision of certain judgements, 
and also likely that some judgements are so pressing they count against the adoption of 
certain principles. What we do then is revise upwards and downwards in this way until 
our ethical judgements and principles are in ‘reflective equilibrium’, and the theory hangs 
together as a coherent whole.
But why should this method be adopted? Again, I cannot offer a full defence here, but 
a few words in favour of the method seem to be in order. First of all, one of the merits of 
this approach is that it does not rely on controversial ‘foundational’ assumptions. That is, 
it does not take there to be some ultimate doctrine or principle from which all correct 
ethical judgements can rationally be deduced. For example, some people believe the 
Bible to be the ultimate source of morality, and that a correct reading of it will lead to the 
proper ethical judgements and principles.11 However, this kind of ethical method relies 
on an acceptance of the truth of its foundational premise. But quite clearly, such a 
premise can be contested on perfectly reasonable grounds. Secondly, reflective 
equilibrium accepts a kind of vitality in ethical enquiry. Thus, while the ultimate goal of 
the method is equilibrium, such equilibrium can easily be shaken by new information and 
fresh insights. Accordingly, its conclusions are not static norms decided finally for all 
time. Instead, they are always open to contestation and debate. I believe that these 
twin components -  what we might call reasonableness and vitality -  are key virtues in 
support of the method of reflective equilibrium.
1.2.3 Foundations, Rationalism, Impartiality and Universalism 
However, this method raises a number of questions that need to be tackled, even if only 
on a superficial level. First of all, one might consider starting with our own judgements to 
be an unsatisfactory means of intellectual enquiry. For don’t we want our conclusions to 
be based on more concrete foundations? However, while we can accept that it would be
" For a Christian approach to animal rights, see Andrew Linzey, Anim al Theology, (London: SCM Press, 
1994).
13
better to have more concrete foundations for our ethical principles, it also seems 
reasonable to point out that none have yet been proven to exist. Indeed, without such 
firm foundations, we are forced to choose between moral scepticism -  the view that 
there are no justified moral beliefs -  and starting elsewhere. I reject moral scepticism 
and propose that we should start elsewhere. Since we must start somewhere, the best 
place seems to be with those moral judgements that we consider to be reliable. So, take 
for example a key assumption in Chapter 2, that it is generally good to make lives better 
and not worse for individuals. I have no means of proving that this judgement is 
ultimately true. However, since it is a reasonable assumption that virtually everyone 
accepts, it seems like a good place to start.
But how then are we to decide which judgements to hold onto and which to revise? I 
argued above that some judgements are so pressing they count against the adoption of 
certain principles, but that some principles explain so much they count in favour of 
revising those judgements. Is there any way of avoiding arbitrariness in this process? I 
believe that providing good reasons can help us avoid arbitrariness. For example, in 
Chapter 5 I claim that we should not revise our considered judgement that human babies 
and the mentally disabled have a moral right not to be killed. However, also in Chapter 
5, I propose that we should revise our judgements, when I claim that using babies in 
experiments that do not cause pain or death can sometimes be permissible. This 
difference is not simply based on some whim of mine, but on good reasons. In these 
two cases, for example, I claim that babies have an interest in continued life, but have no 
interest in not being used in non-lethal and non-painful experiments. Providing good 
reasoned arguments like this provides the process of reflective equilibrium with as firm 
foundations as possible.
Some philosophers who study our obligations to non-humans might not be satisfied 
with this argument. They might argue that since this process of ethical reasoning starts 
with human judgements, its conclusions will always necessarily be skewed in favour of 
human beings.12 They would claim that the emphasis in this thesis of such ‘human 
capacities’ as well-being, consciousness and cognitive ability is a reflection of the bias in 
its methodological assumptions. Such a criticism is, in my opinion, wrongheaded. I start 
my ethical enquiry with human judgements and human experiences quite simply 
because I have no means of transcending my humanity. That is to say, to undertake
12 For a useful critical review o f such arguments in relation to animal ethics see, Elisa Aaltola, “'Other 
animal ethics' and the demand for difference”, Environmental Values, Vol. 11, No. 2, May 2002: 193-209.
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ethical enquiry we must begin somewhere, and that somewhere must always be with 
human beings. After all, we are the only species we know of that undertakes this kind of 
ethical project. Thus, starting with human beings and their experiences is simply 
inevitable. However, this does not mean that my theory will inevitably privilege human 
beings when working out what ought to be done. It simply means that human beings 
and human experience must be the basis from which such enquiry begins.
Having said all this, even if we accept that we should start with the moral judgements of 
human beings, what follows from these judgements might be questioned. Indeed, the 
fact that the process of reflective equilibrium demands that these judgements be stripped 
of partial attachments, and then used to construct general principles is regarded by 
some as fatally flawed. Thus, a number of feminist philosophers have argued that this 
kind of methodological approach is unjustifiably impartial and rationalist, both of which 
are distinctively masculine approaches to morality.13 In contrast, these thinkers propose 
a more feminine philosophy that is based on particular relationships and attachments, 
and also grounded in empathy and care.14
First off, it might help to shed the most controversial aspect of this critique. For while 
an ethic of care certainly provides a distinct moral approach when compared to a purely 
rationalist one, it is implausible to suppose that the former constitutes a necessarily 
feminine approach and the latter a necessarily masculine one. Having done this, we are 
then left with the proposal that we should construct our ethical theory on our feelings of 
empathy and care. Isn’t there something to be said for this? Indeed there is, and the 
process of reflective equilibrium permits this. After all, our moral judgements -  the things 
that get moral enquiry going under this method -  will inevitably be founded on our 
capacities for benevolence and empathy.15 However, what the process takes for granted 
is that these feelings are insufficient: we need more general principles to guide our 
action in particular circumstances. While I do not have the space to defend this view in 
full here, I believe that it is sound. In particular, general principles seem essential if we 
want our theory to impact on how we organise ourselves politically and legally.
13 See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1982); and Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and M oral 
Education, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986).
14 For such approaches in the context of animals, see Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams, Beyond 
Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic fo r  the Treatment o f  Animals, (New York: Continuum Press,
1996).
15 Susan Moller Okin has argued that Rawls’s general method -  and in particular his veil o f ignorance -  
models benevolence. See Susan Moller Okin, “Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice”, Ethics,
Vol. 9, No. 2, Jan. 1989: 229-249.
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Of course, this feminist challenge does not just involve questioning rationalism, but also 
impartiality. For it might well be argued that a method that aims to construct general and 
impartial ethical principles is in denial of one of the most basic facts of moral life: that 
special relationships - such as parent-child and friend-friend - do matter. However, 
reflective equilibrium can well recognise that special relationships matter. In fact, there 
may well be good impartial reasons for endorsing certain partial principles. For example, 
it might be argued that every parent, and not just me, should do the best to give their 
own child a decent start in life.16 But, of course, reflective equilibrium maintains that 
partiality cannot be the foundation of our ethical theory. For if it were, then our initial 
judgements would all differ, and we would have no hope of devising general principles 
that can apply to everyone.
This leads to the final question for my methodological approach: to what extent do its 
conclusions ‘apply to everyone’? Well, since the method is meant to devise general 
ethical principles rather than a private personal morality, we can at least accept that its 
conclusions must apply to ‘others’. But how far do these ‘others’ stretch? In particular, 
are these conclusions only applicable to the culture in which they are formed, as a 
cultural relativist would maintain, or are they universal? This question seems particularly 
pressing for an investigation of our obligations to non-human animals, which is often 
regarded as an ethical enquiry that can only be undertaken by those who can afford it. 
In other words, it is claimed by some that a concern for animals is a mark of a society 
that ignores or eschews more pressing concerns.17 I believe that the impartial approach 
of reflective equilibrium implies that some norms are universal. After all, the considered 
judgements we start with should not be the judgements of any particular society, but 
judgements that we can all reasonably accept. Given this, the principles that stem from 
them must not just apply to us, but apply to all. This is not to deny that circumstance and 
context are irrelevant; clearly they matter, and feed into the theory. Hence we see 
throughout this thesis how animal rights are grounded in some contexts, but not in 
others. Moreover, it must be remembered that the theory is always open to contestation 
and debate on the basis of new information and insight.
As for the charge that this whole project is part of a kind of moral decadence within rich 
nations, I refute it categorically. Clearly there are historical reasons for a certain issue
16 This example is borrowed from David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, p. 30.
17 Such a claim is made for example by Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. xi.
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hitting public consciousness, but such reasons do not determine the validity of the claims 
made about that issue. Thus, even if we accept the inaccurate premise that it took a 
certain standard of living for humans to become interested in the well-being of non­
humans, that does not trivialise the ethical enterprise of working out how we should treat 
those non-humans.1® Indeed, if the conclusions of this thesis are correct, what we do to 
the billions of animals who die and suffer for our own gratification must surely be one of 
the most serious moral injustices we face.
1.3 The Outline of the Thesis
Having outlined the background, the contribution and the methodological assumptions of 
the thesis, it is now necessary to sketch how it will proceed. Basically, I divide the 
enquiry in two: the theoretical and the applied. First, I evaluate the foundations of our 
moral obligations; and second, I examine the implications of these conclusions for our 
use of animals in experiments, agriculture, entertainment and culture.
I start the thesis in Chapter 2 by asking what types of entity possess moral status. An 
entity that ‘possesses moral status’ is one that merits ethical consideration in its own 
right, and thus imposes moral obligations upon others. I argue that entities whose lives 
can go well or badly for themselves possess moral status. Indeed, I claim that the 
capacity for well-being is a necessary and sufficient condition for an entity to have moral 
status.
Of course, this raises the question: what does it mean to have the capacity for well­
being? To answer this question I examine two potential candidates: being a living 
organism and being conscious. I rule out the idea that living entities such as trees and 
ecosystems can have well-being, and claim that phenomenal consciousness (or 
sentience) is the crucial capacity. By so doing I argue that most vertebrates in the 
animal kingdom have moral status and are thus owed ethical consideration for their own 
sakes.
In Chapter 3, I then ask what it means for an animal’s life to go well or badly. In so 
doing, I distinguish between persons and non-persons. The former are those beings, 
such as normal adult humans, with the capacities for moral agency and autonomy. The 
latter, such as non-human animals and human infants, are those beings without such 
capacities. This distinction is important for an account of well-being, because I argue
18 The premise can easily be shown to be inaccurate by pointing to the high levels of concern shown to 
animals by followers o f Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism in some developing countries.
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that persons have a distinct interest in leading their own freely-chosen lives, whereas 
non-persons do not. Thus, I claim that the well-being of persons is characterised by their 
capacity for autonomy, as epitomised by the capabilities approach; whereas the well­
being of non-persons is characterised by their capacity for phenomenal experience, as 
epitomised by hedonism.
In Chapter 4 , 1 then examine the form that our moral obligations to non-humans should 
take. That is to say, can these obligations be translated into non-human or animal 
rights? This section argues that they can and should, and proposes and defends a 
Razian interest-based account of rights.
In the second part of my research I put these theoretical considerations into practice. 
First, in Chapter 5 I look at the use of non-humans in experiments. Do animals have a 
right not to be used in experiments? I answer this question by considering three 
potential animal interests that might ground such a right: the interest in not suffering, the 
interest in not being killed, and the interest in being free. I argue that the first two of 
these interests ground in animals a moral right not to be made to suffer and not to be 
killed in experiments. However, because I argue that animals have no fundamental 
interest in liberty, I claim that animals have no moral right not to be used in 
experimentation.
In Chapter 6, I examine the use of animals in agriculture. In the first instance, I 
examine the implications of the conclusions reached in the previous chapter. That is to 
say, if animals possess prima facie moral rights not to be killed or made to suffer, how 
does this affect agricultural practice? I argue that it necessitates abandoning factory 
farms and the practice of raising animals to kill them. However, I also claim that it does 
not render raising animals for their eggs and milk impermissible.
I then go on in Chapter 7 to discuss the use of non-humans in entertainment. The 
conclusions of this chapter are perhaps the most different to those made by other 
proponents of animal rights. This is because here I argue that there is nothing inherently 
wrong with displaying animals in zoos and circuses, keeping them as pets, and using 
them in sport. For while these practices can be condemned when they cause animals to 
suffer and lead to the death of animals, I claim that they do not in themselves cause 
harm. To make this claim stand up to scrutiny I assess and refute several objections 
that all claim that using animals in these ways is disrespectful, and one objection that 
argues that they prevent animals from acting naturally.
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Chapter 8 discusses the issue of non-humans in culture. Here I look at the issues of 
whaling, hunting, the religious slaughter of animals for meat, and animal sacrifice. Given 
the pressing and important interest that humans have in culture and religion, are the 
prima facie animal rights not to be killed and not to suffer still grounded in these 
contexts? Through a careful analysis of the basis and strength of these interests, I 
argue that they are.
Finally, in Chapter 9, I conclude by drawing the important claims of the thesis together, 
while offering some thoughts on possible future applications of the theory. 
Unfortunately, this thesis has to be selective, as there is simply no room to discuss every 
single human use of animals. However in selecting experimentation, agriculture, 
entertainment and culture, I do believe that I discuss the uses that involve the most 
numbers of animals, and which are the most politically controversial.
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2. Well-Being and Moral Status
In order to consider the obligations that we have to non-human entities, we first need to 
establish whether we do have obligations to them, and if so, on what basis. To this end, 
this chapter introduces two important concepts: ‘moral status’ and ‘well-being’. The 
concept of moral status is quite simply, "...a means of specifying those entities towards 
which we believe ourselves to have moral obligations..."19 In other words, the ascription 
of moral status grants an entity a certain standing, imposing restrictions on our actions 
for the sake of that entity. This latter point is important because it is perfectly possible to 
have obligations regarding something, without necessarily having obligations to that 
thing. For example, imagine that I have an obligation not to kick your dog - on what 
basis might this obligation be founded? On the one hand, the obligation might be based 
on the fact that you own the dog and do not want him to be kicked. In this case, my 
obligation relates to the dog, but is ultimately owed to you; we need not consider the dog 
to have moral status of his own. Alternatively, my obligation not to kick your dog might 
persist even if you encourage me to kick him. This might be because my obligation is 
based on the fact that kicking the dog will cause him pain. Here, my obligation is owed 
to the dog himself, and so the dog is considered to have moral status. Moral status then, 
is a means of delineating the entities to which we have moral obligations.
One important contention of this chapter is that in order to have moral status, an entity 
must have the capacity for ‘well-being’; in other words, it must have a life that can go well 
or badly for itself. The second claim of the chapter is that ‘phenomenal consciousness’ 
(or sentience) is the necessary and sufficient condition for the capacity for well-being. 
Taken together, these claims entail that we have moral obligations to sentient animals, 
but do not have moral obligations to such things as plants, trees and ecosystems. In 
effect then, this chapter defends a scheme of moral status that is centred on sentient 
animals. This separates it from two predominant rival schemes: one in which only 
human beings have moral status, and the other in which all living organisms have moral 
status. It thus stands between traditional ‘anthropocentric’ ethics that have dominated 
Western morality for so many years, and the many ‘biocentric’ ethics that have emerged 
in recent years claiming to overturn this entrenched human bias.
19 Mary Anne Warren, M oral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 9.
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In the course of justifying the claims of this chapter, four broad questions are addressed 
in turn. First, what is well-being, and how does it relate to other common ethical 
concepts that will be used in the thesis? Second, why is well-being so important for the 
ascription of moral status? Third, what characteristics must an entity possess to have a 
life that can go well or badly for itself? And finally, what types of entity actually have 
moral status? In the first place then, we must examine more closely the concept of well­
being.
2.1 The Meaning of Well-Being
In philosophy, well-being is the notion of how well someone’s life is going for an 
individual.20 Thus, we can say that if an individual has well-being then her life is going 
well for her; and if someone lacks well-being then her life is going badly for her. I regard 
an individual’s well-being as synonymous with an individual’s ‘good’ or ‘welfare’, and 
either of these terms could be substituted for well-being throughout the thesis. I tend to 
stick with the term ‘well-being’ out of personal preference and for consistency. In this 
section I explain that well-being is what is called a ‘prudential value’ in that it concerns 
how well life is going for the individual whose life it is. I then go on to demonstrate how 
other moral concepts that are frequently invoked in discussions of our moral obligations 
-  the terms ‘interests’ and ‘harm’ -  are best understood when related to the wider 
concept of well-being.
2.1.1 The Prudential Value of Well-Being
It is crucial to note at the outset that well-being is what is often called a prudential 
value.2' That is to say, well-being relates to how well life is going for the individual 
whose life it is. Prudential values can thus be distinguished from aesthetic, perfectionist 
and ethical values 22 For example, it might be said that something is beautiful (of 
aesthetic value), a good specimen of its kind (of perfectionist value), or even the right 
thing to do (of ethical value), but in making such judgments we need make no reference 
to how things are for the objects or acts themselves. Well-being, on the other hand, is a 
prudential value because something can only promote an entity’s well-being if it is
20 See Roger Crisp, “Well-Being” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy, 
(Summer 2003 Edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/well-being>.
See ibid.; L.W . Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 20; and 
Thomas Scanlon, “Value, Desire and Quality o f Life” in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds.), The 
Quality o f  Life, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 185.
"" L.W . Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, pp. 20-25.
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beneficial for that entity itself. Put another way, I may pursue a life that is devoted to 
looking beautiful, being a perfect example of a member of the species Homo sapiens, or 
doing the morally upstanding thing in every situation, but it is an open question whether 
any of these lives are valuable for me. For while these lives may be of some value, it not 
evident that they are of prudential value. Well-being is a prudential value and concerns 
how well a life is going for the possessor of that life. This is important to bear in mind for 
the subsequent discussion of what types of entity have well-being, as well the later 
examination in Chapter 3 of what makes an individual’s life go well.
I should of course point out that none of this assumes that well-being can only ever be 
assessed by the individual herself, or that the individual is always right in such 
assessments. Indeed, it is perfectly possible for an objective account of well-being to 
recognise that well-being is a prudential value, but maintain that it is best measured in 
relation to certain definitive goods. For example, it could be claimed that individuals in 
extreme poverty can be duped into thinking that their lives are going well, when not even 
their basic needs are being met. Here, it might be argued, is a case where an 
assessment of well-being can be made in relation to objective criteria such as need- 
satisfaction, but that is nevertheless concerned with how life is going for the individuals 
themselves.
2.1.2 Interests
The concept of ‘interests’ is often deemed crucial for ethics. Indeed, it is widely claimed 
that in order to identify our moral obligations it is necessary to consider whether an entity 
has interests and what those interests are. For these reasons, accounts of what it 
means to have an interest are hotly contested.23 In this brief section, however, I wish to 
propose that interests are best and most simply understood as components of well­
being.
23 For examples see, Brian Barry, “The Public Interest” in Anthony Quinton (ed.), Political Philosophy, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); Brian Barry, Political Argument, (London: revised ed., Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 175-186; William E. Connolly, The Terms o f  Political Discourse, (Oxford: 2nd ed., 
Martin Robertson, 1983), pp. 46-69; Andrew Reeve and Alan Ware, “Interests in Political Theory”, British 
Journal o f  Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 4, Oct. 1983: 379-400; Christine Swanton, “The Concept of 
Interests”, Political Theory, Vol. 8, No. 1, Feb. 1980: 83-101; and Grenville Wall, “The Concept of Interest 
in Politics”, Politics and Society, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1975: 487-510.
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Joel Feinberg has argued that to have an interest in x is to have some kind of stake in 
x; and to have a stake in x is to stand to gain or lose depending on the condition of x.24 
Of course, this raises the question, what does to gain or lose mean? For Feinberg, it 
means that one’s well-being is affected by x’s condition. That is to say, an individual’s 
life goes better or worse as a result of the state of x. As Feinberg himself puts it:
These interests...are distinguishable components of a person’s well-being: he 
flourishes or languishes as they flourish or languish. What promotes them is to his 
advantage or in his interest, what thwarts them is to his detriment or against his 
interest.25
An individual has an interest in something when that something will or would affect that 
individual’s well-being.
The fundamental issue then, is not the nature of interests, but the broader question of 
the nature of well-being. This question is tackled in the next chapter. The main thing to 
be taken from this briefest of discussions of interests is that they are components of well­
being.
2.1.3 Harm
Harm is another concept that is often brought out during discussions of lives going well 
and moral obligations generally. Again, I argue that the best understanding of harm is 
achieved when it is related to well-being. Here once more we can turn to Feinberg who 
defines harm as, “...the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest.”26 Since 
interests are components of the broader state of well-being, harm might thus be 
considered to be correctly understood as a setback or decrease in well-being. However, 
there are problems with simply defining harm as a decrease in well-being. Indeed, we 
can imagine examples where such a definition is counter-intuitive. For example, 
Stephen Wilkinson offers the hypothetical situation of a patient who visits a 
psychotherapist who sexually exploits her.27 It is possible that after sessions with the 
psychotherapist the patient actually ends up with higher overall levels of well-being than 
before. That is to say, despite her exploitation, treatment is given and the patient’s life 
goes better than it would have done without the treatment. Now if we accept the
24 Joel Feinberg, The M oral Limits o f  the Criminal Law: Vol 1 Harm to Others, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), p. 33-34.
25 Ibid., p. 34.
26 Ibid., p. 33.
27 Stephen Wilkinson, Bodies fo r  Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the Human Body Trade, (London: 
Routledge, 2003), p. 60.
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proposal that harm is a decrease in well-being, we would have to conclude that in this 
situation the psychotherapist has not harmed the patient. Such a conclusion seems 
manifestly wrong. What is therefore needed is a more complex conception of harm that 
does not always equate the term simply with a decrease in well-being. For instance, we 
might say that the psychotherapist has harmed the patient because she now possesses 
less well-being than she would have had without the sexual exploitation, or simply 
because she has less well-being than she ought to have. Wilkinson calls these the 
‘closest possible world' and ‘normative’ comparisons.28 Clearly, it sometimes makes 
sense to use these more complex comparisons when ascertaining if harm has been 
caused. However, it is also clear that it remains the concept of well-being that plays the 
crucial role when making such assessments. In fact, we might say that to harm 
someone is to make their life go worse: either worse than it was or worse than it should 
be.
2.2 Well-Being and Our Moral Obligations
We have seen that to have well-being is to have a life that can go well or badly for 
oneself. Moreover, if one has the capacity for well-being, one can be benefited and 
harmed, and one has interests which can be set back or promoted. We can already start 
to see then, how well-being plays an important role in working out our moral obligations. 
After all, making lives better, or at least not making lives worse, seems to accord with 
what many of us think morality is all about. At first sight then, well-being certainly seems 
crucial for delineating our moral obligations. However, is the capacity for well-being so 
important for the possession of moral status? For don’t we have moral obligations to 
things without the capacity for well-being, such as sacred objects or works of art? 
Alternatively, is something more than well-being required in order to possess moral 
status, like the ability to act morally oneself? This section addresses each of these 
questions in turn, and claims that the capacity for well-being is the necessary and 
sufficient condition for moral status.
2.2.1 Is Well-Being Necessary to Have Moral Status?
Later in the chapter we will examine in detail what types of thing have the capacity for 
well-being. However, even at this stage we can be relatively confident that some entities 
do not have lives that can go well or badly for themselves. For example, cars, sacred
28 Ibid., pp. 61-63.
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objects, works of art and the dead all lack lives, let alone ones which can go better or 
worse for themselves. Do we have moral obligations to any of these entities?
Let us start with the example of a car. It is generally accepted that no real cars have 
lives that can go well or badly for themselves. Does it therefore follow that we do not 
have moral obligations to any car? For example, would it be legitimate for me to smash 
the windows of the car that is currently sitting outside my flat? It is fairly obvious that I 
have an obligation not to smash up the car outside. However, this obligation is not due 
to the car itself, but to the car’s owner. So, if the car’s owner came to me and asked me 
to smash it up -  say because he wants to turn it into scrap metal -  it would no longer be 
wrong for me to do so, all things considered. My obligations regarding the car are really 
owed to the car’s owner. So cars seem to be a relatively straightforward case of entities 
without the capacity for well-being and without moral status. But what of other entities?
Without doubt, things become more difficult when we consider such entities as sacred 
objects and works of art. For surely we have an obligation not to destroy such things, 
irrespective of whether they are the property of anyone. Indeed we do, but upon 
reflection we see that this obligation is based on the attitudes of other persons, not on 
the nature of the entities themselves. For example, some people believe that we have 
moral obligations to Uluru, the rock formation sacred to the aboriginal people of 
Australia. Taking a pickaxe to Uluru in order to obtain a chunk as a souvenir is regarded 
by some as a violation of our obligations to the rock itself.29 However, while we can 
acknowledge that taking a pickaxe to Uluru is wrong, it would be incorrect to award the 
rock moral status. For to have moral status is to be ethically considerable in one's own 
right, but Uluru is considerable only because it is considered sacred by certain 
individuals. It is the aboriginal people’s attitudes and beliefs that make the rock special, 
and without them it is simply a rock. And as with cars, I see no reason why we have 
moral obligations to rocks.
The same is true of beautiful works of art. I certainly have an obligation not to deface 
the Mona Lisa, even if its owner asks me to. However, this obligation is owed to people 
who wish to enjoy looking at it. I have no obligation to the painting itself. Indeed, if the 
last human being on Earth had a particularly strong disliking for the Mona Lisa - and we 
could be sure that she was the last human - it seems unclear to me why she would have 
an obligation not to deface the painting. So while we can acknowledge that we have
29 Mary Anne Warren argues that sacred rocks such as Uluru have moral status. See Mary Anne Warren, 
M oral Status, pp. 170-172.
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extensive obligations regarding sacred objects and beautiful pieces of art, these are 
founded on the obligations we have to other humans.
Another group of entities who seem to lack lives that can go well or badly for 
themselves is the dead. However, some people believe that we have moral obligations 
to the dead. In fact, the belief that the dead have moral status is prevalent in the 
practices and customs of many societies. For example, when we act according to the 
wishes of a deceased individual, say with regard to the division of an estate or the 
disposal of a body, we often feel that this is because we have an obligation to that dead 
individual. However, I want to deny this claim. Just as with sacred objects and works of 
art, I wish to argue that while our obligations regarding the dead might be demanding, 
they are actually founded on obligations owed to the living. Take for example the case 
of honouring wills. There seems to be two ways in which this obligation is based on the 
interests of the living: first of all, we enjoy life more if we know that our wishes will be 
carried out after our death; and secondly, family and friends are ordinarily happier if the 
deceased individual’s will is honoured. Interestingly, because the obligation is founded 
on the interests of the living, this explains why sometimes we are under an obligation not 
to honour a will. This is reflected in UK law where if an individual feels that the deceased 
has not made suitable provisions for him, a will can be contested. Dead individuals 
should of course be considered in our ethical deliberations, but this is based on and 
tempered by our obligations owed to the living.
As a final point on the dead, consider once again the scenario mentioned above 
involving the last ever human and the Mona Lisa. While this last human has a strong 
disliking for the painting, it is clear that many deceased individuals’ greatly admired it, 
and enjoyed looking at it. Do these considerations place this last human under an 
obligation not to deface the painting? I simply cannot see how, for sadly, the dead will 
never be able to enjoy looking at the Mona Lisa ever again. The dead do not have lives 
that can be affected by what happens to the painting. As with cars, rocks and paintings, 
dead bodies seem to lack the crucial ingredients for the ascription of moral status.
To sum up, in order to ascertain whether or not something has moral status, it is 
necessary to ask whether states of affairs can make its life better or worse. If an entity 
has no capacity for its life to go better or worse for it, then it is not ethically considerable 
in its own right. Of course, such entities are things that we might have obligations 
regarding, but not directly to. Put in the terms of other common moral concepts, such 
entities have no interests and cannot be benefited or harmed. For an entity to have
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moral status then, it is necessary for an entity to have the capacity for its life to go better 
or worse for itself.
2.2.2 Is Well-Being Sufficient to Have Moral Status?
I have argued that possessing the capacity for well-being is necessary to have moral 
status. However, this does not mean that all such individuals actually possess moral 
status. Well-being might be necessary for the possession of moral status, but it might 
also be insufficient. That is to say, some other characteristic might be required in order 
to qualify for moral status. So what might this further characteristic be? In this section I 
briefly examine the claims that being human and being a person are further necessary 
characteristics for the possession of moral status.
Some philosophers have claimed that in order to have moral status one must be a 
member of the species Homo sapiens. Now it could be claimed that being human is 
itself ethically significant because human beings, unlike other species, are made in the 
image of God. However, even if we accept for the sake of argument that God has 
indeed made humans in His or Her image, and that humans are in this sense special, it 
does not follow that we have no direct obligations to non-humans. Indeed, our spark of 
Godliness may mean that we should extend our moral duties to all of God’s creatures.30
Furthermore, it is extremely hard to see why being human is in itself ethically 
significant. After all, whether we have obligations to something surely depends on that 
entity’s characteristics rather than its membership of a particular species. For example, 
if an alien arrived on Earth that was like a human being in every respect except that it 
belonged to a different species, it would be odd to deny that alien moral status. This 
highlights the fact that characteristics are what are important in ascribing moral status, 
not membership of the species Homo sapiens.
However, a better argument might claim that humans alone have moral status in virtue 
of the particular characteristics that humans possess. Many such claims have been 
made and most refer to the fact that only humans are ‘persons’. By persons, it is usually 
meant that humans alone have the capacities for moral agency and autonomy: moral 
agency is the ability to reason and act upon moral principles, while autonomy is the 
ability to frame, revise and pursue a conception of the good life. Now some philosophers 
argue that to be part of the moral community, one needs to be able to understand and
30 Once again, for a Christian foundation to our obligations to non-humans, see Andrew Linzey, Animal 
Theology.
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act upon moral rules.31 Such a claim would exclude non-persons such as animals from 
having moral status, because they cannot understand or act according to such rules. 
Unfortunately though, this argument conflates what it means to have an obligation with 
what it means to be the recipient of an obligation. Clearly, to have the obligation not to 
torture, one must be able to understand what torture is and be able to understand why it 
is wrong. However, to be the recipient of the obligation not to torture all one needs is the 
ability to feel pain.32 For the wrongness of torture surely lies in the gross infliction of 
pain, not in the ability to understand why torture is wrong.
Immanuel Kant also claimed that it is necessary to be a person to have moral status, 
because he regarded it as necessary to possess a sense of justice and the capacity for 
autonomy to be part of the moral community. Kant argued that rational beings like 
humans are ends-in-themselves: individuals who can exercise moral judgement and free 
will, and who are not bound by instinct and emotion. Because rational beings are ends- 
in-themselves, Kant claimed that they have dignity. However, things that are non- 
rational are unable to choose, and are instead driven by instinct alone. Non-rational 
entities thus have no end-in-themselves and are mere ‘things’ to which no obligations 
are owed:
If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he does 
not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is inhuman and
33damages in himself that humanity which it his duty to show towards mankind.
Kant thus believed that while there are some ethical limitations upon our treatment of 
non-persons, these limitations are not derived from the moral status of non-persons, but 
from our duties to humanity. In effect, we should avoid cruelty to non-persons because it 
might make us cruel to mankind.
However, I believe we can criticise Kant’s argument in two ways. First, it is not at all 
clear that being cruel to non-persons necessarily leads to being cruel to persons. 
Second, if only autonomous moral agents are to have moral status, then many humans 
must be excluded from the moral community. For example, given this definition of 
personhood, young infants and severely mentally disabled individuals are non-persons. 
However, if I were to torture an infant or a mentally disabled individual, then I would be 
doing more than just failing in some duty to mankind. Indeed, if that individual could
31 For example see Carl Cohen, “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research”, The New  
England Journal o f  Medicine, 315, No.14, (October 2, 1986): 865-870, p. 866; and Michael Fox, “Animal 
Liberation: a Critique”, Ethics, Vol. 88, No. 2, January 1978: 106-118, p. 112.
32 This point is also made by James Rachels, Created from  Animals, p. 191.
33 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans., Louis Infield, (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 239.
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experience pain, as most babies and mentally disabled individuals can, it seems obvious 
that I would be neglecting a duty to that individual him or herself. An entity’s capacity to 
invoke obligations seems to be independent of its ability to exercise moral agency or 
autonomous choice. That is to say, it seems to make sense that one can have moral 
status without being a person.
Carl Cohen and Michael Fox have accepted the claim that some non-persons have 
moral status. However, they claim that only human non-persons have moral status. 
They argue that it is unimportant that particular humans lack the usual necessary 
characteristics for inclusion in the moral community because, “the issue is one of kind”34, 
and that what is important,"... are the characteristics that a certain class of beings share 
in general, even if not universally.”35
For Fox and Cohen then, human non-persons possess moral status because they 
belong to a group whose members ordinarily possess the characteristics required for 
inclusion. Non-human animals are excluded, on the other hand, because they belong to 
a group whose members generally lack such capacities. However, Nathan Nobis has 
pointed out that even if we accept that we should base an individual’s moral status on 
the characteristics of the group to which it belongs (which is extremely dubious), many 
animal non-persons still warrant entry into the moral community. After all, many animal 
non-persons belong to groups that human persons belong to. For example, both are 
living organisms, both are sentient, both have the capacity for well-being, both possess 
interests and so on. Since such animal non-persons belong to these groups whose 
members have the capacities required for moral status, it remains unclear why animals 
must be excluded from the moral community even on Fox’s and Cohen’s terms.36
More importantly, however, instead of an individual’s kind, I wish to maintain that it is 
the individual’s own characteristics that are crucial in the determination of moral status. 
Indeed, the characteristic that is of ultimate importance in assessing whether an entity is 
ethically considerable is whether it has a life that can go well or badly for itself. The 
crucial questions do not concern whether an entity is a member of the species Homo 
sapiens, nor whether an entity hold the capacities for autonomy and moral agency. 
Rather, we must ask, does the entity have a life that can go better or worse for itself? If 
it does, then it seems perfectly reasonable to suggest that we should limit and adjust our
34 Carl Cohen, “The Case for the Use o f Animals in Biomedical Research”, p. 866.
35 Michael Fox, “Animal Liberation: a Critique”, p. 110.
36 Nathan Nobis, “Carl Cohen’s ‘Kind’ Arguments For Animal Rights and Against Human Rights”, Journal 
o f  Applied Philosophy, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2004: 43-59, pp. 50-51.
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actions for the sake of that entity. In other words, we have moral obligations to that 
thing.
2.3 Life, Consciousness and Well-Being
Thus far I have argued that we have obligations to entities whose lives can go better or 
worse for themselves. But what types of entity are these? Do all living organisms have 
such lives, or only those with the capacity for conscious experience? In this section I set 
out to answer these questions. The section is divided into four: the first two sections ask 
whether life is necessary or sufficient for well-being; and the final two sections ask 
whether consciousness is necessary or sufficient for well-being. In this discussion I 
dismiss the notion that ‘being alive’ is the relevant criterion for determining whether an 
entity has a life that can go well or badly for itself. This is simply because for an entity to 
have a life that can go well or badly for itself, I claim that it must have some point of view 
with which to experience the world. Thus, I argue that this capacity for experience, what 
I call ‘phenomenal consciousness’, is the necessary and sufficient condition for well­
being. Initially then, let us consider the question of ‘life’.
2.3.1 Is Life Necessary for Well-Being?
In the first instance it is necessary to very briefly examine what life actually means. This 
is an incredibly difficult task, with many biologists and philosophers over the centuries 
having contested what being alive necessitates. In spite of these problems I wish to 
outline broadly what is meant when we say that something is living. I suggest that living 
organisms possess each of four particular characteristics. First, all living things have 
cellular organisation, and are composed of one or more cells. Second, all organisms 
have a metabolism, being able to assimilate energy and use it to grow. Third, all living 
things reproduce, passing on traits from one generation to the next. And finally, and 
related to reproduction, all organisms have a genetic structure, based on their 
possession of DNA?7 This list may not be definitive, or uncontroversial, but it will do as 
a working definition. It includes as living such entities as animals, plants and bacteria, 
while excluding viruses, robots, computer programmes and inanimate entities such as 
rocks. Such a definition is therefore in keeping with our own common sense ideas 
regarding what kinds of things living organisms are, along with much of the thinking of
371 have taken these characteristics o f life from Peter H. Raven and George B. Johnson, Biology, (London: 
4th ed., W CB Publishers, 1996), p.73.
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the scientific community. But if this, tentatively, is what life is, is it necessary to have 
well-being?
At first sight, it seems fairly obvious that being alive must be necessary to have well­
being. After all, I have defined well-being as a life that can go well or badly for an 
individual. Given this, it would appear nonsensical to ascribe the capacity for well-being 
to non-living objects such as rocks; for rocks simply have no life that can go well or badly 
for themselves. However, when one considers things that are not living organisms, but 
which might be said to possess ‘artificial lives’, things become more complicated. For 
example, consider the case of robots. A robot will not ordinarily meet the definition of life 
that I have given: they are not cellular, metabolic, reproductive or in possession of 
DNA.38 However, imagine if one day a robot could be built that falls outside of this 
biological definition of life, but which is so sophisticated that it can think, feel, understand 
and even care about its function. Would this robot have well-being? It seems to me that 
it would: it may not have a biological life that can go well or badly for itself, but it would 
certainly appear to have an artificial life that can go well or badly for itself.
Of course, many have argued that a 'thinking' robot such as this is an impossibility. 
This is because no matter how advanced the computer programme within the robot, it 
could never enable the robot to understand what it is doing. It may answer questions, 
solve problems and choose between alternatives, but it could never understand what it is 
doing. In John Searle's terms, a robot may have a grasp of syntax, but can never have a 
grasp of semantics,39 However, while I disagree with Searle, the question of the 
possibility of this thinking robot is not the issue at hand. What we are concerned with is 
whether this hypothetical robot would have well-being. And one objection to the idea 
that it would might claim that the interests of this potential robot would not be its own, but 
the interests of whoever created the computer programme that runs it. The robot's well­
being, it might be claimed, is defined by an outside party and thus really belongs to that 
outside party. However, I do not find this argument convincing. For surely my interests 
as a human being are shaped by the genes handed down to me by my parents and the 
environment in which I have grown up and exist within. Nevertheless, they are still my
38 Clearly, my definition of life is very much biological. Other non-biological definitions could o f course 
be offered. Indeed, some scientists working with robots describe their field as 'Artificial Life1, and have 
even created artefacts which they claim to be 'living'. See Christopher G. Langton, "Artificial Life", and 
Michael Wheeler, "From Robots to Rothko: the Bringing Forth of Worlds", in Margaret A . Boden (ed.),
The Philosophy o f  Artificial Life, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
39 For a full discussion of Searle's argument, see Jack Copeland, Artificial Intelligence: a Philosophical 
Introduction, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 122-132.
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interests. It does make sense then, to say that a sufficiently complex and thinking robot 
will have its own interests, irrespective of who programmed it. For example, consider a 
robot with the capacity to feel and think in the pursuit of its function. Surely torturing or 
tormenting that robot, would harm that robot itself, irrespective of the effects on the 
individual who created it. Accordingly, pending evidence to the contrary, there seems to 
be no good reason to deny that a hypothetical, non-living, thinking robot could have a life 
that can go well or badly for itself. In other words, biological life is not strictly necessary 
for the capacity for well-being.
2.3.2 Is Life Sufficient for Well-Being?
So, I have claimed that entities other than living organisms can have well-being. 
However, that still leaves the question of whether the capacity for well-being is present in 
all living things. Paul W. Taylor and Robin Attfield have both proposed that all living 
things have well-being, or what they call, a ‘good of their own’. Taylor explains that: “We 
can think of the good of an individual non-human organism as consisting in the full 
development of its biological powers.”40 Trees, plants and simple animal life may not be 
aware of their interests, but this does not matter for Taylor. What is important is that 
scientific study has allowed humans to objectively talk about what living entities need in 
order to achieve their ends - what is of advantage to them, and what disadvantages 
them.41 So according to Taylor, achieving their biological ends is to be equated with 
organisms’ well-being, meaning that all entities with biological ends must have well­
being.
A thought-experiment proposed by Robin Attfield is intended to lend weight to the idea 
that all living things have well-being. In his article, “The Good of Trees”, Attfield asks us 
to imagine a situation - for example, following a nuclear holocaust - in which there 
remains one last human (who is aware of her imminent death) and one last tree. For the 
sake of the argument, let us also assume that all the animals who depend on the tree 
have been extinguished. If the human were to chop down the tree, would she be doing 
anything wrong?42 Attfield believes that the reason that many of us are uncomfortable 
with the idea of the last tree being chopped down is because trees have a good of their
40 Paul W . Taylor, "The Ethics o f Respect for Nature" in Michael Zimmerman et al. (ed.), Environmental 
Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, (London: 2nd ed., Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 72.
41 Paul W . Taylor, Respect fo r  Nature: A Theory o f  Environmental Ethics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), pp. 60-63.
42 Robin Attfield, "The Good o f Trees", Journal o f  Value Inquiry, Vol. 15,No. 1, 1981:35-54.
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own based on their flourishing and reaching of ends. Attfield’s argument is thus very 
similar to Taylor’s: all living organisms have a life that can go well or badly, because they 
all have biological ends towards which they are striving.
Interestingly, this focus on biological functioning has also been used by other thinkers 
to say that ‘holistic’ living entities such as species and ecosystems have well-being. For 
example, Lawrence E. Johnson writes: “A species has an interest in continuing in 
equilibrium with its environment, in fulfilling its nature as a species, and in fulfilling its 
nature in its individual species members.”43 Thus for Johnson, the well-being of species 
is based on the “integrated functioning of their life processes”.44
However, I wish to claim that Johnson, Attfield and Taylor all mistakenly conflate an 
entity’s biological functioning with its own good or well-being, when in actual fact, the two 
should be kept distinct. You will remember that at the beginning of the chapter I argued 
that well-being is a prudential value, concerned with how life goes for the individual 
whose life it is. Prudential value is to be contrasted with perfectionist value, which can 
be defined as that which is good for an entity’s kind. Clearly, in discussing what makes 
living organisms and species flourish in terms of their biological ends, Johnson, Attfield 
and Taylor are referring to an entity’s perfectionist value. For example, a tree does well 
by being able to grow unimpeded, bear fruit, shed its leaves and so on. These events all 
equate to a healthy tree doing well in terms of its biological function. However, while all 
these activities might be of perfectionist value, they cannot be said to be of prudential 
value: they do not make life go well for the tree itself.45 Quite simply, this is because a 
tree has no point of view, no mental states, and no cognitive life to experience the 
benefit of such actions. Without doubt, trees can flourish and be good examples of their 
kind, but they cannot have lives that can go well for themselves. In light of this, and 
contrary to these environmental ethicists, not all living organisms have the capacity for 
well-being.
2.3.3 Is Consciousness Necessary for Well-Being?
In the previous section I pointed out that many living organisms, like trees, cannot have 
lives that go well or badly for themselves, because they do not have their own point of 
view. Clearly, this implies that to have well-being, a level of consciousness is necessary.
43 Lawrence E. Johnson, A M orally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental 
Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 178.
44 Ibid., p. 142.
45 This same argument is found in L.W . Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, p. 78.
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However, accounts of what consciousness actually is and where it can be found differ 
greatly. Consciousness is not a single fixed concept; rather, there are various levels of 
conscious state that manifest themselves differently across and within species. The 
following two sections distinguish four different levels of consciousness that are often 
conflated: phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, higher-order thought 
consciousness and self-consciousness. In these sections, I argue that the capacity for 
phenomenal consciousness is both necessary and sufficient for an entity to have well­
being.
Phenomenal consciousness in the way I am using it refers to the qualitative, subjective, 
experiential or phenomenological aspects of conscious experience.46 In other words, to 
be phenomenally conscious is to be able to feel and to experience the world. 
Furthermore, phenomenal consciousness is synonymous with sentience, the ability to 
have sensations, and thus has a strong relationship with the ability to feel pain and 
pleasure. Indeed, by definition things that feel pain must be phenomenally conscious. 
From what I have argued so far in this thesis, it certainly appears that phenomenal 
consciousness is necessary to have a life that can go well or badly. After all, this ability 
to experience the world gives an entity its own point of view, thus making it possible for 
that entity to have a life that goes well or badly for itself.
However, the necessity of phenomenal consciousness for well-being might be 
questioned. For example, sleeping and comatose individuals do not experience the 
world, but it seems sensible to say that they nevertheless possess lives that can go well 
or badly for themselves. This, I believe, is because most such individuals still have the 
capacity for phenomenal consciousness; the experiences themselves are just 
temporarily switched off. Because of the presence of this capacity then, and the 
likelihood that phenomenal consciousness will return, it still makes sense to say that 
sleeping individuals and individuals in temporary comas have lives that can go well or 
badly for themselves. For example, if we neglect someone in a temporary coma, 
allowing her to become infected, we make her life worse. She may not feel the harm, 
but what is important is that she has the capacity to feel it, and may come to feel it in the 
future. Similarly, if I am robbed while asleep, I am not aware of being robbed, but
46 Colin Allen, “Animal Consciousness” in Edward N . Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  
Philosophy, (Summer 2003 Edition),
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/summer2003/entries/consciousness-animal/>.
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because I have the capacity for such awareness I can quite legitimately be said to be 
harmed.
This claim of course leaves the question of those in permanent comas, or who are 
permanently asleep. In effect here, we are talking about individuals who have suffered 
cortical death. Can’t we make things better or worse for the dead? In the previous 
section of the chapter, I assumed not -  but perhaps I was too hasty. Joel Feinberg, for 
one, has argued that interests can survive death, and uses an interesting thought 
experiment to argue that even if a harm is not felt, it may nevertheless exist. He asks us 
to imagine that someone in a far-off place spreads lies and rumours about you without 
your knowledge, the result being that you are the object of ridicule within that place. 
Although you do not feel or experience these harms, Feinberg argues that you have 
nevertheless been injured. Similarly, he argues that although a dead individual can feel 
nothing, that same individual can still be harmed. Some interests, so the argument 
goes, like the interest in not having lies told about you, survive death.47
While this argument has some appeal, I am not convinced by it. Feinberg’s thought 
experiment trades heavily on the feeling so many of us have that telling lies about 
people -  even when they are dead or live in far-off places -  is wrong. However, we can 
concede that it is wrong to spread malicious lies about people, and yet maintain that lies 
do not always make life worse for the individuals we tell lies about. For example, aside 
from its effects on the object of our lies, telling such lies might also be wrong because it 
reveals a bad character, because it upsets the friends and family of the object of our lies, 
or even because it simply spreads untruths. Given this, we can legitimately claim that 
telling lies about the dead is wrong, while also accepting that doing so does not make 
their lives worse. And, since the dead have no lives, I simply cannot see how spreading 
lies about them can make their lives worse. Without doubt, we might be able to tarnish a 
dead person’s reputation or damage his legacy, but that is quite different to worsening 
how life goes for the individual whose life its is. This, quite obviously, is because there is 
no such life to be affected. Given this, we cannot say that the dead have the capacity for 
well-being; the capacity for phenomenal consciousness still seems to be necessary.
However, before finally accepting that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is 
necessary for well-being, we must consider whether entities with lower levels of 
consciousness can have lives that can go well or badly. Indeed, there is a class of 
conscious state ‘below’ the level of phenomenal consciousness that we might call
47 Joel Feinberg, "The Rights o f Animals and Unborn Generations", p. 59.
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‘access consciousness’?48 If an entity is access conscious I mean that it can absorb and 
process information via its senses, but those states feel like nothing for that entity. 
Clearly, from a human perspective it is difficult to imagine what it might be like to be 
access conscious and no more. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that 
some entities are able to access the world and even react to it, without being able to feel 
or experience anything of it in a qualitative sense. For example, consider the case of 
zombies in horror films. Zombies seem to be access conscious because they are able to 
appreciate and react to facts and events in their environment. Indeed, the main purpose 
of zombies in such movies is to attack human beings, and in order to attack these 
human beings the zombies’ senses must be switched on to their presence and 
information processed through some rudimentary cognitive ability. Importantly, if the 
zombies were not access conscious, then why would they attack? However, when 
zombies attack, the characters in the film usually fight back. This often involves (keeping 
the levels of blood and gore high) knives, axes, guns and so on. What is distinctive 
about zombies is that they do not react to these blows. In fact, zombies can be stabbed, 
shot and have their limbs hacked off, but they do not flinch, and instead continue 
relentlessly in their attacks. All of this suggests that zombies possess access 
consciousness, but lack phenomenal consciousness.
I want to argue that zombies also lack well-being. Since zombies lack the capacity for 
qualitative experience, they are much like trees, plants and the dead, in that they have 
no point of view that is their own. Thus, while we might say that a zombie with all its 
limbs and a good range of helpless victims in its environment has a life that is going well, 
it is only going well in a perfectionist sense. That is to say, the zombie is doing well in 
terms of the type of entity that it is, but it is not leading a life that is going well for itself. 
Because access conscious entities like zombies lack the capacity to feel events, they 
lack the ability to have a life that can go well or badly for themselves.
2.3.4 Is Consciousness Sufficient for Well-Being?
While the capacity for phenomenal consciousness might be necessary for well-being, 
perhaps it is insufficient. In particular, perhaps a level of consciousness higher than 
mere experience and feeling is necessary to have a life that can go well or badly for 
oneself. Indeed, this argument is put forward by Peter Carruthers. For Carruthers, it is
481 have borrowed the concept of access consciousness from Ned Block, “Consciousness” in Samuel 
Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy o f  Mind, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1994), p. 214.
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impossible to have real phenomenal consciousness without possessing ‘higher-order 
thought consciousness’. ‘Higher-order thought consciousness’ is a type of conscious 
state that exists when an entity is able to reflect on its thoughts and consciousness. In 
this sense, it is something more than mere phenomenal consciousness, because it 
necessitates evaluating and ruminating on experiences and feelings. Carruthers argues 
that it is wrong to conflate (as I have) the question of whether a thing has experiences 
with the issue of whether there is something that it feels like to be that thing.49 Instead, 
Carruthers argues that an entity only feels like something when its experiences are 
available to conscious thought.50
To support his point, Carruthers offers the example of absent-minded driving. When 
driving absent-mindedly the driver may be able to perform quite complex and demanding 
manoeuvres. However, when asked to describe or recount the journey, the driver will 
not be able to recall anything. This, for Carruthers, is a clear example of a non- 
conscious experience. Importantly, the account of phenomenal consciousness that I 
have given in this chapter cannot explain why absent-minded driving is non-conscious. 
In fact, since there must be something experienced by the driver, my account suggests 
that this situation is an example of a conscious state. Carruthers’s account, on the other 
hand, can explain why absent-minded driving is non-conscious. It is non-conscious 
because the driving experiences are not available to the driver’s higher thought.
Of course at this stage it can be asked why any of this matters for the ascription of well­
being. Carruthers provides the beginnings of an answer to this when he asks: what 
does it feel like to be the subject of a non-conscious experience, such as absent-minded 
driving? The answer is, ‘nothing’.51 So while entities may have experiences, unless 
these experiences are available to higher-order thought processes, they feel like 
nothing. And if experiences are not felt, they cannot affect how life goes for an 
individual. Thus, Carruthers would claim that entities that are only phenomenally 
conscious cannot have lives that can go well or badly for themselves.
I believe that Carruthers’s account of non-conscious states is highly questionable. 
First, it is not clear that a state is non-conscious if one does not have thoughts about it. 
For example, is Carruthers’s absent-minded driver a true example of a non-conscious
49 Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue, p. 171.
50 Ibid., pp. 181-182.
5' Ibid., p. 170.
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experience? I think a better explanation of it is selective attention.52 For it is highly 
doubtful that lack of memory is a clear indicator that an experience is non-conscious. If it 
were, it would mean that our consciousness over any given day would be sporadic, to 
say the least.53 Furthermore, it must be remembered that many of our experiences in life 
do not require further reflection in order to be truly felt. For example, if a flame burns my 
hand, I pull it away without consideration. It is the pain that makes me pull my hand 
away, and while I may not be reflecting upon that pain, it nevertheless does feel like 
something to me. In fact, it is quite possible to imagine situations in which an individual 
is so consumed by pain that higher-order thoughts about that pain are impossible. 
Nevertheless, surely we can say that the pain feels like something for that person: it 
feels bad, and it ordinarily makes life worse for the individual. Given all this it seems 
perfectly legitimate to say that one does not need the capacity to reflect on one’s 
experiences to have a life that can go well or badly; all one needs is the capacity to 
experience.
However, perhaps this conclusion is too quick. Perhaps there is a further and different 
level of consciousness that is required in order to have a life that can go well or badly. 
One possible candidate is self-consciousness. In actual fact, self-consciousness 
commonly refers to two quite different states. First, it sometimes relates to an entity 
being self-aware - in other words, that it knows who it is. Second, self-consciousness 
can relate to what I referred to above as ‘autonomy’: an entity’s ability to access an ‘inner 
realm’ from which it can frame, revise and pursue a particular type of life or conception of 
the good. Starting with the latter, it might be argued that if an entity has nothing to look 
forward to, nothing to plan for and nothing to reflect on, then it has no life that can go 
well or badly for itself. It may have good or bad experiences, but it does not have a 
‘comprehensive self tied to goals and projects which can be hindered or thwarted.
However, requiring this type of self-consciousness to be necessary for a life to go well 
or badly fails to accord with our ordinary understanding of well-being. For example, 
consider the paradigm example of entity that has the capacity for this kind of self- 
conscious autonomy: an adult human. Can an adult human’s life go badly or worse than 
it might, even in the absence of any effects on autonomous capacities or what I have
52 As do Dale Jamieson and Marc Bekoff, “Carruthers on Nonconscious Experience”, Analysis, Vol. 52,
No. 1, Jan. 1992: 23-28, p. 24.
53 Michael Lyvers, “Who Has Subjectivity?”, Psyche, 5 (31) December, 1999, 
<http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v5/psyche-5-31 -lyvers.html>.
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called the comprehensive self? I believe that it can. Consider, for example, a case of 
chronic back pain in a musician. Imagine that the pain is such that although it is 
stabbing and persistent, it does not affect the musician’s ability to pursue his love of 
playing music, nor does it prevent him from fulfilling other things valuable to him such as 
going to concerts, visiting friends and family, and raising children. Despite the fact that 
the musician’s autonomous capacities are intact, it nevertheless makes sense to say that 
his life is going worse for him than it might. Quite obviously, this is because the musician 
is suffering from chronic back pain. In other words, bad experiences and feelings are 
sometimes sufficient to make a life go worse, irrespective of the effects on one’s 
‘comprehensive self.
But what of the other meaning of self-consciousness - that is, being self-aware? Once 
again, some philosophers regard this type of consciousness as something over and 
above phenomenal consciousness. Thus, while an entity might be able to experience 
the world, it may not have any understanding of its own place and existence within that 
world. Scientists have tested for this type of self-consciousness in animals and babies 
by using the ‘mirror test’. That is, they place a mirror in front of the subject and observe 
its reactions. Interestingly, most tests conducted with mirrors to see if the reflection is 
acknowledged have concluded that, “...the great apes and human children over the age 
of two years have some understanding of the self, but no other species do.”54 
Importantly, if some entities have no conception of self, it makes it doubtful whether they 
have their own point of view from which to experience the benefit or harm of actions and 
events in the world. Perhaps then, phenomenal consciousness is insufficient for well­
being, because self-consciousness is also required. However, I am sceptical of this 
differentiation between the capacity to experience and the possession of a sense of self. 
I simply cannot comprehend how an entity could be able to experience the world and yet 
have no sense of self. For if there is experience and feeling in an entity, there must 
surely be some subject -  some ‘self - having those experiences and feelings. While that 
subject might not be able to recognise its own reflected image, I fail to see why that 
negates the possession of a sense of self. Rather, it seems much more plausible to say 
that phenomenal consciousness presupposes some locus of experience, and thus some 
sense of self.
54 Marc Hauser, Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think, (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 125. Note, 
however, that since the publication o f this book, elephants have also passed the mirror test. See BBC News, 
“Elephants’ jumbo mirror ability”, 31st October 2006, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/17hi/sci/tech/6100430.stm>.
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Of course, in response it might be claimed that self-consciousness does not merely 
refer to a locus of experience, but also a sense that one is separate from other entities. 
If this is right, we can accept that an individual can possess phenomenal consciousness, 
and thus feel events in the world, but also accept that the same individual can lack self- 
consciousness, and thus be unaware that it, and not some other individual, is feeling 
those states. However, even if all this is right -  and I am highly doubtful that it is -  it 
does not prove the capacity for phenomenal consciousness to be insufficient for well­
being. For even if we assume that a dog say, is phenomenally conscious but not self- 
conscious in the sense defined, if that dog were to experience excruciating pain, it would 
still make sense to say that life was going badly for that dog. After all, even though the 
dog is not aware that the pain is exclusive to him, it still feels like something to him, and 
quite obviously makes his life worse. Given all of this then, it would appear that the 
capacity for phenomenal consciousness is sufficient for well-being.
In this section I have argued that phenomenal consciousness is the necessary and 
sufficient condition for well-being. In other words, in order for an entity to have a life that 
can go well or badly for itself, it must be able to experience and feel the world. While 
being a living organism or being able to process information and react to the world may 
give an entity some function or purpose, they are insufficient to give it a life that can go 
well or badly for itself. Moreover, entities do not need anything more than phenomenal 
consciousness to have well-being: being able to reflect on one’s feelings is not 
necessary to have a life that can go well or badly; nor is the capacity to frame, revise and 
pursue comprehensive goals; and nor is the ability to recognise oneself in a mirror.
Of course, all of this is important because, as I argued earlier in the chapter, well-being 
is so crucial in determining who and what has moral status. Given this then, the next 
task is to consider just what types of entity are phenomenally conscious. For once this is 
established, we will know what types of entity we have moral obligations towards.
2.4 Locating Phenomenal Consciousness and Moral Status
To have a life that can go well or badly and thus to have moral status, an entity must be 
able to experience the world. Quite obviously this excludes such entities as rocks, trees 
and plants. But what does it include? It will seem fairly obvious to anyone who has had 
any contact with animals that many of them are phenomenally conscious in the sense 
that I have described above. However, the fact that it seems obvious is not enough to
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prove the point, for it might be that a dog’s yelp when kicked is in fact an unfelt reflex. It 
could be that dogs are really like zombies, reacting to events in the world but having no 
qualitative experience of them. Furthermore, our certainty in determining what kinds of 
creature are sentient varies greatly as we move around the animal kingdom. For 
example, do fish, lobsters or insects have phenomenal consciousness? In this section I 
will attempt to argue the case that many species of animal are indeed phenomenally 
conscious and so do possess moral status, while also cautiously proposing where the 
line for such consciousness can be drawn.
2.4.1 Evidence in Favour o f Animal Experience
I mentioned above that a dog’s yelp when kicked might be an unfelt reflex reaction. 
Given that we know from simple observation that dogs can access the world, process 
information about it and react to it, if this yelp were a mere reflex, this would suggest that 
dogs are access conscious, just like zombies. However, I believe that there are at least 
three good reasons for supposing that dogs and many non-human animals are not like 
zombies and do have experiences.55 First, quite unlike zombies, many animals behave 
as if they possess sentience. Of course, this is illustrated by the fact that animals 
sometimes cry out or show distress when in pain. However, the reason we can often 
take such actions to suggest more than mere instinctive reaction or reflex response, is 
based on the fact that pain will lead many species to adapt their behaviour, say by 
avoiding those things that have caused them pain, or by protecting injured body parts. 
Second, while there are obvious differences between humans and other species of 
animal, it is important to bear in mind that we are essentially made of the same stuff. For 
example, the zoologist Donald R Griffin writes:
...as mental experiences are directly linked to neurophysiological processes -  or 
absolutely identical with them, according to strict behaviourists -  our best evidence 
by which to compare them across species stems from comparative neurophysiology.
To the extent that basic properties of neurons, synapses, and neeuroendocrine 
mechanisms are similar, we might expect to find comparably similar mental 
experiences. It is well known that basic neurophysiological functions are very similar 
indeed in all multicellular animals.56
55 These three reasons are also given in Mark Rowlands, Animals Like Us, pp. 5-9; Robert Gamer, Animal 
Ethics, (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), pp. 28-29; David DeGrazia, Animal Rights: a Very Short Introduction, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 42-43, and, Taking Animals Seriously, pp. 108-112.
56 Donald R. Griffin, The Question o f  Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity o f  Mental Experience, 
(New York: The Rockefeller University Press, 1976), p. 70.
41
Humans share very similar neural mechanisms with animals and this in itself makes it 
likely that our experiences are to some extent alike. Indeed, in terms of pain, it has been 
pointed out that endogenous opiates, which function within organisms to alleviate pain, 
exist in all mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish and in some invertebrates such as 
earthworms and insects.57 Furthermore, the effects of opiates and other drugs on 
behaviour are similar across many species of animal. Indeed, when laboratory animals 
are offered drugs that produce pleasurable states of consciousness in humans, such as 
cocaine, heroin and alcohol, the lab animals tend to devour them, often preferring them 
to food when offered the choice.58 This strongly suggests that many animals possess 
conscious states something like our own.
The third reason for supposing that animals do have some mental experience is that it 
makes sense from an evolutionary perspective. The ability to feel pain, and experience 
comfort and pleasure makes it likely that mobile creatures will avoid the former and 
pursue the latter. The effect of such experiences on behaviour is of course vital for 
' survival and successful reproduction. One would thus expect many successful species 
of roaming animal to have the capacity for some subjective experience.
2.4.2 Objectively Proving the Subjective
I have argued that the behaviour of animals, their physical structure and their 
evolutionary success makes it very likely that many of them have mental experiences. 
Of course I have not proved that animals are phenomenally conscious. Indeed, proving 
that phenomenal consciousness exists anywhere and in anything is an impossible task. 
For example, the fact that another human is behaving like me and is made of the same 
stuff as me does not mean that I can be certain that he or she has the same mental state 
as me. In fact I cannot be certain that all other humans are not zombies, and that I am 
not the sole being in existence with any conscious experiences. For phenomenal 
consciousness is subjective: it is about how things seem and what things feel like for an 
entity. Thus to find out objectively how things seem and feel like for other entities is 
problematic. As Nagel puts it: “...every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected 
with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will 
abandon that point of view.”59 And so, to say with certainty that other humans feel things
57 Mark Rowlands, Animals Like Us, p. 7.
58 Michael Lyvers, “Who Has Subjectivity?”.
59 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 4, Oct. 1974: 
435-450, p. 437.
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like I do (or feel anything at all) is impossible. However, I am not inclined to believe that 
every other human is a zombie. I draw this conclusion because of certain things I notice 
about their behaviour and because I know they are like me physically. Similarly, I am not 
inclined to believe that all animals are zombies. Again, I am drawn to this conclusion 
from the ways in which they behave and from the facts I possess about their structure.
The fact that I believe that many animals are sentient does not make me think that all 
animals have the same level of conscious experience. Clearly, different animals behave 
in different ways, have divergent evolutionary histories and possess contrasting genetic 
structures. I believe, therefore, that animals have different capacities for conscious 
experience. However, I also believe that it is likely that different humans will often have 
contrasting levels of conscious experience. For example, it is extremely unlikely that the 
capacity for conscious experience amongst a newborn baby, a 12 year old, and a frail 
elderly individual in declining health will be identical. This is in keeping with my belief 
that consciousness is a fluid concept that exists differently across and within species.
However, while phenomenal consciousness is bound to manifest itself differently, what 
really matters is where it can be found. For if an entity does have this capacity, then it 
also has a life that can go well or badly for itself, and most importantly, has moral status. 
I have argued that it is very likely that many animals possess such lives. But of course, 
there still remains the important question of which animals. Having conceded that 
phenomenal consciousness can manifest itself differently makes drawing a line around 
consciousness an incredibly difficult task. Nevertheless, a few claims can still 
legitimately be made.
2.4.3 Drawing the Line
I believe that the case for conscious experience in vertebrates is overwhelming. Given 
their behaviour and physical structure (including complex central nervous systems) it is 
very likely that such animals are phenomenally conscious. For example, mammals are 
considered to be sufficiently similar to humans (remembering of course, that humans are 
mammals) in so many ways that they are regarded to be extremely useful in cosmetic 
and medical experiments.60 It is extremely likely, due to their similar neural structures 
and nervous systems that such similarities extend to the capacity to have experiences.
The case for sentience in birds is also strong. For example, studies on factory-farmed 
chickens have shown that given a choice of two feeds, one with and one without
60 For more on animal experimentation see Chapter 5.
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painkillers, lame chickens choose the feed with painkiller more often than fit birds, and 
as levels of lameness increase, so too does consumption of the painkiller feed.61 This 
provides compelling evidence that birds can experience pain and desire to alleviate it.
More controversial, however, is the case offish. Two studies in 2003 provided different 
accounts of whether fish can feel pain. In the first, James D. Rose argued that fish 
brains are not sufficiently developed to experience pain. He claims that other studies 
which have put forward evidence of fish pain have in fact only provided evidence of 
nociception, the reflex reaction to threatening and injurious stimuli.62 However, a later 
study also in 2003, this time by the Roslin Institute in Edinburgh, found evidence in trout 
of nociception and the experience of pain. In the later study, the fish were initially found 
to have nociceptors on their heads and mouths. Some fish then had bee venom injected 
into their mouths, which caused them to express anomalous behaviour. For example, 
the trout went into a ‘rocking motion’ similar to that exhibited by stressed mammals, 
rubbed their lips onto the gravel and walls of the fish tank, and took three times as long 
to resume feeding compared to the fish who were not injected.63 Such behaviour 
appears to be more than simple reflex reaction, and seems to provide compelling 
evidence that fish can and do feel pain. Moreover, if fish have the capacity for 
phenomenal consciousness it is also likely that amphibians and reptiles have the 
capacity to experience the world. This is because fish, amphibians and reptiles possess 
similar neurophysiology and behavioural patterns.
When we turn to invertebrates, however, the evidence for phenomenal consciousness 
is much weaker. Taking insects, for example, there is no strong evidence for the 
existence of the capacity for phenomenal consciousness. It is true that insects do 
*■ possess sophisticated apparatus to sense their environment, including sensory hairs to 
detect touch, tympanal organs to detect sound, and chemoreceptors to detect chemical 
signals.64 Moreover, recent studies with insects have shown the presence of quite 
complex brain functions including sleep, learning, memory and attention 65 All this 
provides compelling evidence for what I have called access consciousness. However,
61 BBC News, “Crippled chickens choose pain re lie f’, 26th March 2000, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/691129.stm>.
62 The Daily Telegraph, “Anglers are finally o ff the hook: fish feel no pain”, 9th February 2003.
63 Alex Kirby, “Fish do feel pain, scientists say”, BBC News, 30th April 2003, 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/sci/tech/2983045.stm>.
64 Peter H. Raven and George B. Johnson, Biology, p. 896.
65 “Do fruit flies dream o f electric bananas?”, New Scientist, Vol. 181, Issue 2434, p. 32, 14th February 
2004.
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proof of phenomenal consciousness is limited. While endogenous opiates are present in 
many insects, their central nervous system is greatly limited when compared to that of 
other animals, and there is little behavioural evidence to suggest the ability to feel states 
such as pain. For example, insects continue with their normal behaviour even after 
severe injury, loss of limb, and sometimes even whilst being devoured.66 More evidence 
is needed, but there is little reason at present to believe that insects can feel pain and 
thus that they are phenomenally conscious.
The same is true with other invertebrate animals: behavioural and physiological 
evidence suggests that they are not phenomenally conscious. However, we must be 
careful here, for invertebrates are a wide group, containing a quite diverse variety of 
species. For example, while we can be reasonably sure that creatures such amoebas 
and oysters lack the capacity for consciousness, there is some debate over such 
animals as lobsters and cephalods (octopi and squid). Indeed, it is widely reported that 
when a live lobster is plunged into boiling water (this is the way some people cook them), 
it thrashes about seemingly in pain. However, a recent Norwegian study declared that 
lobsters’ nervous systems are too simple to feel pain, and that their thrashing when 
boiled alive is merely muscle contraction.67 The case of octopi and squid is more difficult 
still, as their nervous systems are the most advanced of all invertebrates, but still much 
simpler than those of vertebrates. What is needed is more evidence, and no doubt this 
will come. At present then, it is probably most reasonable to conclude given the 
evidence available that all vertebrates (mammals, birds, fish, reptiles, amphibians) are 
phenomenally conscious, while most invertebrates (insects, molluscs, crustaceans, 
arachnids and so on) are not. Importantly, this means that the former have moral status, 
but the latter do not.
So much for phenomenally conscious animals - but what about humans? Throughout 
this chapter, I have simply assumed that all humans have the capacity for phenomenal 
consciousness. However, it would be odd to believe that this capacity is present within 
an individual human from the moment of conception. So just when does this capacity 
begin? What is certainly clear is that at around 25 days after conception, the brain 
comes into existence. However, it cannot be claimed that the capacity for conscious 
experience has also emerged at this stage; for although the brain exists, it has not yet 
begun to function. In fact, the earliest estimates of when electrical activity begins to
66 David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, p. 111.
67 David Adam, “Scientists say lobsters feel no pain”, The Guardian, 8th February 2005.
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appear in the brain are at 6 weeks into gestation. Again, however, this proves little. The 
brain may be ‘functioning’ at a most rudimentary level at this stage, but that provides no 
evidence of consciousness. After all, when I switch on my computer prompting 
electricity to charge through it, I cannot be said to have switched on consciousness. It is 
at around 9 to 10 weeks of gestation that the foetus begins to respond to stimuli, for 
example by closing the fingers of its hand when its palm is touched. This does provide 
evidence of sensory ability, but of course provides no evidence of conscious experience. 
The behaviour in this situation may simply be a reflex reaction (perhaps like insects or 
lobsters). Indeed, although there is electrical activity in the brain of the foetus at an early 
stage of development, as well as signs of responses to stimuli, its brain does not in fact 
have the capacity for conscious experience until much later. Importantly, the human 
brain is not functional at all in any real sense until the nerve cells that form it are 
connected by synapses. Before this happens the brain is really just a mass of nerve 
cells. This synaptic connectivity appears at 25 weeks. Moreover, the cortex - regarded 
as a crucial property in the capacity for conscious experience -  does not come into 
existence until between 25 and 32 weeks of gestation.68 In sum, it is at around 25 weeks 
(at the earliest) that it appears that human foetuses possess the necessary neural 
development to have the capacity for conscious experience, and thus it as at this point 
that a human has moral status.
To summarise this section I wish to make three points. First, there is good behavioural, 
physiological and evolutionary evidence to support the view that many animals possess 
the capacity for phenomenal consciousness, and thus for moral status. Second, while it 
cannot be proved categorically that anyone or anything else has conscious experiences, 
it is reasonable to assume based on good evidence that some entities do have such 
experiences. Finally, current evidence supports the view that all vertebrates have the 
capacity for phenomenal consciousness, but that the majority of invertebrates do not. It 
also suggests that humans develop the ability to have a life that can go well or badly for 
themselves, at around the age of 25 weeks. In conclusion then, moral status cannot 
legitimately be assigned to all of the animal kingdom, but nor can it to all humans. The 
characteristics and capacities of the individual in question are what matters, and each 
case should be judged on the best available evidence. If the evidence that I have
681 have taken these stages of brain development in the human foetus from David Boonin, A Defense o f  
Abortion, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 104-111.
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presented here alters, as it undoubtedly will, then the lines around moral status need to 
be redrawn accordingly.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have hoped to do three things: first, to introduce and explain the concept 
of well-being; second, to explain why the concept of well-being is so important in working 
out what has moral status; and finally, to offer an account of what types of thing have 
moral status. In addressing these questions I have argued that well-being is a prudential 
value, concerning how life goes for the possessor of that life. To have the capacity for 
well-being is to have a life that can go better or worse, to be able to be benefited and 
harmed, and to have interests which can be set back or promoted. I have also claimed 
that the capacity for well-being is the necessary and sufficient condition for moral status. 
To determine what types of thing have moral status then, we need to ask what types of 
thing have lives that can go well or badly for themselves. I have argued that to have 
such a life, an entity must have the ability to feel and experience the world. These 
entities include many vertebrate animals such as mammals, birds, fish and reptiles, but 
exclude such things as rocks, trees, plants, dead people and most invertebrate animals.
Given all this, the ultimate conclusion of the chapter is that we have moral obligations to 
sentient animals. In the next chapter I anticipate the process of working out just what 
these obligations are by offering an account of animal well-being. That is to say, just 
what does it take for an animal’s life to go well or badly?
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3. The Well-Being of Non-Human Animals
In the previous chapter I argued that sentient animals have moral status because they 
have lives that can go well or badly for themselves. Now that we know the types of non­
human entity towards whom we have moral obligations, we need to start thinking about 
what those obligations actually consist of. As I suggested in Chapter 2, most of us 
regard a fundamental purpose of morality to be about making the lives of individuals 
better, or at least, not making them worse. If this is right -  and I think that it is - it 
appears that the content of our moral obligations depends in large part on what it is that 
makes life go well or badly for individuals. In a nutshell then, in order to work out our 
moral obligations to animals, we need an account of animal well-being. Just what is it 
that makes life go better or worse for sentient animals?
To answer this question, I once again draw on the distinction between persons and 
non-persons. I do this because I claim there to be an important difference between what 
makes life go well for persons and what makes life go well for non-persons. You will 
recall from Chapter 2 that I have claimed that persons are those entities with the 
capacities for moral agency and autonomy: they can reason about and act upon moral 
principles; and they have the ability to frame, revise and pursue a conception of the 
good. This is quite a high standard of personhood, the paradigm example being a 
normal adult human. Clearly, some philosophers regard such a standard as too high, 
while others deny that the concept of personhood has any value at all.69 These 
concerns are primarily based around the fear of defining personhood in an arbitrary way, 
and then using it to ascribe moral status. However, I am not using personhood to assign 
moral status. On my account, some non-persons do possess moral status. I only wish 
to use the category of person as a convenient and recognisable short-hand to 
distinguish between entities with differing capacities.
Given my definition, the paradigm example of a person is a normal adult human being. 
Non-persons, on the other hand, include all those entities without the capacities for 
moral agency and autonomy. Non-persons obviously include such things as rocks, cars, 
trees and so on; but since such things do not have the capacity for well-being, I am not 
concerned with them in this chapter. Rather, the non-persons that interest me are
69 For someone who provides a lower threshold for personhood than me, see Evelyn B. Pluhar, Beyond 
Prejudice. David DeGrazia and S.F. Sapontzis, on the other hand, regard the concept of personhood to be 
of no use, see David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, p. 21 On; and S.F Sapontzis, “A  Critique of 
Personhood”, Ethics, Vol. 91, No. 4, July 1981: 607-618.
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phenomenally conscious beings who fall short of personhood. To be explicit, I am 
obviously thinking of sentient animals here. For while many animals have the capacity to 
experience the world, it is extremely unlikely that any can reason ethically like most 
humans can, or reflect upon and pursue goals and ambitions like most humans can. 
This is not to deny that sentient animals have desires or sometimes act altruistically, for 
simple observation tells us that they do. However, altruism and desire are quite different 
from moral agency and autonomy. For the capacities of moral agency and autonomy 
require the ability to reflect upon, consider, and revise one’s moral acts and desires. 
Moreover, autonomy also suggests the ability to choose and pursue a conception of the 
good life. We can see then, how personhood is closely connected to the more 
sophisticated levels of consciousness I referred to in the previous chapter: high-order 
thought consciousness and self-consciousness. There is simply no evidence to suggest 
that sentient animals possess these further levels of consciousness; and nothing to 
make us believe that they possess the capacities of personhood.70 At this point, 
however, it is extremely important to note that not all humans possess such capacities 
either. For example, it is quite clear that young infants and the severely mentally 
disabled lack the capacities for moral agency and autonomy. According to this account 
then, such individuals are also non-persons.
As I mention above, the reason for differentiating between persons and non-persons is 
because I consider the capacities of personhood -  and in particular, the capacity for 
autonomy - to have an important bearing on what makes the lives of individuals go well. 
Put simply, for a person, one’s well-being is tied to the capacity for autonomy. However, 
for a sentient non-person, one’s well-being is tied to the capacity for good and bad 
experiences. Thus the reason for discussing what makes life go well for persons in a 
thesis that is focused on our obligations to non-humans and non-persons, comes down 
to the importance of this difference between personal and animal well-being. For as we 
will see later in the thesis, I claim that our obligations to persons and non-persons are 
often different, and that this is because the two groups have different interests. To make 
this claim viable, the idea that different things make life go well or badly for persons and 
non-persons needs to be justified.
70 O f course, evidence may one day reveal that some non-human animals do possess such capacities. In 
particular, cetaceans and the great apes seem like possible candidates. I f  so, they can legitimately be 
described as persons, and thus be subsumed within the account o f the well-being of persons I outline in this 
chapter.
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In justifying this claim, the chapter is divided in three. First I provide an account of the 
well-being of persons, arguing in favour of the ‘capabilities approach’ advanced by 
Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. Second, I evaluate whether this same account 
can be applied to non-persons. Given the differing capacities of non-persons, I argue 
that it cannot, and claim that hedonism provides the appropriate means of deciding what 
makes life go well for animals and other non-persons. Finally, I ask whether this 
differential account of well-being must lead to a differential and hierarchical account of 
moral status. I argue that it does not, and claim that persons and non-persons with lives 
that can go well or badly for themselves possess equal moral standing.
3.1 The Well-Being of Persons
This section looks at some accounts of what it means for a person’s life to go well. 
There is a huge variety of rival accounts of what it means for a person to have well­
being. Thus, an evaluation of all such possible alternatives is beyond the scope of this 
section. Instead, I claim that most recent theories of personal well-being can be placed 
into one of four groups: some theories assess well-being by the amount of pleasure in a 
life; others by reference to the satisfaction of desires; others by measuring whether goals 
are achieved; and still others by assessing whether particular objective goods such as 
needs, functionings and capabilities are met. In this section I evaluate some of the 
theories contained within each of these groups. I conclude by arguing that given the 
particular capacities that persons possess, a version of the capabilities theory offers the 
correct means of assessing personal well-being.
3.1.1 Pleasure
Hedonism claims that the well-being of persons can be measured solely by reference to 
the presence of pleasurable states and the absence of painful ones. Quite simply, life is 
going well for a person when he or she has more pleasurable experiences than painful 
ones, and badly for a person when painful states are predominant. However, while we 
might wish to acknowledge that pleasurable experiences are of crucial importance to a 
good life for persons, it is doubtful whether they are the end of the matter. Robert Nozick 
has highlighted this point with his famous ‘experience machine’ thought experiment: 
Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think 
and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting 
book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your
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brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life’s 
experiences?71
Nozick points out that if pleasure were the only gauge of personal well-being, as 
hedonists claim, then we should all want to plug into the experience machine. The 
reason that many of us presumably would not want to plug in, he claims, is because 
pleasurable states are not all that are important to us. Nozick suggests instead that as 
persons we also want to be certain people and do certain things, and not just have the 
feelings that these situations engender.72 Here, I believe, Nozick really gets to the heart 
of the matter. As autonomous persons, actually being a particular type of person, and 
actually pursuing certain goals are central to a good life. Pleasure cannot trump 
authenticity for autonomous beings; that is why we regard a life full of happiness, but 
where that happiness is based on fraudulent relationships, to be so tragic. For example, 
consider the case of Truman Burbank in the film The Truman Show*. Truman has a 
very pleasurable life with good friends and a loving wife. However, little does he know 
that his life is being filmed for a television show, and that his friends and wife are actors. 
Truman’s life is pleasurable, but it is not a good life for him, because his life is a sham.
In the face of such a critique, L.W. Sumner has attempted to rescue hedonism in a 
revised form. Well-being, for Sumner, is related to happiness. However, happiness is 
not simply assessed in terms of pleasure over pain, but instead in terms of the wider 
concepts of enjoyment over suffering. Moreover, for a life to go well, this happiness 
must be authentic and, “...of an informed and autonomous subject.”73 For Sumner then, 
life is going well for a person when his or her subjective mental happiness is combined 
with the objective goods of authenticity, rationality and autonomy. Such a theory helps 
hedonism get round the problem of Nozick’s experience machine, recognising as it does 
that feelings are not the sole determinants of well-being.
However, the problem with Sumner’s theory stems from the fact that despite using 
authenticity, autonomy and rationality as filters, it still relies heavily on the individual’s 
own expressions of satisfaction with his or her life. Staking so much on the individual’s 
own feelings makes assessments of well-being extremely difficult. For just how are we 
to tell when an individual who expresses happiness is or is not autonomous and fully 
informed? It might be clear in the case of an addict or the victim of abuse, but it gets 
much more difficult in other circumstances. For example, consider the case of a poor,
71 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 42.
72 Ibid., p. 43.
73 L.W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, p. 172.
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deprived and malnourished woman in the Third World who expresses satisfaction with 
her life. She may have all the relevant information on how many calories she needs to 
consume to be nourished properly; she may not have anyone standing behind her 
forcing her to say that she is happy; but surely we are rightly sceptical of the claim that 
her life is going well. Of course, it might be claimed that she has not come to her 
conclusion autonomously, but instead has been conditioned to accept her lot. But how 
are we to tell whether she has been conditioned or not? For it seems perfectly 
reasonable to point out that everyone’s feelings are shaped by circumstance to some 
extent; so when does this shaping become non-autonomous conditioning?
The deep problem of answering such questions has led some theorists to avoid relying 
so heavily on the subject’s own feelings when assessing personal well-being, and 
instead to make the objective goods of well-being (including autonomy) explicit at the 
outset. This is a position I endorse later in the section.
3.1.2 Desires
Despite the apparent benefits of a more objective account of well-being, many theorists 
feel that it is crucial to retain the subjective means of assessing personal well-being, 
especially since well-being concerns how well life is going for the individual whose life it 
is. For who is in a better position to measure how well a life is going than the subject of 
that life? However, rather than measure well-being by reference to the feelings of the 
subject, some philosophers have focused on the desires of the individual. These desire 
theories of well-being claim that a person’s life is going well to the extent that his or her 
desires are satisfied, and badly to the extent that his or her desires are frustrated.
However, it is immediately evident that the satisfaction of some desires does not make 
us better off. For instance, if I am depressed I might desire to throw myself under a bus, 
if I am addicted to alcohol I might desire to drink myself into a stupor, and if I am 
conditioned to think of my life as worth less than that of others I might desire to go 
without food and medicine. In each case, it is fairly obvious that the satisfaction of these 
desires will not make my life better. Importantly, we can make this judgement by 
referring to factors outside of my own individual preferences.
In light of this, many theorists have adopted ‘informed-desire’ accounts of well-being 
which focus on those desires that a person would have under conditions of rationality,
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information and autonomy.74 In effect, informed-desire theories attempt to ‘correct’ for 
the fact that individual desires can be shaped by situation and circumstance. However, 
even setting aside the huge problem of measuring what desires individuals would 
choose in ideal conditions, it is unclear why desires are so important in the first place. 
Indeed, is the satisfaction of a desire good in itself, or good because what we desire is 
good? If desire satisfaction is good in itself then there would clearly be no need to filter 
out ‘bad desires’ as informed-desire accounts do; the satisfaction of any desire would 
make our lives better, because desire satisfaction is itself the good-making property. 
Thus, given our previous conclusion that the satisfaction of some desires will not make 
our lives better, the only plausible answer seems to be that satisfying a desire is good to 
the extent that what we desire is good.75 For example, satisfying my desire for 
recreation makes my life go better because recreation is good, whereas satisfying my 
desire for self-harm makes my life worse because self-harm is bad. Of course, this 
seems to leaves us in a situation where what is important for well-being is what is good, 
rather than what we desire. In light of this, it seems preferable to examine and assess 
which goods make life better, rather than what persons do want, would want or should 
want.
3.1.3 Goals
Joseph Raz claims that the good that makes persons’ lives better is the pursuit of goals. 
For Raz, ‘goals’ cover a broad range of pursuits including “...projects, plans, 
relationships, ambitions, commitments and the like.”76 Furthermore, “...our well-being 
consists in the whole-hearted and successful pursuit of...” such goals.77 Given the 
autonomy of persons, this certainly seems like a plausible account of personal well­
being. However, the same problem that applies to desire theories seems to apply to this 
goal-based theory: is the pursuit of any goal good in itself, or must the goal be good?
74 For examples of informed-desire accounts, see R. Brandt, A Theory o f  the Good and the Right, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979); James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and M oral Importance 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); and John Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory o f Rational Behavior”, in 
Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), pp. 39-62.
75 Roger Crisp offers a similar analysis. See Roger Crisp, “Well-Being”.
76 Joseph Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom, p. 291.
77 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the M orality o f  Law and Politics, (Oxford: revised 
ed., Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 3.
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For Raz, the goal does need to be good78, but it is its pursuit that is valuable in itself. 
Indeed, pursuing valuable activities is good precisely because we are what I call 
persons: we are self-governing agents who should control our conduct and take charge 
of our own lives.79 A person with a sedentary, passive life inevitably lacks well-being, 
according to Raz’s theory.
But while projects, plans and ambitions are undoubtedly important for personal well­
being, we must ask whether they are the sole determining factor of a good life. After all, 
it seems fairly obvious that goods we receive passively can benefit us. For example, it is 
not necessary to pursue food to be benefited by having something to eat; simply having 
food makes life go well. Raz does recognise this, and thus acknowledges that the 
satisfaction of biological needs is important for well-being, irrespective of whether they 
are adopted as goals.80 Importantly though, Raz believes that other events, unrelated to 
biological need, only contribute to well-being when they relate to our comprehensive life 
goals.81 Still, if the satisfaction of biological needs can benefit us ‘passively’, why not 
other goods? For example, it clearly makes sense to say that access to education 
makes all individuals’ lives better, even when being educated is not a life goal. Indeed, 
access to education will allow persons (if they so choose) to pursue greater and more 
sophisticated life plans and projects. It seems then, that Raz should acknowledge that 
some goods are valuable to a person’s life even when they are received passively and 
even when they are not part of his or her comprehensive life goals.
3.1.4 Needs, Functionings and Capabilities
The idea that there are some goods that make a person’s life go well irrespective of 
whether they are attached to an individual’s own feelings, preferences or life goals, has 
led some theorists to adopt a more objective theory of well-being. For example, a 
needs-based theory might claim that all persons share basic biological needs; and that 
when these needs are met, a life is going well, and when they are not, a life is going 
badly. However, while it is clear that the satisfaction of basic biological needs is crucial 
for a life to go well, it does not seem to tell us the whole story. If it did, it would mean 
that a person locked up against his or her will but fed and watered would be leading a
78 W e must approve of them, have valid reasons for pursuing them, they must be morally sound and they 
must be socially formed. See Joseph Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom, pp. 300-319.
79 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the M orality o f  Law and Politics, p. 4.
80 Joseph Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom, p. 290.
81 Ibid., pp. 292-3; and Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the M orality o f  Law and 
Politics, p. 7.
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life going well. For this reason, most needs-based theories go beyond mere biological 
functionings and tend to relate needs to the avoidance of harm, or the ability to function 
physically and socially.82 A person’s life is then considered to be going well to the extent 
that these needs are satisfied.
However, most of these theories focus solely on the achieved satisfaction of needs and 
thus provide an unsatisfactory account of personal well-being. To explain, imagine two 
individuals who are equally malnourished. One is the victim of a famine and is unable to 
feed himself. The other is a wealthy religious devotee fasting out of choice.83 Under the 
needs-based accounts outlined above, the two individuals have the same level of well­
being, based on the fact that they each have the same level of need-(dis)satisfaction. 
Most of us would be reluctant to accept this conclusion because of the fact that the 
religious devotee, unlike the famine victim, freely chooses to be malnourished and is 
capable of being well-fed. These elements of choice and capability appear to play a 
crucial role in our assessment of personal well-being.
In light of such considerations, Amartya Sen has argued that it is not just a person’s 
achieved functionings that need to be taken into consideration when assessing well­
being, but also his or her capability to achieve these functionings. For Sen, a person’s 
well-being can be measured by reference to, “A person’s capability to achieve 
functionings that he or she has reason to value...”84 In this way, Sen recognises that 
there are important objective goods (functionings) that make life go well, and by focusing 
on capabilities acknowledges that the freedom to achieve these functionings is itself a 
crucial determinant of well-being.
Having said all this, it nevertheless remains to be asked what the functionings that ‘one 
has reason to value’ are, and while Sen proposes that they may range from being alive 
to having self-respect, he is not concerned to offer any definitive list. Yet without at least 
some content we are again in difficulty when it comes to accurately measuring the well­
being of persons. In response to this, Martha Nussbaum has provided a list of the 
‘central human functional capabilities’. For Nussbaum, there are ten core human
82 See David Braybrooke, Meeting Needs, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Len Doyal and Ian 
Gough, A Theory o f  Human Need, (London: Macmillan, 1991); and David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth: 
Essays in the Philosophy o f  Value, (Oxford: 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2002). Doyal and Gough, and 
Wiggins claim that needs are those goods that when satisfied keep us from harm, while Braybrooke relates 
needs to physical and social functioning.
83 This example is borrowed from Amartya Sen, “Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 
1984”, The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 82, No. 4, April 1985: 169-221, p. 201.
84 Amartya Sen, Inequality Re-examined, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 4-5.
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functional capabilities: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, imagination and senses, 
emotion, practical reason, affiliation, relationship with other species, recreation and 
control over one’s environment.85 Nussbaum claims that for a person’s life to go well he 
or she must be capable of achieving all of these functionings. However, she also claims 
that this list is not final, and is always open to amendment and addition.
An obvious objection to Nussbaum’s account is that it moves too far away from a 
person’s own feelings, tastes and preferences in assessing how well a person’s life is 
going. For surely our interests -  which remember constitute our well-being -  include 
things other than these core capabilities. For example, it makes sense to say that my life 
goes well for me when I have certain personal interests met, such as the interest in 
gardening, being a good teacher and fighting for a political cause. Since these interests 
are not shared by everyone, it would be a mistake to include them in an objective list of 
core capabilities. Given all this, the capabilities approach appears to be an incomplete 
account of personal well-being. However, the incompleteness of the theory is its virtue. 
The capabilities approach should be regarded as providing the necessary but insufficient 
criteria for personal well-being. To put it another way, Nussbaum is providing a list of the 
necessary goods to frame and pursue a good life. These goods are the basic elements 
a person requires access to in order to live well; how and whether they live well after that 
is up to them.
But that still leaves us with the question of what to do about these more subjective 
elements of well-being? Is it simply illegitimate to talk of my interest in being a good 
teacher, for example? I think that we can recognise such interests by distinguishing 
between what Feinberg has labelled ‘welfare interests’ and ‘ulterior interests’.86 Welfare 
interests can be thought to correspond with Nussbaum’s core capabilities. These are 
the things that all persons require in order to live well, and to achieve their more personal 
aims. These personal aims are one’s ulterior interests, and correspond to the individual 
desires, aims, goals and conceptions of the good that persons have. Although in reality 
both types of interest will usually make up an individual’s well-being, for a philosophical 
account of well-being welfare interests are sufficient. They are sufficient for a 
philosophical account of well-being for four reasons. First of all, including ulterior 
interests in the theory is problematic, for we face the difficult problem of having to filter
85 Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: the Capabilities Approach, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 78-80.
86 Joel Feinberg, The M oral Limits o f  the Criminal Law: Vol. 1 Harm to Others, pp. 37-45.
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out those personal aims and desires that clash with individuals’ well-being. Secondly, if 
a different path is taken and the ulterior interests of persons are listed in an objective list, 
this will lead to perfectionism, counting against the fact that individuals have different 
goals and conceptions of the good. Thirdly, the ultimate purpose of our theory of well­
being is to work out obligations that improve the lives of persons (or at least not make 
them worse), and it seems unrealistic to suppose that we have a moral duty to facilitate 
every single private aim and desire of persons. Finally, given the autonomy of persons, 
what matters most for well-being is the ability to frame, revise and pursue a conception 
of the good - not the particular content of that good.
The advantages of the capability approach as a theory of personal well-being should 
hopefully be clear. First, it provides a realistic means of assessing the well-being of 
persons. Under this scheme there is no need to filter out inauthentic feelings, or ill- 
informed desires, because it can assess well-being without having to rely on the mental 
states of individuals. Second, it does not claim that goods are only valuable to persons 
when they are attached to desires or life goals. Instead, it recognises that goods that we 
have received passively can sometimes benefit us. Thirdly, it does not see the simple 
achievement of these goods as the ultimate determinant of well-being, but by relating 
them to our capability to achieve them, acknowledges the importance of freedom and 
choice in making the lives of persons go well. Finally, by focusing on the welfare 
interests of individuals, rather than their ulterior interests, it does not seek to outline a 
perfectionist blueprint for the good life of all persons.
Having arrived at an account of what it means for the life of a person to be going well, it 
is now necessary to consider whether such an account also applies to the lives of non­
persons.
3.2 The Well-Being of Non-Persons
To have well-being is to have a life that is going well for oneself. To be a non-person is 
to lack the particular capacities for moral agency and autonomy outlined above: non­
persons are not entities that are able to reflect on and pursue conceptions of the good; 
and nor can they act morally. A clear example of a non-person in these terms, is of 
course a sentient animal. This section examines four different accounts of what it might 
mean for a non-person’s life to go well: capabilities, achieved functionings, desire 
satisfaction and hedonism. In the course of this examination, I claim that the well-being 
of non-persons cannot be accounted for by capabilities. This is based on the fact that
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non-persons lack the capacity for autonomy. Instead, I argue that the well-being of non­
persons, including human non-persons, is accurately accounted for by their experiences. 
To be specific, I endorse a hedonistic account of the well-being of non-persons, in which 
a non-person’s life goes well or badly in relation to the amount of enjoyment or suffering 
in that life. In the final part of the section, I address the difficult problem of where to draw 
the line between persons and non-persons, arguing that each entity’s well-being must be 
assessed with regard to that individual’s own capacities.
3.2.1 Capabilities and Non-Persons
Martha Nussbaum claims that her capabilities approach not only captures the well-being 
of humans, but also of animals. Indeed, Nussbaum argues that all animals are entitled 
to a dignified existence which encompasses a range of different capabilities:
Dignified existence would seem at least to include the following: adequate 
opportunities for nutrition and physical activity; freedom from pain, squalor, and 
cruelty; freedom to act in ways that are characteristic of the species...; freedom from 
fear and opportunities for rewarding interactions with other creatures of the same 
species, and of a different species; a chance to enjoy the light and air in tranquility.87 
However, Nussbaum’s emphasis on the freedom and opportunity of animals to achieve 
valuable functionings is quite misplaced here. To explain, remember that the capabilities 
approach works so well for persons because it reflects the autonomy of persons. In a 
nutshell, the theory builds choice into the account. The theory does not list all the 
components of the good life, but lists all the goods that must be available in order for a 
person to frame and pursue a good life. In this way the theory reflects the fact that 
persons are autonomous agents pursuing their own ends.
However, the advantages of this theory of personal well-being are largely irrelevant in 
the case of non-persons. Non-persons lack the levels of reflection and deliberation 
required to be described as autonomous agents pursuing their own ends. For example, 
while a baby may have desires that she acts upon, and a certain level of rationality to 
choose between options, it is evident that these do not amount to the capacity to frame 
and pursue a good life of her own. In light of this, the capability to achieve valuable 
functionings is not relevant to whether life is going well for a baby, because as a non­
person she cannot forge and pursue her own conception of the good life. Or, to put it in 
terms of the types of interest outlined above, a baby has welfare interests, but no ulterior
87 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers o f  Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, (London: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 326.
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interests. For example, it does not matter for the baby’s well-being whether she has, in 
Nussbaum’s terms, ‘opportunities for nutrition’, but only whether she actually has decent 
nutrition. This is because a baby is unlike a religious devotee, and cannot choose to 
pursue a life devoted to fasting. Contrary to Nussbaum then, the capabilities approach 
works well for autonomous persons, but not for non-autonomous non-persons.
3.2.2 Achieved Functionings, Needs and Non-Persons
Given all of this, it might seem reasonable to suppose that it is achieved functionings 
which account for the well-being of non-persons. If so, our focus should shift to 
determining what these achieved functionings are. One claim might be that life is going 
well for a non-person when his or her biological needs are satisfied. Thus, a dog's life 
might be regarded as going well for herself when she has enough of the goods she 
needs in order to survive. However, even after momentary reflection it becomes evident 
that this does not provide an accurate picture of the well-being of non-persons. For 
example, a dog may have enough of the goods she needs to survive, and yet be 
chained to a wall for her entire life, making her suffer from boredom and frustration. It 
would be odd to regard such a dog’s life as going well for herself.
Perhaps then, goods other than mere biological needs should be added to the account. 
For example, we might claim that for a dog’s life to go well, she not only needs to 
achieve her ‘survival functionings’, but also her ‘species-specific functionings’. In other 
words, to have a good life the dog must be able to roam around, exercise curiosity, 
generally act like a dog, and, “...flourish as the kind of thing it is.”88 In this light, we can 
easily see how chaining the dog to a wall prevents her from having a good life.
However, by relating well-being to the achievement of species-specific functionings, we 
are starting to move away from an account of how life goes for the individual whose life it 
is. For such an account suggests that what makes life go well for an individual is the 
extent to which that entity is a good example of its species. But as I argued in the 
previous chapter, this is to make a perfectionist assessment of a life; whereas what we 
are after is a prudential assessment. To take an example, consider the case of another 
non-person, a stag. A stag will undoubtedly be a better example of a stag if he engages 
in fights over territory and mates. Such fighting, one might say, is a natural functioning
88 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Beyond ‘Compassion and Humanity’ : Justice for Nonhuman Animals” in Cass R. 
Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum (eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 306.
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of stags. However, it is hard to see how such fighting always makes life better for stags. 
Indeed, it seems nonsensical to suppose that the losers of such fights who often suffer 
painful and life-threatening injuries have lives that are going well for themselves. So, in 
some cases, achieved species-specific functionings seem to result in lower levels of 
well-being overall.
Perhaps one way of resolving these problems would be to adopt Bernard E. Rollin’s 
claim that the only functionings that relate to an animal’s well-being are those that matter 
to that being.89 For Rollin, an animal’s interests are tied to its telos: “...a nature, a 
function, a set of activities intrinsic to it, evolutionary determined and genetically 
imprinted.”90 However, not just any function tied to the telos of a being can be classed 
as in its interest: it must also matter to the individual in question. In this way, Rollin’s 
account recognises that well-being is a prudential value. By tying his account to 
subjective experience, Rollin can explain why being chained to a wall is bad for the dog, 
and why fighting could be bad for a stag: it matters to the dog that she is not chained, 
and it matters to the stag not to be injured and in pain. However, as promising as 
Rollin’s account is, his reliance on the experiences of animals makes it questionable 
whether achieved functionings are left with any explanatory force. After all, what matters 
to these animals is not that their telos has been violated, but that they are in pain. Given 
this, might it not be more straightforward to explain animal well-being solely in terms of 
these feelings and experiences, without any mention of the animal’s telos or natural 
functionings? For surely the most obvious reason the chained dog has a life going badly 
for her is because she is suffering, not because she lacks the natural functionings of a 
dog. Similarly, the reason the vanquished stag has low well-being is simply because he 
suffers, not because the fulfilment of his natural telos has been impeded. Perhaps then, 
we should turn away from accounting for the well-being of non-persons in terms of 
natural functionings and needs, and instead look towards subjective experiences.
3.2.3 Desires and Non-Persons
One way of tying subjective experience to well-being is to propose a desire or preference 
based account of well-being. In fact, this way of accounting for the well-being of animals 
(and indeed humans) has been proposed by Peter Singer, who claims that one’s
89 Bernard E. Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality, p. 75.
90 Ibid.
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interests can be equated with what one desires.91 Unfortunately, this account suffers 
from considerable problems. Simply put - and as we saw was the case with persons -  
the successful pursuit of one’s desires does not necessarily lead to a better life. For 
example, I know of a dog with an enormous appetite who desires to eat as much as 
possible. However, the satisfaction of such desires is not in her interests; she is 
overweight and the weight is adversely affecting her health, making her suffer. Having 
her desires satisfied is in this case bad for the animal. Similarly, when we brought our 
pet cat home for the first time we were told not to let him outside for the first week or so. 
This was to prevent him from running outside and never returning. Judging by his 
actions at the time, keeping the cat indoors ran contrary to his preferences. However, it 
is perfectly reasonable to say that frustrating his desires in this way was for the cat’s own 
good; he is not currently wandering the streets as a stray with all the hardship that 
involves, but has a life full of pleasure as part of our family. Once again, preventing the 
satisfaction of desires was good for the animal. It seems clear then that preference- 
satisfaction does not provide the correct account of the well-being of non-persons.
3.2.4 Pleasure and Non-Persons
Having ruled out these various accounts of the well-being of non-persons, it seems that 
we are left with hedonism. To recap, hedonism claims that an individual’s life goes well 
in relation to the presence of pleasure and the absence of suffering. As we have already 
seen, tying the well-being of non-persons to subjective experience in this way certainly 
seems plausible. Moreover, hedonism can explain the well-being of the different 
examples of non-persons that I have used throughout the section with great ease. For 
example, the baby suffers from being malnourished, the dog suffers from being chained 
to the wall, the stag suffers from being injured and in pain, the dog with the enormous 
appetite will suffer from weight-related illnesses, and my-cat would have suffered from 
becoming a stray. Given all this, should we recognise hedonism as the correct account 
of the well-being of non-persons? Before doing so, we need to consider some potential 
problems.
First of all, I claimed above that measuring the quality of a person’s life solely in terms 
of the amount of pleasure experienced in a life fails to acknowledge the value of 
authenticity in persons’ lives. It was argued that a person leading an artificially pleasant 
life, as in the example of the experience machine, would not be leading a life going well
91 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, (Cambridge: 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 13.
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for him or herself. Is this not also true in the case of non-persons? I believe not. For 
what makes authenticity valuable for persons is the fact that they are autonomous. 
Autonomy involves the ability to frame and pursue a conception of the good, and thus 
implies some degree of control over one’s own life. This is what makes a happy life 
based on lies and deceit so tragic for persons: it undermines a self-chosen, self- 
governing, and authentic life. However, since non-persons are not autonomous, 
authenticity loses its importance. It is quite possible for a happy non-person to have a 
life going well, even when his happiness is based on lies and deceit. To illustrate this 
point, consider the administration of medicine. Ordinarily, it would be wrong to deceive 
an adult human by concealing medicine in his food without his knowledge, even if that 
medicine would make that individual healthier. This is because an adult human is a 
person, who should have some control over his own life, including whether he wishes to 
take a particular medicine. However, the situation is quite different for non-persons. 
Deceiving non-persons in the administration of medicine is quite correctly considered to 
be permissible. This is why it is quite normal for us to hide medicines in the food of our 
babies and pet animals. We deceive them so that they may feel better. For non­
persons then, it appears that good subjective experiences trump a self-governing life 
without deceit.
However, another potential problem with hedonism lies in the fact that it accounts for 
well-being solely on the basis of pleasure and pain. For aren’t there other mental states 
which are good and bad for non-persons? Take for example, feelings of satisfaction, 
relief, and contentment; and on the other side, feelings such as boredom, frustration, 
anxiety and depression. However, I do not regard this criticism to be devastating for 
hedonism. I think that we can accept that these other states contribute to the well-being 
of non-persons, and still retain hedonism. After all, these states are still good and bad 
mental experiences. Perhaps then we should follow the proposal of Sumner outlined 
above, and instead of pleasure and pain, adopt the wider concepts of ‘enjoyment’ and 
‘suffering’. These wider concepts can absorb these different mental experiences, and 
still allow us to adopt hedonism. For if we follow this proposal, we can say that a non­
person’s life goes well to the extent that she enjoys life and does not suffer.
But still it might be denied that the well-being of non-persons can be reduced solely to 
subjective experience. For consider two non-persons, let us say two dogs, who are in 
equal levels of pain, but one of whom is malnourished and the other well-fed. Surely it 
would make sense to say that the well-fed dog’s life is going better for himself compared
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to the malnourished dog. If this is true, this suggests that the well-being of non-persons 
does not depend solely on experiences, but also on objective goods such as needs- 
satisfaction. However, I believe that our instinct that the well-fed dog’s life is going better 
is actually based on his likely subjective experiences. This is because the well-fed dog 
is likely to have better experiences overall in his life, even if not presently. For example, 
being well fed will keep the dog feeling well by preventing pangs of hunger, relieving 
frustration and preventing painful illnesses. The malnourished dog, on the other hand, 
will no doubt suffer from these burdens of malnutrition for some time into the future. In 
other words, in the vast majority of cases, malnutrition will lead that dog to suffer more 
overall in his life when compared to the well-fed dog.
Of course, this might not be true in all cases. One can certainly conceive of a situation 
in which a well-fed dog could suffer just as much as a malnourished dog. For example, 
the well-fed dog might suffer some kind of long-term chronic pain. In this case, would it 
still not make sense to say that the well-fed dog’s life goes better for himself? I fail to 
see how: given their equal levels of suffering, it seems more plausible to say that their 
lives are going equally badly for themselves. Of course, we might recognise that the 
well-fed dog is a better specimen of a dog, just as a watered plant is a better example of 
a plant, but this is a perfectionist judgement. When we consider how life goes for the 
individuals themselves, both dogs suffer equally, which strongly suggests that their lives 
are going equivalently badly for themselves.
However, there remains one final potential problem with hedonism. Enjoyment and 
suffering are mental states, but mental states cannot simply be observed and counted. 
Given this, how can we tell when an individual non-person has more pleasant states 
than painful ones, or vice versa? For this is just the type of information we will need to 
judge whether a life is going well or badly. In fact, this might seem a particular difficulty 
for non-persons, since most non-persons cannot use language to tell us how they are 
feeling. However, while it must be acknowledged that it is impossible to get inside the 
mind of another, it would be wrong to then assume that we can make absolutely no 
assessment of subjective feelings. After all, we can and do derive strong evidence for 
the presence of particular feelings from individuals’ behaviour and physical appearance. 
For example, it is fairly obvious when a dog is suffering, and this is indicated by such 
things as her cries, whimpers, subdued posture, lack of appetite, shabby coat, lethargy 
and so on. I believe that such evidence is obtainable and reliable, and allows us to 
measure the subjective feelings of non-persons. In particular, and relevant to the
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hedonistic assessment of well-being, it allows us to measure whether a non-person is 
primarily suffering, or primarily enjoying life. Moreover, the fact that non-persons cannot 
tell us how they are feeling might in fact be an advantage. As I have mentioned above in 
the case of persons, expressed satisfaction with a life may be the result of lack of 
information or conditioning. Perhaps then, physical and behavioural evidence is more 
reliable.
3.2.5 Potentiality and Drawing the Line for Personhood
Of course, claiming that hedonism is the correct theory of well-being for non-persons 
does not just have significance for non-human animals. As I have argued, this theory 
also accounts for the well-being of human non-persons, such as young infants. This 
notion, however, seems to raise two problems that have not yet been discussed. First of 
all, it might be objected that the lives of such human non-persons cannot be judged 
solely on the basis of pleasure, because human non-persons have the potential to be 
persons. Because of this potentiality, perhaps it would make more sense to account for 
the well-being of all humans in the same way: namely, the capabilities approach. I think 
there are two big problems with such a claim. First of all, quite obviously not all human 
non-persons possess the potential for personhood. Those individuals with severe and 
permanent mental disabilities, for example, will never develop the capacities moral 
agency and autonomy. This fact seems to negate the basis of this claim’s justification 
for subsuming all humans under one account of well-being. Secondly, it would be both 
bizarre and negligent to account for a young infant’s present well-being on the basis of 
her potential. Of course, most babies have the potential for autonomous choice, but to 
treat them as if they have it now would be disastrous. This is why we ensure that babies 
are well-fed, not that they have the capability to be well-fed. This is why we ensure that 
babies do take their medicine, not that they have willingly consented to receive it. In 
other words, we ordinarily regard the well-being of human non-persons to be quite 
different to that of persons: the primary aim of care is to keep such individuals from 
suffering.
However, this discussion raises a second problem with the account given so far. For if 
the well-being of non-persons is accounted for by hedonism, and the well-being of 
persons by the capabilities approach, we need an account of when it is that non-persons 
become persons. Clearly this is not a problem for animals and the permanently mentally 
disabled who will be non-persons throughout their lives, but it is a very big problem for
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the lives of most human beings. For just when does a child develop the capacities for 
moral agency and autonomy? Without doubt, these capacities are not ‘all or nothing’ 
concepts and will develop gradually over time, making each child different. However, 
there is no need to be particularly worried about not having a clear date identifying the 
moment when all infants suddenly become persons. For one thing, we deal with these 
complexities and subtleties in the development of human children every day. That is to 
say, parents and guardians do everything for newborn babies and try to keep them 
happy and comfortable. Here hedonism seems a most apt account of well-being. 
However, as babies grow older and become children, parents begin to foster and 
facilitate their child’s individuality by gradually giving them space to frame and pursue 
their own particular ends. As this development occurs goods other than simple pleasure 
begin to become valuable to the child. The unfolding of this process will occur at 
different rates for different children, and their well-being can be judged accordingly. I do 
not think it a devastating problem that there is no clear and definitive date when all 
human infants become persons. Indeed, a flexible approach to the well-being of infants 
that is sensitive to each individual’s own capacities seems entirely appropriate.
This more complex picture of well-being is also attributable to non-humans. For 
example, it may one day be shown that cetaceans, the great apes, or other animals 
have some capacity for moral agency and autonomy. If so, the well-being of such 
animals will have to be judged accordingly. All we can do, in both the human and non­
human cases, is to determine well-being based on that entity’s own particular capacities. 
While this is a difficult task in many cases, I believe that hedonism for non-persons and 
capabilities for persons can serve as a useful rule of thumb.
3.3 A Hierarchy of Moral Status?
However, this differential account of well-being that I have offered may have an impact 
on the moral status of entities. As a reminder, I argued in Chapter 2 that sentient 
animals have moral status. Moreover, their moral status is based on the fact that they 
have lives that can go well or badly for themselves. However, I have now claimed in this 
chapter that the well-being of persons is quite different to that of non-persons: personal 
well-being is related to core capabilities, non-personal well-being is related to 
pleasurable experiences. This difference is down to the fact that persons are entities for 
whom autonomy is valuable, whereas non-persons are not. Given this difference, and 
given these extra capacities of most human beings, perhaps we can say that while
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animals do have moral status, they have a lower moral status than that of persons. In 
this way we could construct a hierarchy of moral standing, with those beings with the 
greatest capacities at the top, and those with the fewest at the bottom. Since those 
entities at the top would have weightier moral status, it would make sense to grant their 
interests greater weight.92
There are two problems with this approach. First of all, and as I have stressed 
throughout this chapter, animals are not the only non-persons, for there are many 
human non-persons. If animals possess a lower moral status on the basis that they are 
non-persons, then so too must many humans. This would mean subordinating the 
interests of individuals such as young infants and the severely mentally disabled. This is 
not a route many of us want to head down. However, even if we accept this route, and 
maintain that all non-persons have lower moral status, there is a second problem with 
constructing such a hierarchy. Quite simply, it makes all the interests of one group 
weightier than the interests of another without sufficiently good reason. For while we 
might acknowledge that persons have different, further and even more complex interests 
than non-persons, this seems insufficient as a ground to grant all of their interests 
absolute priority. For surely it is only logical and fair to consider the interests of 
individuals on their own merits. Thus, rather than constructing a hierarchy of moral 
status, which stipulates the priority of the interests of one group, we should instead 
adopt a theory of equal moral status, where the weight of an interest is judged on its own 
worth. Philosophers who have proposed this method have called it, ‘the equal 
consideration of interests.’93 This does not mean that we treat all those entities with 
moral status in exactly the same way; for it would of course be absurd to give pigs the 
vote, or vaccinate school children against foot-and-mouth disease. But it does mean 
that we consider the interests of those beings with moral status equally, and grant 
interests with equal weight the same moral importance, no matter to whom they belong.
3.4 Conclusion
92 Hierarchies of moral status and interests have been constructed by Donald VanDeVeer, "Interspecific 
Justice", Inquiry, Vol. 22, No. 1-2, 1979: 55-70; Robin Attfield, The Ethics o f  Environmental Concern, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); and Gary Varner, In N ature’s Interests?, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998).
93 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 2, and Practical Ethics, p. 21; David DeGrazia, Animal Rights -  a 
Very Short Introduction, pp. 19-34, and, Taking Animals Seriously, pp. 36-74; and Mark Rowlands, 
Animals Like Us, pp. 32-34.
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In this chapter I hope to have shown that one cannot provide an account of well-being 
that is the same for everyone and everything. Entities that have lives that can go well or 
badly for themselves, have quite different capacities, which determine what makes their 
lives go well. For a person, one’s well-being is tied to the capacity for autonomy. While 
for a non-person, one’s well-being is tied to the capacity for good and bad experiences. 
More specifically, life goes well for persons when they are capable of achieving valuable 
functionings; and life goes well for non-persons when they enjoy life and do not suffer. 
Importantly, none of this has any bearing on the ascription of moral status: all entities 
with well-being hold moral status equally.
Now that we have decided that sentient animals have moral status, and know what 
makes their lives go better or worse, we next need to consider how to frame our moral 
obligations to them. For example, do we have an obligation to maximise animals’ well­
being, or can we consider the well-being of animals to be protected by moral rights? I 
address these questions in the next chapter.
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4. Non-Human Animals and Moral Rights
I have argued that sentient non-human animals have moral status: sentient animals 
merit ethical consideration in their own right, and because of this we have certain moral 
obligations to them. However, such a conclusion only gets us so far. What must be 
considered next is the type of obligations that we have to non-human animals. To do 
this, we need some form of ethical framework with which to delineate our obligations.
It could reasonably be claimed that the arguments that I have presented thus far lend 
themselves to a welfarist scheme such as classical utilitarianism. After all, I have argued 
that phenomenally conscious animals have moral status because they have the capacity 
for well-being. Moreover, I have put forward a hedonistic account of animal well-being: 
animals’ lives go well for them when they have more pleasurable states than painful 
ones. One might then assume that the obligations we have to animals are based around 
the principle that we should seek to maximise their overall well-being. That is, we should 
aim to achieve, ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’.
However, despite these appearances, adopting classical utilitarianism as our theoretical 
framework would actually be at direct odds with my account of moral status. Classical 
utilitarianism is aggregative, seeking to produce the best overall balance of good over 
bad consequences for all under consideration. While each and every individual counts 
under an aggregative theory, the individual is neither the prime focus, nor the prime 
source of value. Instead, individuals are merely ‘receptacles’ of value, with ultimate 
value residing in what is deemed good: in this case, pleasure.94 However, the account of 
moral status that I have put forward is in stark contrast to this. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
entities with moral status have a certain standing, meaning that they merit ethical 
consideration in their own right, and are not valuable simply because of their contribution 
to some other goal, such as aggregate pleasure. To be specific, non-human animals are 
valuable in themselves because they have lives that can go well or badly for themselves; 
or, to put it another way, they are valuable because they have interests that can be set 
back or promoted.
This is not to claim that increasing or maximising well-being can never be the right thing 
to do with regards to our treatment of animals. It is merely to state that maximising 
aggregate well-being is not the fundamental principle that guides our moral obligations to
94 Tom Regan, The Case fo r  Animal Rights, p. 205.
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them. What is needed then, is a theoretical framework that is consistent with this 
account of moral status, by individuating animals rather than treating them aggregatively. 
I wish to claim that ‘rights’ can meet this need, by acknowledging the value of individual 
animals themselves and by acting as brakes on the pursuit of aggregative well-being.
Of course, this raises several questions. What are rights? How do we assign particular 
rights to individuals? Are animals the type of entity that can possess rights? This 
chapter aims to provide answers to each of these questions in turn. The first section of 
the chapter asks what is distinctive about rights. In the second section of the chapter I 
ask how we can assign moral rights. Finally, in the last section, I outline and refute 
some specific objections to the idea that animals can possess rights.
4.1 What Kinds of Thing Are Rights?
If we are to build a theoretical framework around rights, it is important to have a clear 
understanding of what rights are. Such an understanding will also help us to evaluate 
whether it is even possible for non-human animals to hold rights. In light of this, we need 
to discover what it is that makes a right a right. Most theories of rights attempt to come 
up with some common feature that all rights share. This is a difficult task, primarily 
because so many different types of rights exist. For example, one obvious distinction is 
between legal and moral rights. However, even within each of these limits, further 
different kinds of right can be distinguished. Before going on to examine what the 
essential feature of rights might be, it will be useful to briefly distinguish some of these 
various types of right.
4.1.1 Legal Rights, Moral Rights and Hohfeldian Incidents
Legal rights are those rights that are established by the law. Most theorists tend to 
follow Wesley Hohfeld in identifying four types of legal right: claim-rights, liberty-rights, 
powers and immunities.95 A claim-right exists when a person owes another a 
corresponding duty. For example, in the UK I have the legal claim-right not to be 
assaulted: you have a legal duty not to assault me. Liberty-rights enable an individual to 
do something, in the sense that he or she has no duty not to do it. For instance, I have 
the legal liberty-right to walk to the end of my street, because there is no law preventing
95 Just a few of the more detailed analyses of these relations are, Peter Jones, Rights, pp. 12-25; Matthew H. 
Kramer, “Rights Without Trimmings” in Matthew H. Kramer et al., A Debate O ver Rights, pp. 7-22; and 
Leif Wenar, “The Nature o f Rights”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2005: 223-253.
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me from so doing. Powers, as the name suggests, empower individuals to carry out 
actions. Legal powers in the UK include voting and getting married. Finally, immunities 
enable individuals not to be subject to another’s power. For example, in the UK 
individuals have the legal immunity not to be married against their will.
In contrast, moral rights exist, not in virtue of some piece of legislation, but in virtue of 
normative justification. So, while it is possible for legal and moral rights to correspond, 
they might not. For example, some think that prisoners in the UK have the moral right to 
vote, even though they are denied such a right by UK law.96 This example illustrates an 
important relation between moral and legal rights: we often invoke moral rights in order 
to establish (or challenge) legal rights. We might claim then, that moral rights sometimes 
serve as a foundation for legal rights.
Although Hohfeld’s classification was intended as a description of legal relations, it can 
also be applied to the notion of moral rights. For it would not be too difficult to make the 
case that an individual has the moral claim-right not to be assaulted, the moral liberty- 
right to walk to the end of the road, the moral power (right) to vote, and the moral 
immunity (right) not to be married against one’s will.
So, we can see already that there are many different types of right. Rarely, however, 
does any one right fall exclusively into just one of these various categories. Very often 
rights are ‘clusters’ of these Hohfeldian incidents:
For example, if morally I have the right to marry whomever I choose, that may be 
understood as bringing together the moral liberty-right to marry the partner of my 
choice, the moral claim-right that others should not impede my use of that liberty, the 
moral power to enter into a marriage of my own choice and a moral immunity against 
being ‘married off against my will.97
Despite the fact that there are so many different types of right, most accounts of rights 
attempt to offer some common feature that each of these rights possesses. If we can 
determine what this feature is, we will be able to explain what kind of thing a right is.
4.1.2 The Will Theory of Rights
For the ‘will’ or ‘choice theory’ of rights, the essential feature of a right is the presence of 
choice in the right-holder. To be more specific, it is claimed under this theory that when
96 Interestingly, the right of prisoners to vote has been acknowledged by the European Convention on 
Human Rights. This illustrates that determining legal rights is by no means straightforward. For a recent 
case concerning U K  prisoners’ right to vote, see BBC News, “Convicts ‘will not all get vote’”, 6th October 
2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/4315348.stm>.
97 Peter Jones, Rights, pp. 47-48.
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an individual has a right to something, then that individual is able to demand or waive 
enforcement of the relevant duty.98 To clarify, let us take the example of a loan: I have 
lent you some money, and you have agreed to pay me back. It is clear that in this 
situation you have a duty to repay me. Moreover, it is perfectly legitimate for me to 
demand repayment from you, or, if I so choose, I can waive your duty to repay, thereby 
cancelling the debt. Similarly, if the loan has been confirmed by a valid legal contract, I 
can be said to possess the legal right to repayment: I can demand enforcement through 
the relevant channels, or I can cancel the contract and waive your duty. The overarching 
criterion of these rights and all rights, according to the will theorist, is the ability to 
demand or waive enforcement of the relevant duty.
However, we can question whether all rights possess this feature of choice. Let us take 
the example of the right against being tortured to death.99 In the UK, I do not have the 
legal power to waive anyone’s duty not to torture me to death: I cannot relieve someone 
of that duty, for instance by signing it away. Even if my killer were able to prove that I 
had rationally consented to death by torture, he would still be convicted, other things 
being equal, for torture and for murder. According to the will theory, since I have no 
ability to waive the performance of this duty, I have no legal right against being tortured 
to death. Naturally, this seems rather odd. After all, in view of laws against murder and 
torture, it seems uncontroversial that I possess the legal right not to be tortured to death. 
Indeed, not only would many see it as uncontroversial that I possess this right, they 
would also regard it as one of the more fundamental rights that I possess.100
Hillel Steiner has attempted to get around this problem with the will theory by 
suggesting that under the criminal law the will theory vests rights in state officials rather 
than citizens.101 So, although I may not have the power to waive anyone’s duty not to 
torture me to death, some state official does. At first glance this might seem strange. 
For which state official could possibly waive this duty not to torture? Steiner claims that 
if we go high enough up the chain of officials we will eventually find someone with the 
ability to waive such a duty. For example, the Crown Prosecution Service could choose
98 For just some examples of the will theory see, H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” in Anthony 
Quinton (ed.), Political Philosophy', L .W . Sumner, The M oral Foundation o f  Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1987); N.E. Simmonds, “Rights at the Cutting Edge” in Matthew H. Kramer et al., A D ebate Over 
Rights; and Hillel Steiner, “Working Rights”.
99 I borrow this example from Leif Wenar, “The Nature o f Rights”, pp. 239-240.
100 This point is also made in Neil MacCormick, “Rights in Legislation” in P.M.S. Hacker and Joseph Raz 
(eds.), Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour o f  H.L.A Hart, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
101 Hillel Steiner, “Working Rights”, p. 250.
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not to prosecute my killer, effectively annulling my right. However, even if we accept that 
there exists someone with the power to waive this duty, it still fails to rescue the will 
theory from the initial objection. For under Steiner’s account the legal right against being 
tortured to death lies not with me but with the relevant state official. Steiner is happy to 
accept this implication of the will theory of rights. However, many find this implication too 
perverse to accept, because it is at direct odds with our common understanding of 
rights.102 For as stated above, it seems uncontroversial that I have the legal right not to 
be tortured to death, not some state official on my behalf. Thus the implications of the 
will theory are so at odds with our common understanding of rights that it seems better to 
search for an alternative candidate that explains what kind of thing rights are.
4.1.3 The Interest Theory of Rights
For interest theorists of rights, the essential feature of all rights is the benefit afforded to 
the right-holder. According to this theory of rights, when an individual has a right to 
something, then that something will be of benefit to that individual.103 So, to go back to 
the torture example, we can explain my right against being tortured to death by 
appealing to my interests in not being tortured and not being killed. For the interest 
theory, my ability to waive the right is irrelevant to my possession of it.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that all rights necessarily confer benefits on anyone. For 
example, I may have the right to inherit something, but that inheritance might impose a 
considerable burden upon me. While the inheritance would not benefit me, it would still 
surely make sense to say that I have the right to that inheritance. Having said this, I do 
not think that this example proves a devastating problem for the interest theorist. 
Although a particular right may not benefit the right-holder, the interest theorist can 
nevertheless point out that such rights generally do.104 Thus, although I may have no 
interest in this particular instance of inheritance, I do have an interest in inheritance 
generally, thus making sense of my right to inheritance in this case.
Nevertheless, defining the overarching criterion of rights as the benefit provided to the 
right-holder remains problematic, particularly when it comes to dealing with rights as 
powers invested in particular offices. For example, I mentioned above that some powers 
are rights, such as the legal right to vote. The interest theory can explain this right by
102 Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Rights”, p. 240.
103 For some examples of the interest theory of rights see, Neil MacCormick, “Rights in Legislation”;
Joseph Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom ; and Matthew H. Kramer, “Rights Without Trimmings”.
104 Ibid., p. 93.
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pointing to the benefits that individuals accrue from participating in the political process. 
However, powers that are vested in positions of office are less easy for the interest 
theory to cope with.105 For example, it makes sense to say that doctors have the right to 
prescribe medicine for their patients. And yet it is unclear how the doctor benefits from 
this particular right. In fact, the point of the right to prescribe is not that the doctor herself 
benefits, but that her patients do.
Of course, the interest theorist might claim that it is in the interests of a doctor to be 
able to prescribe medicine. After all, the doctor would not be able to do her job if she 
were unable to prescribe medicine, and no doubt the doctor has an interest in doing her 
job. However, while this rebuttal has some initial plausibility, one does not have to dig 
very deep to reveal its limitations. For the right of doctors to prescribe medicine is 
fundamentally based on the very fact of being a doctor, irrespective of one’s interest in 
the power of prescribing. For example, I may have a very strong interest in being able to 
prescribe medicine: it may be my life-long goal to become a doctor and I may have a 
deep yearning to make the sick better. However, no matter how strong and overriding 
this interest is, I could only possess the right to prescribe by qualifying as a doctor. That 
is to say, the right to prescribe is based upon someone legitimately holding the office of 
‘medical doctor’, not on anyone’s interest in prescribing.
Another solution to the problem of powers of office is simply to bite the bullet and claim 
that such powers are not in fact rights. Unfortunately such an approach suffers from the 
same problem that beset the will theory. That is, our ordinary understanding of rights 
suggest that many powers of office are rights: the right of the doctor to prescribe; the 
right of the judge to sentence; the right of the policeman to arrest; the right of the traffic 
warden to fine; and so on. To adopt an overarching criterion of rights that denies that 
such powers are rights would again be at too great a cost to our ordinary use of the term. 
As we shall see later, however, it may be possible to recognise interests as the basis for 
the vast majority of rights, despite the problems the theory faces with powers of office.
4.1.4 The Entitlement and Several Function Theories of Rights
105 Peter Jones, Rights, p. 31; and L e if Wenar, “The Nature of Rights”, p. 242.
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In view of the limitations of the interest and will theories, some theorists have proposed 
broader conceptions of what rights are. For example, Peter Jones has put forward the 
idea that the essential feature of rights is the establishment of titles in individuals:106 
What is distinctive about legal or moral systems that incorporate rights is that they 
invest people with titles. The possession of a title means that the possessor 
becomes (immediately if not always ultimately) the locus of legal or moral concern.
If his title concerns his own actions (as in the case of liberty-rights), it justifies or 
legitimates those actions. If it concerns the actions of others (as in the case of 
claim-rights), it provides the ground for others’ being required to act in ways that the
107title requires.
Jones argues that rights are rights because they are possessed. Thus, when a right is 
violated, the right-holder him or herself is wronged. It is not just that some legal or moral 
rule has been broken, but that what is owed to the right-holder has not been 
forthcoming.108
While what Jones says is reasonable, it tells us little about the essential feature of 
rights. This is because, under the entitlement theory, in any particular right-statement 
the word ‘right’ is simply replaced by the word ‘title’. To clarify, let us return to an 
example of a right already given in the chapter and examine how the entitlement theory 
illuminates our understanding of the right. The right against being tortured to death 
would presumably be explained by the fact that the right-holder has been entitled (either 
legally, morally, or both) to not be tortured to death. While this may be true, we are none 
the wiser regarding what a right is. Yes, the right makes the right-holder the locus of 
legal or moral concern, and yes, it requires others to refrain from acting in certain ways. 
But we already know this from the right-statement itself. The investing of a title may well 
be part of what rights do, but it does not tell us what rights are.
Another alternative to the will and interest theories has recently been advocated by Leif 
Wenar. Wenar claims that there is no one thing that all rights do for right-holders, 
because they have various functions.109 Wenar’s ‘several functions theory’ offers the 
following conception of rights:
All rights are Hohfeldian incidents. All Hohfeldian incidents are rights so long as they 
mark exemption, or discretion, or authorization, or entitle their holders to protection,
106 Note that H.J. McCloskey also sees rights as entitlements. H.J. McCloskey, “Rights”, The Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 59, Moral Philosophy Number, April 1965: 115-127.
107 Peter Jones, Rights, p. 36.
108 Ibid. pp. 36-37.
109 Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Rights”, p. 248.
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provision, or performance. Therefore, rights are all those Hohfeldian incidents that 
perform these several functions.110 
Wenar believes that his theory better captures the essence of rights when compared to 
‘single function theories’ like the interest and will theories. This is because it 
acknowledges that rights play a number of roles in our lives, and thus can account for 
every single instance of every right-claim.
Wenaris theory might be regarded as the logical extension of seeking a theory that 
attempts to ascertain the essential feature of each and every instance of a right-claim. 
Because rights are so numerous and various in type, it should be of little surprise that 
some will ‘protect’, others will ‘authorise’, others will ‘provide’ and so on. Unfortunately, 
by opting for a theory that is so disparate we start to lose focus on the essential feature 
that unites the vast majority of these functions. For it is clear that we ordinarily grant 
exemption, discretion, protection and so on to individuals in order to benefit them. To 
illustrate, let us consider some examples of these different functions of rights. As an 
example of an ‘exemption-based’ right, Wenar offers the licence to drive a car. This is 
an exemption from a general duty not to operate dangerous machinery at high 
speeds.111 As an example of a ‘protection-based’ right, we might offer an individual’s 
right against assault. Finally, a ‘provision-based’ right can be illustrated by a child’s right 
to a decent education.112 While we can agree with Wenar that all of these examples of 
rights have different functions, it is nevertheless clear that all of these functions afford 
benefits to the right-holder. So we might concur that rights grant their holders 
exemption, discretion, authorisation, protection, provision or performance, but still 
maintain that these functions serve primarily to secure and further the interests of 
individuals.
Of course, it will be pointed out at this stage that I have brushed under the carpet the 
fact that interests do not ground every single one of these functions. In particular, rights 
that serve to ‘authorise’ an individual with a power of office are not always based on the 
interests of the right-holder. As we saw above, a doctor who is authorised the power to 
prescribe can be considered as possessing a right even though that right is not 
grounded in her interest in prescribing drugs. In light of this, I think it is best to accept 
that the interest theory is incomplete. However, while the interest theory cannot account 
for every single instance of every single Hohfeldian incident, it nevertheless captures the
1.0 Ibid., p. 252.
1.1 Ibid., p. 226.
1.2 Ibid., p. 229.
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true essence of the vast majority of rights. So while Wenar is correct to point out that 
rights serve different functions, in his quest for a complete theory he loses sight of the 
fact that most of these functions -  with the exception of authorisation - are themselves 
based on the interests of the right-holder. By aiming for absolute completeness in our 
account of rights, we end up with a theory that tells us little about what they are. 
Moreover, since animals are not the types of entity that can possess rights which 
correlate to the powers of office, the interest theory adequately accounts for the types of 
moral right that are the concern of this thesis.
However, while all of this is useful at a conceptual level by explaining the kind of thing 
that rights are, it is not particularly useful in helping us assign moral rights. Rights might 
well be based on interests, but when is it justified to invest someone or something with a 
right? And what type of entity can be legitimately described as possessing a right? 
These important questions are addressed in the following two sections.
4.2 Assigning Moral Rights
The project of assigning moral rights is crucial, both to this thesis and to anyone who 
considers rights to have moral force. For if rights are to provide the theoretical 
framework within which to formulate our obligations to individuals (human or otherwise), 
we are in crucial need of a means to determine which moral rights (if any) such 
individuals possess. However, for most analyses of rights, the question of the grounds 
on which we might legitimately assign moral rights has been left somewhat neglected. 
Indeed, most theories of rights focus solely on identifying and defending the essential 
feature (or features) of rights.
To illustrate, consider the entitlement theory, which tells us that rights are always 
ascriptions of titles. This theory by itself fails to offer an account of when such 
ascriptions are justified. For example, up until 1979 husbands in the UK were legally 
entitled to rape their wives. Does this mean that these men possessed a moral right to 
rape? On its own, the entitlement theory can tell us nothing. We need further 
argumentation to either justify or deny the possession of particular titles.
The will theory claims that rights are choices that an individual holds over whether to 
demand or waive enforcement of a relevant duty. However, it cannot by itself tell us 
when such choices and duties are morally legitimate. For example, a slave-owner has 
the power to demand or waive the duties of his slave. Does he then have a moral right 
to the services of his slave? Again, the will theory by itself is silent on the matter. We
76
require further argument to determine whether the slave in this example possesses a 
moral duty to serve his master.
The interest theory as set out above also suffers from the same problem. The interest 
theory claims that rights are benefits afforded to the right-holder. However, it does not 
determine which benefits should be afforded the protection of rights. For example, I 
might benefit from the possession of my neighbour’s house, but does that mean I have a 
right to it? The interest theory as set out above can provide no answer.
What is clearly needed then is a means by which to determine when the ascription of 
moral rights is justified. I claim in this section of the chapter that Joseph Raz has 
provided the appropriate framework with which to do this. Before proceeding with the 
defence of this claim, I should point out that in defending Raz’s framework I do not 
address the objections that his account cannot explain group rights, powers of office and 
rights involving third-party beneficiaries.113 While I do consider Raz’s theory to at least 
be able to account for group rights and the rights of third-party beneficiaries, such rights 
are not relevant to this thesis, making any such discussion superfluous. That is to say, 
the animal rights I consider in the remaining chapters of the thesis are neither group 
rights, powers of office, nor the rights of third-party beneficiaries. With this qualification 
in mind then, let us move to the explanation and defence of the Razian framework.
4.2.1 Joseph Raz’s Interest Theory
Raz has argued that an individual has a moral right when that individual has an interest 
that is sufficient to impose a duty on another:
‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an 
aspect of X ’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other 
person(s) to be under a duty.114 
What we have here is an interest-based theory that sets out a means by which to 
determine which interests correspond to rights. The theory exhibits two important 
features. First of all, having an interest in something does not mean that one 
automatically has a right to that thing. Instead, in order to have a right the interest must 
give grounds for holding another to be under a duty. Thus, while we might recognise 
some interest of an individual, other considerations might mean that no-one is under a 
duty with respect to it, and therefore that no relevant right exists. For example, if I do not
113 The latter objection is made by H .L.A . Hart, “Are there any Natural Rights?”, pp. 57-58.
114 Joseph Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom, p. 166.
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(like the look of my face, I might have an interest in being provided with a face-lift. 
However, given the expense of face-lifts and given the nature of my interest, it may be 
that no-one is under a duty to provide me with one, and thus that I have no right to be 
provided with a face-lift.
The second important feature of Raz’s theory is that it is a scheme in which rights 
ground duties. In other words, rights do not just correlate with duties; sometimes a duty 
exists because of the establishment of a right. I say ‘sometimes’ because not all duties 
are rights-based: some duties are justified by reasons other than rights.115 Nevertheless, 
the fact that rights ground duties is worth noting because it shows that the determination 
of who has a right often precedes the determination of who has the corresponding duty 
and what that duty is.116 Thus, although we may establish that someone or something 
has a moral right, there may still be work to be done with regards to formulating our 
precise moral obligations.
4.2.2 The Peremptory Force of Rights
One interesting claim that Raz makes about rights is that they have ‘peremptory 
force’.117 The peremptoriness of rights is generally taken to mean that rights are not 
simply important considerations to be weighed and balanced against other 
considerations in our moral deliberations. Instead, rights end such balancing by 
delineating what ought to be done. The peremptory force of rights is not a notion unique 
to Raz. Most rights theorists regard rights as acting as constraints on aggregative 
reasoning, rather than as things to be subsumed by it.118 Thus, rights mark important 
limits on what can be done to an individual. All this, of course, is in keeping with the 
comments made at the very beginning of the chapter: rights appropriately reflect the 
value and separateness of individuals, by not treating them aggregatively. It thus seems 
important that the scheme we use to assign moral rights reflects the peremptoriness of 
rights.
115 For example, it could reasonably be claimed that I have a duty not to destroy the rare flowers growing in 
my garden. Such a duty does not seem to be necessarily founded on anyone or anything’s moral right.
116 Joseph Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom , pp. 184-185. See also, Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 16.
117 Joseph Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom, p. 192.
118 Rights have been regarded as ‘ limits’, ‘trumps’, and ‘side-constraints’ on an aggregative framework.
For examples see, Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia; Jeremy Waldron, “Rights in Conflict”, 
Ethics, Vol. 99, No. 3, April 1989: 503-519; and, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: 
Duckworth, 2004).
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However, as Nigel Simmonds has pointed out, Raz’s scheme actually seems to count 
against the peremptoriness of rights:
Establishing the existence of a right will, for this theory, be only the first step in a
potentially complex course of reasoning that may or may not lead to the conclusion
119that a certain individual is under a duty.
After all, we have seen that the establishment of a right under Raz’s theory will not 
always allow us to distinguish the precise duty or the particular duty-bearer in relation to 
that right. Often, much more work needs to take place in order to determine what 
morally ought to be done. Thus, far from ending moral deliberation, establishing a right 
under this theory seems to be just the tip of the iceberg.
However, while under Raz’s scheme it may not always be obvious who has a duty 
when a moral right is identified, establishing a right does involve the claim that someone 
is under a duty. Otherwise, the right could not have been established in the first
instance. There thus seems to be a simple way to rescue the idea that rights are
peremptory. That is, we can claim that all rights impose duties that determine finally 
what ought to be done. However, because of the complexities of ethical choices and 
decisions, the establishment of the right alone will not always tell us who has the 
relevant duty and what it consists of. There is no contradiction in claiming that a right 
has peremptory force, while also claiming that the duty that it is connected to is 
sometimes unclear.
This notion of peremptoriness also brings up the issue of rights conflicts. For as 
Jeremy Waldron has pointed out, if we follow Raz’s analysis of rights, conflicts of rights 
seem inevitable.120 For example, imagine that you and I are in hospital, both with some 
terminal disease that requires a particular pill to cure it. It would seem that we both have 
an interest that is sufficient to impose a duty on the doctors to provide us with that pill. 
However, what if there is only one pill? Here it seems is a case where rights clash, and 
thus do not seem to be peremptory. I believe that Raz’s scheme is able to deal with 
such clashes if it invokes the idea of ‘prima facie rights’. Prima facie rights are those 
rights that exist outside of specific circumstances, and such rights can conflict. So, to 
return to the hospital example, it can legitimately be argued that we both have a prima 
facie right to healthcare. However, once we examine the specific details of a situation, 
prima facie rights might not always translate into the actual assignation of those rights.
119 N.E. Simmonds, “Rights at the Cutting Edge” p. 204.
120 Jeremy Waldron, “Rights in Conflict”, p. 503.
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Thus, if it transpires that the pill will give me just a few more months of life (imagine that I 
have some other disease, for example), but is likely to give you many more years, it 
could be argued that your interest in the pill outweighs mine, and you have a right to the 
pill, and I do not. Hence, prima facie rights might clash, but concrete rights cannot. This 
allows rights to retain their peremptory force in finally deciding what morally ought to be 
done.
Clearly, Raz’s scheme is not the end of the process by which we ascribe moral rights. 
That is to say, on its own it cannot finally determine the validity of any putative moral 
right. We need to identify relevant interests and assess whether they are sufficient for 
the imposition of a duty. Thus, a good deal of argument and justification needs to be 
done in order for a right to be assigned. Moreover, even when a moral right is assigned, 
that does not signal the end of moral deliberation: we also need to go on to identify the 
appropriate duty-bearers and the nature of the duty itself. In other words, Raz’s scheme 
only provides the framework for deciding who has which rights, and who has which 
duties. This is the framework that shall be used in subsequent chapters when deciding 
what obligations we have to animals in the fields of experimentation, agriculture, 
entertainment and culture.
4.3 Can Non-Human Animals Have Moral Rights?
Before getting on to the examination of these different contexts, however, one crucial 
problem remains. For it may not have gone unnoticed that one important aspect of 
Raz’s scheme has thus far been neglected. Raz writes that, ‘“X has a right’ if and only if 
X  can have rights...”121 Thus Raz, like so many other philosophers, claims that not all 
entities can possess rights. It might be the case then, that although Raz’s scheme is the 
appropriate means for assigning moral rights, it is ill-suited to the formulation of our 
moral obligations to non-human animals, because animals are not the sort of creatures 
that can be right-holders. In this section I examine certain capacities that some 
philosophers regard as necessary for an entity to be a right-holder. Since most of these 
conditions refer to some aspect of ‘personhood’ (moral agency, autonomous choice and 
so on), they bar animals from being right-holders. However, I will conclude that these 
characteristics are unnecessary for being a right-holder, and that any entity with the 
capacity for well-being is able to possess a right.
121 Ibid., p. 166 (emphasis added).
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4.3.1 Choice and Autonomy
While I have proposed that the essential feature of rights is that they benefit the right­
holders, and that we should assign rights on the basis of interests, it does not follow that 
anything with interests must also have rights. After all, having interests might be a 
necessary but insufficient condition for possessing rights. In light of this, perhaps we can 
resurrect the will theory and use it as an account of who or what is capable of 
possessing rights.
The will theory holds that only those creatures capable of exercising choice can 
possess rights. This is due to the fact that it claims that in order to have a right, one 
must be able to demand or waive enforcement of the duty of another. Thus, if one lacks 
the capacity for such waiving or demanding, one cannot possess a right. Since it is 
uncontroversial that animals are incapable of such choice, the will theory denies rights to 
animals and other ‘unempowerable creatures’.122 Hart makes the point clearly:
These considerations should incline us not to extend to animals and babies whom it 
is wrong to ill-treat the notion of a right to proper treatment, for the moral situation 
can be simply and adequately described here by saying that it is wrong or that we 
ought not to ill-treat them or, in the philosopher’s generalized sense of ‘duty’, that we
123have a duty not to ill treat them.
What is interesting about Hart’s claim is that he is not denying the possibility that animals 
merit ethical consideration in their own right; he is simply stating that because they lack 
the capacity for autonomous choice, animals are incapable of possessing rights.
Of course, it is necessary to ask why the capacity for choice is so important. As we 
saw earlier, an individual can have a right even when he is unable to waive or demand a 
duty in a particular circumstance. For example, individuals have the legal right not to be 
tortured to death, even when they themselves cannot waive the duty of others to refrain 
from torture. Given this, why would we want to limit the range of right-holders to those 
with the capacity for choice? The answer comes from the relationship between rights 
and autonomy. As Angus Taylor puts it:
Unlike animals, it is argued, each human being is confronted with the question of 
how to live his or her life. It is because we can make moral choices that we require a
122 ‘Unempowerable creatures’ is taken from Hillel Steiner, “Working Rights”, p. 259.
123 H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?”, p. 58.
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sphere of personal jurisdiction within which we can exercise this capacity. Our rights 
define this sphere.124
Here we get to the nub of the matter. For will theorists, rights demarcate spheres of non­
interference in which humans should be left to formulate and pursue their plans.125 If 
individuals lack the capacity for such autonomous choice - as animals, children and the 
mentally disabled do -  then such individuals are not creatures whom one can 
legitimately speak of as possessing rights.
Of course, this way of looking at rights does have some appeal. For we do often speak 
of rights as essentially connected to freedom, autonomy and choice. To take some 
examples, the rights to free speech, religion, association and so on, all endow their 
holders with entitlements to non-interference. However, as we have seen, rights are 
frequently unrelated to or founded upon autonomy. To maintain that they are would 
make the list of rights we possess implausibly narrow. For example, my right not to be 
tortured is not based on the fact that torture will interfere with my personal dominion of 
autonomous choice, but on my clear interest in avoiding excruciating pain. We can thus 
see that the things that we possess as rights are not solely related to autonomous 
choice. In fact, I have argued that rights are based on our interests. Furthermore, our 
interests are not exhausted by our interest in autonomous choice. This fact helps to 
explain why it is generally regarded as uncontroversial that children can possess rights. 
That is, while children may lack the capacity for autonomous choice, they do have 
interests. Moreover, some of a child’s interests, such as her right not to be abused, are 
entitled to protection in the form of rights.
Some theorists, however, are willing to face up to the implications of the will theory and 
maintain that the capacity for autonomous choice is necessary to possess a right. 
Nevertheless, it is claimed that this does not entail important interests being left 
unprotected by rights. For example, Hillel Steiner acknowledges that many people want 
to ascribe rights to children and animals (and other ‘unempowerable creatures’) because 
of the fact that they have interests that merit protection. Moreover, they want to ascribe 
rights to such individuals because rights are viewed as ‘peremptory’. Steiner, however, 
does not see this as a problem for the will theory. That is, he claims that the interests of 
children and animals do merit protection in the form of rights, even under the will theory. 
However, Steiner claims that the right lies not with the child and animal themselves, but
124 Angus Taylor, Animals and Ethics, (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003), p. 59.
125 Hillel Steiner, “Working Rights”, p. 238.
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with the individual capable of demanding or waiving the relevant duties.126 For example, 
a child has an interest in not being abused, but the right lies not with her, but with 
someone else such as her parents, the police, a state official and so on.
This approach is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, this scheme is it too much at 
odds with our common understanding of rights. Ordinarily in right claims, the right-holder 
and the object of our moral concern coincide. However, under Steiner’s scheme, the 
individual who possesses the right and our object of moral concern are different people. 
This seems strange because we are used to conferring rights on individuals on the basis 
of what they are owed, rather than on the basis of what someone else is owed. Second, 
for Steiner a right only exists when there is someone with the ability to exercise choice 
over the right: to waive or demand enforcement of the relevant duty. However, this is 
implausible. For example, it is evident that no-one can legitimately waive our moral duty 
not to abuse children. Such a duty is unwaivable. Thus, for Steiner, it must be the case 
that not only do children have no moral right against abuse, but no-one has a moral right 
against child abuse. Thus we are back to the situation where a child’s interest in not 
being abused is unprotected by a right.
Employing the will theory as our means of determining what kind of entity can have 
moral rights is fatally flawed. The claim that only beings capable of choice can possess 
moral rights needs defending. The defence must point to the fact that rights demarcate 
spheres of autonomous choice. However, this is not all that rights do: they serve 
individuals’ interests, not all of which relate to autonomy. Once it is recognised that 
moral rights are founded on interests, the will theory is unable to explain why moral 
rights should be denied to entities with the capacity for well-being, but without the 
capacity for autonomous choice.
4.3.2 Reciprocity and Moral Agency
However, perhaps non-human animals cannot be right-holders because they are unable 
to morally reciprocate. That is to say, while we might be said to have duties or 
obligations to animals, animals cannot be said to have any such duties to us, since they 
lack moral agency. This inability to reciprocate might bar animals from being able to 
possess rights. Of course, this begs the question: why is the ability to reciprocate 
necessary to possess rights?
126 Ibid., pp. 259-261.
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The importance of reciprocity is frequently advanced by ‘contractarian’ political and 
moral philosophers. These philosophers regard the obligations we have to one another 
as the result of some kind of hypothetical contract. Thus the benefits, burdens, rights 
and duties we hold as individuals are justified to the extent that we would have chosen 
them in the formulation of this contract. Clearly animals are incapable of deliberating 
and acting morally, and would thus be unable to choose or consent to any such contract. 
For this reason alone, animals might be said to be incapable of possessing moral rights.
Even if we accept that moral principles and moral rights derive from such a contract, 
however, it remains unclear why animals must therefore be excluded from the class of 
rights-holders. True, animals cannot participate and select moral rights in a hypothetical 
contract, but it does not follow from this fact that animals cannot be selected as 
legitimate right-holders.127
At this stage, it might be pointed out that I have missed one of the crucial features of 
many such hypothetical contracts. That is, the parties formulating the moral principles 
are not just rational and moral, but also self-interested. It is here that this notion of 
reciprocity really kicks in, because individuals formulating the contract choose principles 
restricting their own conduct on the basis that others will accept similar restrictions. The 
end result, it is claimed, will thus be of mutual advantage. With this in mind, it would 
seem that the parties would have little motivation to formulate principles restricting their 
conduct with regards to animals. Indeed, the parties would surely benefit from denying 
rights to animals: they could then use animals however they please. The contractarian 
Peter Carruthers makes this same point:
Since it is rational agents who are to choose the system of rules, and choose self- 
interestedly, it is only rational agents who will have their position protected under the 
rules. There seems to be no reason why rights should be assigned to non-rational 
agents.128
However, it must be pointed out that for any contract theory based on mutual 
advantage to be plausible, self-interest must be qualified. For if self-interest were left 
unchecked, any particular individual might choose principles that favour his own race, 
gender, religion, social group and so on. This seems, in terms of fairness, an 
unreasonable way of selecting principles of justice. For this very reason, John Rawls
127 Having said that, since the contract is hypothetical it remains unclear to me why animals could not be 
given the hypothetical capacity for moral deliberation and thus be able to participate. However, the idea 
that reciprocity necessitates excluding animals from the class o f right-holders can be defeated without 
delving into such a difficult (and contentious!) proposal, so I leave it aside.
128 Peter Carruthers, The Animal Issue, pp. 98-99.
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places his contracting parties behind a ‘veil of ignorance’.129 Behind the veil of 
ignorance, individuals are unaware of their race, gender, religion, class, natural abilities 
and so on. This means that parties must choose principles without knowing who they 
will be and what social position they will hold. In this way, impartiality is built into the 
contracting process. Rawls sees self-interest and impartiality as the two means of 
achieving fair principles.
However, none of this suggests that we can use the Rawlsian model to ascribe rights to 
animals. For even behind the veil of ignorance, the parties know that they will be 
members of society: a cooperative community for mutual advantage. In other words, the 
parties know that they will bring something to this scheme, and in return will receive 
something. So once again, we are left to wonder on what basis parties formulating 
principles for such a scheme would allocate rights to animals who cannot reciprocate.
Perhaps the most obvious point to make in reply to this is that the contractarian scheme 
as constructed here would also exclude many humans from possessing rights. After all, 
many humans due to disability or age bring nothing to the cooperative venture. And yet, 
most of us regard children and the disabled as legitimate possessors of rights. A 
contractarian who wishes to include such humans in the class of right-holders and yet 
exclude animals, will need to show on what basis it would be rational and in their 
interests for the choosing parties to do so.
One possible argument a contractarian might make is to point out that children, unlike 
animals, will eventually be able to reciprocate. It would thus be rational for parties to 
protect children with rights to ensure their future contribution to the cooperative scheme. 
Building an argument along these lines might thus be able to keep children among those 
beings capable of possessing rights. However, this argument does not work for those 
disabled humans who will never be able to contribute to society in the relevant way. 
Nevertheless, a plausible but different argument could be made. For it might be claimed 
that parties could imagine themselves, through accident or illness, becoming disabled in 
the future. This would make it rational and in their interests for parties to give rights to 
the disabled. And since the parties know that there is no chance of them changing
129 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice. O f course, I should point out that Rawls’s contractarianism as outlined 
in A Theory o f  Justice pertains to the principles that should regulate the ‘basic structure’ o f society. In 
other words, the scope of its application is limited to such things as the legal, political, financial and 
economic institutions o f society; it is not intended to provide the basis for a general theory of morality. 
However, since Rawls’s arguments could be used for such a theory, and given the legacy and force o f his 
ideas, they are valuable and necessary to this discussion.
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species in the future, there will be no such rational and self-interested reason to assign 
rights to non-humans.
However, this argument clearly fails to work for individuals who are disabled for their 
whole lives. The parties would not seek to protect these individuals, for just as they 
could never change species, nor could they become individuals who have been disabled 
their entire lives. This, of course, is because the parties are rational self-interested 
parties who can and do contribute to society. In light of all this, there seems to be no 
rational and self-interested reason for contracting parties to assign rights to those 
disabled individuals who have been unable to reciprocate throughout all of their lives. 
And yet, most of us believe that such permanently disabled humans beings can and do 
have rights.
There seems to be two options available to the contractarian. First, she could 
steadfastly maintain that all those individuals who have never or will never be able to 
reciprocate should be excluded from holding rights. This, of course, would lead to the 
exclusion of many disabled human beings from the class of right-holders. The 
immediate unattractiveness of this conclusion suggests that we should at least look to 
see if there is a legitimate alternative option. I believe that there is a better alternative. 
Simply, she could propose a contract that is not fundamentally based on the notions of 
reciprocity and self-interest. Instead, more emphasis could be placed on the role of the 
contract in modelling what is fair.130 For example, we might argue that parties should 
select principles impartially, so that they not only apply to those who contribute to a 
society based on mutual advantage, but also to those whose lives can go better or 
worse for themselves.131 This would not only allow for the straightforward ascription of 
rights to children and the disabled, but also to animals.
To conclude this section, I wish to state that the capacity for moral reciprocity is not 
necessary to be a right-holder. Even if we assume that moral principles (and thus rights) 
are derived from a hypothetical contract, it does not follow that animals should be 
excluded. While it is clear that animals could not select the principles of justice, they 
could nevertheless be selected as right-holders under those principles. If it is claimed
130 Mark Rowlands takes this option, arguing that i f  one pays attention to the notion o f ‘intuitive equality’ 
in Rawls’s argument, an effective Rawlsian and contractarian basis for animal rights can be achieved. He 
does this by putting knowledge that one is a rational agent behind the veil o f ignorance. Mark Rowlands, 
“Contractarianism and Animal Rights”, Journal o f  Applied Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1997: 235-247.
131 This suggestion is influenced by Brian Barry’s argument in favour of a conception of justice as 
impartiality, rather than justice as mutual advantage. See Brian Barry, Justice As Impartiality, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995).
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that animals would not be selected because they bring nothing to a community based on 
mutual advantage, we must ask whether mutual advantage is so fundamental to our 
moral principles. Our ready ascription of moral rights to children and the disabled 
suggests that it is not.
4.3.3 Well-Being
As stated above, Raz does not think that all entities are capable of being right-holders. 
Instead, he regards only those creatures whose well-being is of ultimate value as 
capable of possessing rights:
Capacity for possessing rights: An individual is capable of having rights if and only if 
either his well-being is of ultimate value or he is an ‘artificial person’ (e.g. a
1*50
corporation).
So some entities, according to Raz, have ultimate value, while others are only valuable 
instrumentally or derivatively. Entities with instrumental or derivative value are valuable 
only in terms of their consequences for other things. As an example of an entity that is 
only valuable instrumentally, Raz offers a fine work of art. He argues that the value of 
any piece of art is derivative: “It derives from their contribution to the well-being of 
persons.”133
Let us assume that Raz is correct, and that only beings whose well-being is of ultimate 
value can possess rights. Is the well-being of non-human animals derivative or ultimate? 
Raz himself offers no answer to the question, simply stating that some people regard 
creatures such as dogs to have derivative value, while others regard them to be of 
ultimate value.134 However, this is rather unsatisfactory. What we need is some means 
by which to determine whether dogs have ultimate or derivative value. This, I believe, I 
have already provided. In my discussion of well-being in Chapter 2, I claimed that the 
capacity for well-being is a necessary and sufficient condition for having moral status. 
To have moral status is to be ethically considerable in one’s own right That is to say, to 
have moral status is to merit particular treatment for oneself, and not just because of 
one’s contribution to someone else’s well-being or to some greater good. Thus, entities 
with the capacity for well-being are necessarily of ultimate value. In sum then, to have 
interests and the capacity for well-being is to be an entity capable of possessing rights.
132 Joseph Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom, p. 166.
133 Ibid., p. 178.
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In this section I have argued that sentient animals can have moral rights. This is based 
on their capacity for well-being and, thus, their possession of interests. Rights are 
sometimes thought to be held only by those beings who are ‘persons’: those creatures 
capable of moral agency and autonomous choice. However, once we recognise the fact 
that some of our rights are unrelated to our status as persons, but instead are based on 
other interests, then the justification for limiting the class of right-holders to persons 
vanishes. All entities with interests, with lives that can go well or badly for themselves, 
are capable of possessing moral rights.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has defended an interest-based rights framework for the purpose of 
delineating our moral obligations to non-humans. Moreover, it has claimed that non­
human animals can legitimately be ascribed moral rights. This rights-based framework 
is in keeping with the account of moral status given in preceding chapters. For rather 
than treating animals as receptacles of value, it marks out limits on the pursuit of 
aggregative goals. After all, sentient animals are ethically considerable in their own 
right, and each sentient animal is considerable in their own right. To put it in Raz’s 
terms, the well-being of each sentient animal is of ultimate value.
With all of this in mind, it must now be asked which moral rights non-human animals 
possess, and what moral obligations we have to them. The task of the remaining 
chapters of the thesis is to examine whether animals have rights not to be experimented 
upon, not to be raised for food, not to be used for human entertainment, and not to be 
used in cultural practices.
5. Non-Human Animals and Experimentation
Non-human animals are used for a wide range of experiments in laboratories across the 
globe. To simplify, we can distinguish two different types of animal experimentation: 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic.135 The former are often also referred to as ‘medical 
experiments’ and include those procedures that are carried out to research diseases and 
biological processes, to develop new drugs, and to test drugs for safety. While most of 
these experiments are designed to bring improvements to human health, it should not be 
overlooked that experiments for animal medicines also fall under this therapeutic 
umbrella. Non-therapeutic experiments, on the other hand, include those procedures 
that are carried out for general biological research, for educational purposes and for 
testing household products and cosmetics. While the testing of toiletries and cosmetics 
is now banned in the UK, non-therapeutic experimentation is currently permitted in most 
countries, is claimed to confer considerable benefits to humans, and is thus worthy of 
being included within the analysis of this chapter.136
Of whichever form, the issue of animal experimentation is more politically heated than 
any other question relating to our treatment of animals. This, I believe, is partly due to 
the fact that prima facie both sides have convincing arguments. Proponents of animal 
experimentation point to the incredible benefits that humans are claimed to receive from 
experimenting on animals, and conclude that such experiments are absolutely essential 
for human well-being. Those against animal experiments point to the enormous levels of 
suffering that such experiments inflict on animals, and provide gruesome details of 
practices within the laboratory that create incredible distress to millions of sentient 
beings.
In this chapter, I explore whether animals have a moral right not to be experimented 
upon. To determine this, and following the Razian conception of rights that I outlined in 
Chapter 4 , 1 will examine whether animals possess an interest that is sufficient to impose 
upon us a moral duty not to experiment on them. To this end, the chapter is divided into 
four sections. First, I propose a means of assessing the strength of an individual’s 
welfare interests. In the subsequent three sections I examine three potential interests of
1351 borrow this distinction from Robert Gamer, Animals, Politics and Morality, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1993), p. 121.
136 The testing o f cosmetics and toiletries on animals in the U K  has been banned since 1998. In 2002 the 
EU decided to ban such use by 2009-2013. For a recent call for the return o f cosmetic testing, see Alok 
Jhan and Paul Lewis, “Scientist backs animal testing for cosmetics”, The Guardian, 4th March 2006.
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animals that might ground a right not to be experimented upon: the interest in not 
suffering, the interest in continued life and the interest in being free. I will claim that 
while the first two of these interests give strong grounds for an animal’s right not to be 
experimented upon, the latter interest does not. For this reason, I will conclude that 
animal experiments that result in pain or death are morally illegitimate, while painless 
experiments in which the animal does not die are permissible.
5.1 Establishing the Strength of an Interest
In order to establish whether animals have an interest that is sufficient to ground a right 
not to be experimented upon, we need some way of determining the strength of their 
interests. You will recall that in Chapter 3 I proposed that we should consider the 
interests of those entities with moral standing equally and on their own merits. But just 
how are we to determine their strength? In this section I argue that there are two broad 
factors relevant to the strength of an interest: the value of the particular good to the well­
being of the individual in question, and the level of psychological continuity between the 
individual now and when the good or goods will occur.137 Before commencing, I should 
make it clear that what I have to say in this section concerns determining the strength of 
individuals’ welfare interests, as defined in Chapter 3, rather than their ulterior interests. 
I am not concerned with what makes a personal aim or personal conception of the good 
weaker or stronger for individuals. First of all, this is because these types of interests 
rarely translate into moral rights. To take an example I gave in Chapter 3 ,1 may have an 
interest in being a good teacher, but it would be odd to say that I have a moral right to be 
a good teacher. Secondly, welfare interests are held by animals, whereas ulterior 
interests, being related to one’s personal conception of the good, are only held by 
persons. For these reasons then, I am concerned with the strength of welfare interests: 
those necessary goods for a life to go well.
5.1.1 Value to the Individual and Psychological Continuity
The first obvious way in which we can determine the strength of an interest is to consider 
its value to the individual in question. This, of course, is an incredibly difficult task, but is 
by no means entirely futile. For example, I have an interest in both having enough to
137 This account o f the strength of an interest is greatly influenced by Jeff McMahan’s account o f the 
strength of what he calls ‘time-relative interests’. However, as I make clear later in the chapter, my account 
differs in one important regard. See Jeff McMahan, The Ethics o f  Killing, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p. 80.
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eat, and in receiving paid holiday. However, the value of having enough to eat is greater 
for me than that of receiving holiday pay. I could live a life of high quality without paid 
holiday, but would find it hard to do so without having enough to eat. It therefore makes 
sense to say that my interest in having sufficient food is stronger than my interest in 
receiving holiday pay.
The second factor which often contributes to the strength of an interest concerns the 
relationship between the individual at the time when we attribute the interest, and the 
individual when that interest will be satisfied. Jeff McMahan calls this the ‘psychological 
continuity’ of the individual between now and when the future good or goods will 
occur.138 By psychological continuity McMahan means those psychological connections 
that link ourselves over time. Examples of such connections include: the relation 
between an experience and the memory of it; a desire and the later experience of its 
satisfaction or frustration; and the earlier and later manifestation of a character trait, 
value or belief.139 Without doubt, not everything and everyone has equal levels of 
psychological continuity over time. For example, ordinarily a newborn infant has 
negligible levels of psychological continuity with her future self at age 21, while a 21 year 
old has strong continuity with herself as a 25 year old. Now McMahan’s claim is that an 
individual’s interest in a future good varies with the strength of this psychological 
continuity. So, if the level of psychological continuity between the individual now and the 
time when the goods are received is strong, then the interest in that good becomes 
stronger. However, if the level of psychological continuity is weak, then the 
corresponding interest becomes weaker.
But why is psychological continuity over time important at all? Perhaps the total 
amount of good in a life should be the factor in ascertaining the strength of an interest, 
irrespective of psychological continuity. However, this claim is mistaken. As I argued in 
Chapter 4, individuals should not be regarded as receptacles of value contributing to the 
net amount of good in the universe; rather, what matters from a moral point of view are 
individuals themselves. Maximising the good in a life is important because it is of value 
to the individual whose life it is, not because it contributes to the total good in the world. 
And if we are concerned with the value individuals receive from the good in their lives, 
psychological continuity must be important. For surely a good is of more value to an 
individual when that individual can strongly identify with the subject receiving that good.
138 Ibid., p. 59.
139 Ibid., p. 39.
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In this way, a future good of mine will be of more value to me the more I can identify with 
the future self who receives that good. For these reasons, psychological continuity over 
time is a contributing factor to the strength of interests that relate to future goods.
5.2 A Right Not to Be Subject to Painful Experimentation?
Given this account of the strength of interests, we must now consider whether animals 
possess any interests that are sufficient to ground in them right not to be experimented 
upon. First of all then, we must consider the animal interest in not suffering. After all, it 
is evident that most experiments carried out on animals necessitate the infliction of pain: 
experiments are usually designed to model particular diseases, to assess the effects of 
drugs, and to test how much of a particular product can be administered before it 
becomes dangerous. Furthermore, the animal subjects are often kept in caged, 
cramped conditions that cause considerable suffering. More recent practices, such as 
the production of genetically engineered animals, also usually involve the infliction of 
considerable pain on animals, even when this is not intended.
I wish to claim that animals have a very strong interest in avoiding suffering. Take, for 
example, the value of avoiding pain for animal well-being. The account of animal well­
being I gave in Chapter 3 was hedonistic: an animal’s life goes better for that individual 
when he or she has more enjoyment and less suffering in that life. The absence of pain 
is thus absolutely crucial for an animal’s life to go well, and we can reasonably claim that 
a sentient animal has a very strong interest in avoiding pain. In fact, some philosophers 
have suggested that an animal’s interest in avoiding suffering is equivalent to that of a 
human’s. For suffering by its nature is a bad experience for whoever feels it and, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, there is good evidence to support the notion that pain is 
experienced in a similar way by both humans and sentient animals.140
However, the claim that animals and humans have an equivalent interest in avoiding 
suffering might be questioned. For example, it might be pointed out that human persons 
are capable of more than simple phenomenal consciousness, making their suffering 
worse. To illustrate, imagine that my dog and I break a leg which causes us both to 
suffer. It could be claimed that this suffering is worse for me because of my extra 
cognitive capacities. For instance, I might dwell on and become obsessed by the pain, 
thus spiralling into a depression. Also, as a person I have certain aims and projects I
140 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, pp. 7-17.
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wish to fulfil that might be frustrated by my broken leg, exacerbating my suffering. Both 
capacities are lacking in my dog, perhaps making the break less bad for him.
However, these types of arguments can also be used to support the idea that the dog 
suffers more from his leg being broken. For example, perhaps my additional capacities 
allow me to rationalise my pain, understanding that it will come to an end. A dog on the 
other hand, might be totally consumed by his suffering. Similarly, it might be that my 
plans and projects actually lessen the effects of my pain, helping me to enjoy a decent 
quality of life despite the break. It seems to me that such arguments could run and run, 
without ever reaching an adequate solution. For this reason, I doubt that we can come 
up with any definitive basis for saying that avoiding suffering is more valuable for 
humans, more valuable for animals, or equally valuable for both animals and humans. 
Instead then, we must recognise that suffering is sometimes worse for humans and 
sometimes worse for animals. However, we can also say that ordinarily, avoiding 
suffering is extremely valuable for both.
But what about the other factor relating to the strength of an interest, psychological 
continuity? First of all, it seems clear that animals, as non-persons, possess weaker 
psychological continuity with their future selves when compared to human persons. This 
is quite simply because animals have fewer earlier and later mental states that refer to 
one another.141 It is true that animals are not trapped in the present and do have desires 
which are future-oriented. However, lacking higher forms of consciousness, they cannot 
conceive of themselves in the future like persons can, and certainly cannot reflect on 
long-term future events like persons. Given this, does this make the animal interest in 
not suffering weaker than that of humans? Not necessarily, for the interest in not 
suffering does not always refer to some future good, to be obtained by some future self; 
in fact, it usually relates to an immediate good to be received by one’s present self. In 
light of this, we can acknowledge that this difference in psychological continuity gives 
adult humans a stronger interest than animals in, say, not contracting arthritis when they 
get older. However, we must also recognise that it does not give them any stronger 
interest in not contracting arthritis now.
Clearly, there are serious difficulties in measuring the relative strength of the human 
and animal interests in avoiding suffering. However, I propose that we accept these 
difficulties and simply recognise that suffering is ordinarily a serious harm for both. In 
sum, both humans and animals have a strong interest in avoiding pain. Given that
141 Jeff McMahan, The Ethics o f  Killing, p. 198.
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suffering is a serious harm for animals, and that we have moral obligations to animals, 
the prima facie case for an animal right not to be subject to painful experiments looks 
good. However, at least three different arguments have been suggested to question the 
justifiability of assigning such a right. First, the great benefits provided by animal 
experimentation have been pointed to, with the accompanying claim that such benefits 
trump animals’ interests in avoiding pain. Second, some have argued that we have 
special obligations to our fellow human beings which override our obligations to 
individuals from different species. Finally, it is claimed that human life is worth more 
than animal life and thus that painful experiments on animals are permissible. I examine 
each of these claims in turn in the remainder of this section.
5.2.1 The Benefits of Experimentation Justify its Continuation
The most common argument put forward by those in favour of animal experimentation is 
what we might deem ‘the argument from benefit’. This argument takes a simple cost- 
benefit analysis approach, and concludes that the interests of animals in avoiding pain 
are outweighed by humans’ interests in the life-saving treatment offered by therapeutic 
experiments. In other words, the benefits of animal experimentation are simply too great 
to warrant any thought of its discontinuance. For example, “...proponents cite progress 
in the area of Alzheimer’s disease, AIDS, basic genetics, cancer, cardiovascular 
disease, haemophilia, malaria, organ transplantation, treatment of spinal cord injuries 
and countless others.”142 Moreover, it is claimed that this progress has not just been to 
the benefit of humans: improved treatment for sick and injured animals has also been 
generated by animal experimentation. The argument suggests that all future progress in 
these areas would be lost should painful experimentation be stopped.
The first thing we have to consider when assessing this argument is its factual validity. 
For if it can be shown that no benefit has derived or will derive from painfully 
experimenting on animals then the argument from benefit becomes redundant. To this 
end, many proponents of animal rights argue that animal experiments are not only 
unnecessary, but also a hindrance to future medical progress.143 This is a large and 
difficult topic, which I lack the space to explore fully here. Moreover, an assessment of 
the scientific validity of using animal models in experiments is best conducted by those
142 David DeGrazia, Animal Rights -  a Very Short Introduction, p. 103.
)43 For a philosophical example of such an argument see, Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks, Brute Science: 
Dilemmas o f  Animal Experimentation, (London: Routledge, 1996).
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with much greater scientific expertise than me. However, this by no means entails that 
there is nothing left for the moral philosopher to say. For without doubt, an empirically 
based cost-benefit analysis of animal experimentation will not definitively decide the 
moral question. For example, animal experiments may provide wide-ranging medical 
benefits and be morally impermissible. Indeed, it is this possibility that I now wish to 
explore.
Let us assume then, for the sake of argument, that painful experimentation on animals 
can and does provide some contribution to medical progress. This assumption cannot 
by itself legitimate painful experimentation on animals. For if we were concerned solely 
with medical progress, then we should begin whole scale programmes of experiments on 
human beings. This is because human subjects provide the best experimental models 
for researching human diseases or testing the effects of drugs on humans. For while an 
experiment on a rat may provide clues as to the effect of a particular drug on humans, an 
experiment on a human being will provide much harder and more reliable evidence. 
This is precisely why programmes of clinical trials on humans are conducted. 
Importantly, however, such trials always require consent, and very rarely involve the kind 
of invasive and painful experimentation that takes place on animals. So, if we recognise 
that painful and non-consensual experiments on animals can contribute to medical 
progress, we must also recognise that painful and non-consensual experiments on 
humans will confer even greater benefits.
Of course, most of us believe -  quite rightly - that such programmes of painful human 
experimentation would be impermissible, even in the face of such potentially enormous 
gains. Many, including myself, would consider programmes of painful and non- 
consensual human experimentation to violate important human rights based on well­
being and autonomy. And as we saw in Chapter 4, rights are meant to act as ‘side- 
constraints’ on the pursuit of social goods such as medical progress. Of course all of 
this begs the question: why do non-human animals not also possess such rights? Why 
can animals, but not humans, be painfully experimented upon for the sake of the social 
good?
5.2.2 Species Membership is Ethically Significant
Perhaps the difference between the human and the animal interest in not being 
experimented upon comes down to species membership. Some argue that it is 
legitimate for humans to grant extra weight to the interests of fellow humans. This is
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because it is claimed that species membership itself is morally relevant, and that it is 
normally justifiable for individuals to favour the interests of the species to which they 
belong. Thus as humans, it is legitimate for us to give extra weight to the human interest 
in not suffering and translating this into a right, while denying such a right to non­
humans.
At first, this theory looks like it stipulates a hierarchy of moral standing as discussed 
and refuted in Chapter 3. However, this relationship-based argument can accept that 
humans and animals have equal moral standing and that we should give equal 
consideration to their interests. All it does is claim that these interests are not 
equivalent: the human interest in avoiding pain is weightier because of species solidarity, 
and thus legitimately trumps the interest of animals. Anders Nordgren is an advocate of 
just such a position:
Being a member of our own species is...an ethically relevant trait. W e do have 
special obligations to members of our own species. Vital human interests may 
outweigh animal interests. This means that to the extent that we have good reasons 
to expect that severe human suffering can be relieved, animal experimentation 
involving harm should be accepted.144
There is an obvious intuitive appeal in such a position. It acknowledges that animals 
possess important interests which should be judged on their merits, but claims that when 
those interests conflict with the important interests of humans, that it is legitimate to 
favour the latter. Unfortunately, intuitive appeal by itself cannot justify the position. 
Indeed, the enormous problem facing the proposal that species membership is ethically 
relevant is to explain why it is. The theory needs to explain why it is legitimate and not 
prejudicial to favour our own species at the expense of others.
Perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to offer such an explanation has come from 
Lewis Petrinovich.145 First of all, Petrinovich argues that speciesism (favouring one’s 
own species) is a natural fact of life:
Humans, as well as all other social animals, are speciesists. Animals of all species 
show a clear preference for their own kind: They associate and mate with their own 
species; they fight alongside their own kind against members of a foreign species to
144 Anders Nordgren, “Animal Experimentation: Pro and Con Arguments Using the Theory of Evolution”, 
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2002: 23-31, p. 30.
145 Another important advocate of this relationship-based approach is Mary Midgley. See Mary Midgley, 
Animals and Why they Matter.
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secure resources; and they defend the young of their own species. Any species that 
did not show preference for its own kind would become extinct.146 
Petrinovich then argues that favouring our species can be likened to favouring our kin 
members: both ‘moral feelings’ have evolved in order to protect the replication of genes. 
Furthermore, he argues, both are justified as ethical positions because we have stronger 
emotional bonds to our kin and fellow species members.147 In light of this, subordinating 
the interests of other species can be justified, a position directly relevant for the case of 
animal experimentation:
I maintain that, when push comes to shove, the interests of members of our species 
should triumph over comparable interests of members of other species. This 
position does not imply that any human whim should take precedence over essential 
needs and deep welfare interests of nonhuman animals. It only means that human 
interests should be read as high cards in any game where costs and benefits are
148taken into consideration.
Unfortunately, Petrinovich’s argument as stated has clear and obvious problems. In the 
first place, one can question the rather simplistic model of species solidarity that 
Petrinovich presents. He claims in the previous quote above that members of a species 
breed with one another, defend themselves against other species and protect each 
other’s young. Of course, none of these traits are without significant exceptions. 
Individuals can and do breed with mates outside of their species, fight and kill members 
of their own species and kill and eat each other’s young. Drawing ethical inferences 
from empirical facts about nature is undermined by the huge problem of attempting to 
discover what ‘natural’ is.
More fundamentally, Petrinovich also appears to commit the naturalistic fallacy of 
deriving an ought from an is. His argument suggests that we do favour our own species, 
that evolution explains why we favour our own species, and thus that we should favour 
our own species. But, of course, the question of what is right can be decoupled from the 
question of what is natural. For example, it is no doubt natural for humans to rape and 
murder one another. Clearly, however, the fact that rape and murder are natural does 
not make them right.
In light of such arguments, Petrinovich argues that compatibility with the laws of biology 
is a necessary but insufficient condition for a valid moral claim. Thus, on his view, an
146 Lewis Petrinovich, Darwinian Dominion: Animal Welfare and Human Interests, (London: M IT  Press, 
1999), p. 217.
147 Ibid., pp. 220-222.
148 Ibid., pp. 3-4:
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ethical position must also be consistent with the “basic freedoms of human beings”.149 
This would seem to get round my examples of rape and murder, where clear violations 
of basic freedoms take place. Essentially then, Petrinovich permits a degree of rational 
thinking to supplement his biological thesis. But, once a degree of rationality is allowed 
in, it is unclear why we must stop at basic human freedoms. After all, if rationality is 
allowed to supplement the basic biological argument then one could provide a rationally 
based defence of non-human freedoms. Or, rather, one could offer a rational defence of 
non-human well-being, and claim that an animal’s interest in avoiding pain is equivalent 
to and is not trumped by a human being’s interest in avoiding pain. Without doubt, 
Petrinovich owes us an argument for why some supplementary rational arguments are 
acceptable, and why others are not.
There remains a further problem with the claim that species membership is ethically 
relevant. Of all the classes and types of living organisms, why is species membership 
the relevant one? As noted in Chapter 2, we all belong to a wide variety of groups and 
classes. In light of this, it might be deemed arbitrary to choose species membership as 
ethically relevant, instead of say biological class, biological order, race, gender or 
religion.150 For it is no doubt the case that many of us have closer emotional bonds to 
some of these groups than to our species.
Putting the boot on the other foot also highlights the difficulty with claiming that it is 
justifiable to favour the interests of one’s own species. In effect, the argument states 
that it would be legitimate for an alien species to experiment on human beings in order to 
further its own interests. I do not believe that this is a morally acceptable conclusion. 
Indeed, the example works well to highlight the fundamental prejudice inherent in 
theories that favour the interests of one’s own group: they end up favouring the strong at 
the expense of the vulnerable.
In conclusion, the position that species membership is ethically relevant as outlined by 
Petrinovich fails. Claiming membership of a similar species is simply not enough to 
justify granting extra weight to human interests. If subordinating an animal’s interest in 
avoiding pain is to be justified, a morally relevant difference between humans and 
animals must be proposed. Perhaps, for example, human life is worth more. This is the 
issue to which I turn in the next section.
149 Ibid., p. 238.
150 See Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks, Brute Science, p. 229.
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5.2.3 Human Life is Worth More than Animal Life
Many philosophers seem to accept the claim that human lives are worth more than 
animal lives. Perhaps then, an animal’s interest in avoiding pain can be overridden in 
order to protect human lives, because of the simple fact that human lives are worth 
more. To make the claim stand up to scrutiny, it is necessary to point to those particular 
characteristics that humans possess that make their lives more valuable. This section 
examines one such attempt to do this.
Bonnie Steinbock has proposed that animal experimentation is justified, and bases her 
argument on the fact that humans are morally autonomous, whereas animals are not: 
Both rats and human beings dislike pain, and so we have a prima facie reason not to 
inflict pain on either. But if we can free human beings from crippling diseases, pain 
and death through experimentation which involves making animals suffer, and if this 
is the only way to achieve such results, then I think that such experimentation is 
justified because human lives are more valuable than animal lives.151
Immediately, however, a problem becomes obvious. For as I have argued elsewhere, 
the capacities for autonomy and moral agency are not possessed by all human beings. 
So do human non-persons such as newborn infants and the mentally disabled also have 
less valuable lives, making painful experiments on them permissible?152 Steinbock 
addresses this problem directly and argues that it is not justifiable to experiment on such 
humans. On her view, humans that lack moral autonomy cannot survive in the world 
without our special care, whereas non-human animals survive very well despite having 
fewer capacities than ordinary humans. Because of this difference, Steinbock argues 
that it is justifiable to experiment on animals but not on so-called ‘marginal humans’.153 
However, even if we concede the premise that there is this difference between non­
human animals and non-autonomous humans, it does not appear to lead to the 
conclusion Steinbock wants it to. What is needed, but not provided, is a case to be 
made for the moral relevance of being able to survive with or without special care. After 
all, and as Angus Taylor points out, Steinbock first wanted to subordinate the interests of
151 Bonnie Steinbock, “Speciesism and the Idea o f Equality”, Philosophy, Vol. 53, No. 204, April, 1978: 
247-256, pp. 253-254.
152 The claim that we should treat non-humans and humans with similar capacities in the same way is often 
called, ‘the argument from marginal cases’ . See Daniel Dombrowski, Babies and Beasts: The Argument 
from  Marginal Cases, (Urbana: Illinois University Press, 1997).
153 Bonnie Steinbock, “Speciesism and the Idea o f Equality”, p. 255.
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animals because of the fact that they possess fewer capacities than humans, and yet 
now she wants to subordinate them because they possess greater capacities.154
In reality, Steinbock’s argument concerning special care is a red herring. Her 
fundamental argument for why we should experiment on animals but not on humans 
essentially comes down once again to the assumption that species membership is 
ethically relevant. Her real argument is based on our ability to identify with members of 
our own species and to empathise with others. She writes that:
...when we consider the severely retarded, we think, 'That could be me." It makes 
sense to think that one might have been born retarded, but not to think that one 
might have been born a monkey.155 
It is hard to know what to make of such an argument. Importantly, why does it make 
sense to think that one might have been born retarded, but not to think that one might 
have been born a monkey? Surely considering being bom as someone or something 
else are equally far-fetched imaginative flights of fancy. In any case, determining 
whether lives are more valuable than others solely on our capacity for empathy with 
them is both dubious and dangerous. As pointed out above, people have variously 
strong sympathies with different groups: does this mean that the suffering of our fellow 
nationals, religious believers or gender counts more in each case?
Of course, Steinbock’s overall thesis could be bolstered to circumvent such arguments, 
even if at the cost of intuitive plausibility. That is to say, she could claim that all non- 
persons’ interests can be subordinated, whether human or not. After all, every single 
non-person lacks the capacity for autonomy, and so, according to Steinbock, possesses 
a less valuable life. So, she might bite the bullet and claim that animals, babies, and the 
severely mentally disabled can all be painfully experimented upon for the sake of 
persons.156 While abhorrent to our intuitions, this position is at least consistent and must 
be considered.
In order to tackle this proposal it is necessary to take a closer look at the suggestion 
that persons’ lives are more valuable than non-persons’ lives. Why do the capacities of 
personhood make the lives of persons more valuable? Clearly the claim is not that 
persons’ lives are prudentially more valuable: that is, more valuable to the individuals 
themselves. For clearly neither a baby nor a pig are concerned that they do not have
154 Angus Taylor, Animals and Ethics, p. 127.
155 Bonnie Steinbock, “Speciesism and the Idea o f Equality”, p. 255.
156 O f course, I should make it absolutely clear that Steinbock does not and has not made such an argument.
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the capacity for moral action. The life of a happy pig is just as valuable to a pig, as the 
life of a happy human is valuable to a human.
Instead, the claim is that persons’ lives are inherently more valuable. Persons can 
write books, worship gods, build monuments, create beautiful works of art, discuss the 
past, consider the future, act righteously and so on. Such capacities, so the argument 
runs, are intrinsically more valuable than non-persons’ capacities. For while non­
persons can feel pain, desire food, take shelter, flee from danger and so on, such 
capacities, it might be claimed, are of a different and lower order. The argument then 
seems to be that the capacities of persons are inherently more worthwhile than those of 
non-persons, and thus that their lives are also of more value.
However, there are two clear problems with such an argument. First of all, the claim 
that the capacities of personhood make persons’ lives inherently more valuable than 
those of non-persons is extremely dubious. While we can readily acknowledge that the 
capacities of persons are remarkable, it is unclear to me that they are necessarily more 
valuable. Without doubt, persons can write books, build monuments, act righteously and 
so on; but they can also wage wars, destroy environments, enact genocide and act in 
other terrible ways. It is surely doubtful that a person’s capacity to act sadistically is 
inherently more valuable than a whale’s capacity to use echolocation. However, 
perhaps the rejoinder would be that even an immoral person has the capacity for choice. 
Such autonomy, so the argument would go, necessarily leads to a richer, fuller and thus 
more valuable life than that which a non-person is capable of.
But even if we accept this, there remains a further problem with this overall line of 
argument. If we claim that individual lives can be rated as more or less valuable 
depending on the richness of their lives, we must also apply such reasoning to persons 
themselves. After all, different persons have different levels of richness in their lives. 
For example, imagine two individuals, Bill and George. Bill has a fairly nervous 
disposition and leads a blinkered life of routine in a mundane job. George, on the other 
hand, has an outgoing disposition and leads a spontaneous life, seizing any opportunity 
that comes his way. I think we can say, and with little controversy, that George’s life is 
richer than Bill’s. For while both share the basic capacity for an autonomous existence, 
George is much more able to exercise and realise such autonomous capacities. But 
surely we cannot reasonably claim that George’s life is inherently more valuable than 
Bill’s. And even if we did want to make this bizarre claim, I cannot think of anyone who
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would deem it legitimate to sacrifice Bill’s interests for the sake of George.157 And yet, in 
effect, this is the logic of the ‘more valuable life argument’. If non-persons’ interests can 
be sacrificed for the sake of persons because the former have lives that are less 
valuable, there seems to be no good reason why the interests of persons with less 
valuable lives should not also be sacrificed. However, the conclusion that the weak and 
dull can justifiably be exploited for the benefit of the strong and vibrant is not one that I 
am prepared to endorse.
To conclude this long section, I wish to end with the claim that animals have a moral 
right not to be subjected to painful experimentation. The interest that animals have in 
avoiding pain is fundamental to their well-being. If we are to take animal well-being 
seriously, as I have suggested we should, then those who claim that we can subordinate 
animal interests by conducting painful experimentation on them need to provide 
convincing arguments to support their case. However, none of the arguments presented 
by proponents of animal experimentation do the work that their advocates want them to. 
If our primary moral injunction were medical progress, painful and coercive 
experimentation on human beings would be legitimate. If we consider it legitimate to 
favour our own species at the expense of others, we must ask whether it is also 
legitimate to favour our own biological class, race, gender, religion and so on. Finally, if 
we consider humans to possess inherently more valuable lives than non-humans, and 
that the latter* s interests can legitimately be sacrificed for the former’s, we must also face 
up to the fact that not all human lives are equally valuable. But do we want to endorse 
the idea that some humans’ interests can be sacrificed for the sake of other humans with 
supposedly more valuable lives? I for one, do not. In sum then, the non-human animal 
interest in avoiding pain is sufficient to impose a duty upon us not to subject sentient 
creatures to painful experimentation.
5.3 A Right Not to Be Killed by Experimentation?
If animals have a right not to be subjected to painful experimentation, it might seem fairly 
obvious that they also have a right not to be killed by experimentation. However, upon 
reflection this is by no means obvious at all. First of all, one can conceive of 
experiments whereby animals are anaesthetised, experimented upon and then killed
157 Nazis, social Darwinists and followers of Nietzsche might well endorse such a sacrifice. Happily, I 
personally do not know any such people.
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painlessly. That is to say, not all experiments that end in death need also involve pain. 
Secondly, the interest that an animal has in avoiding pain is clearly different to the 
interest that an animal has in continued life. In fact, while the animal’s interest in 
avoiding pain is relatively clear - especially given the hedonistic account of animal well­
being that I have presented - there are question marks over whether animals even 
possess an interest in continued life. In light of this, in order to ascertain whether 
animals have a right not to be killed by experimentation, we must first ask whether they 
even have an interest in continued life. For if animals don’t possess such an interest, 
they cannot possess the corresponding moral right.
5.3.1 Do Animals Have an Interest in Continued Life?
Some might argue that if causing animals to suffer harms them (as I have claimed) then 
so too does killing them. Such a judgement would presumably be based on the 
assumption that being killed is a greater misfortune than being made to suffer. However, 
the claim that an entity has an interest in not suffering does not entail that it also has an 
interest in continued life; nor can we take it for granted that death is a greater misfortune 
than suffering. In fact, there is one obvious and important difference between death and 
suffering: it feels like something for an animal to be in pain, while it clearly does not feel 
like anything for an animal (or anyone else) to be dead. This considerable difference 
between suffering and being dead is, I think, reason enough to warrant a separate 
justification for the claim that animals have an interest in continued life.
I should point out that in the discussion that follows I will be considering painless death 
and killing. For it is clear from my argument above that a painful death harms an animal, 
since animals have an interest in avoiding pain. However, I am concerned here with 
assessing whether death and killing are in themselves harmful to animals.
As a reminder, I have argued that interests are components of well-being, and that 
animals’ lives go well when they have more pleasurable experiences than painful ones. 
In light of these considerations, do animals’ lives go better when their lives will continue? 
I wish to claim that often, when assessing the well-being of individuals, we use what 
might be called an ‘immediate’ understanding of well-being. That is to say, we judge the 
well-being of an entity as it currently stands. For example, to assess whether a dog’s life 
is going well or badly for him, we try to determine how he feels at the moment; we add 
up and evaluate those things that affect the animal’s life as it now stands. Indeed, it 
would usually be odd to judge a dog’s well-being by things that might or might not
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happen to him at some point in the future, or by reference to events in his past. For 
example, a dog may have been treated cruelly in his past, and may suffer from some 
disease in the future, but if the dog is currently fit, healthy and happy then it makes 
sense to say that his life is going well.
If we use this so-called immediate understanding of well-being, it remains unclear in 
what way continued life improves the quality of life of animals. After all, it is extremely 
doubtful that animals’ lives are presently made better by the fact that they might have 
pleasant experiences in the future. This is because most animals have weak 
psychological continuity with their future selves, and are unable to conceive of 
themselves having pleasant experiences in the future. Of course, a dog may desire to 
go for a walk in the future. A dog will surely even have some understanding that my 
going to get the lead means that a walk is on its way. However, none of this entails that 
the dog can conceive of herself enjoying this walk in the future. The dog cannot put 
herself in the future in the way that a self-conscious entity is able to. Since non-persons 
cannot conceive of themselves in the future in this way, it is difficult to see how the 
prospect of continued life makes life immediately better for animals. Thus we might 
conclude that continued life does not contribute to the immediate quality of life of animals 
and is thus not in their interests.
However, this is not the only way to judge quality of life. It is also possible to judge 
well-being in an ‘overall’ sense, measuring well-being in terms of the overall life of an 
individual. For example, it is often difficult to get domestic cats to take medicine that the 
vet has provided for them. Indeed, often it is necessary to hold them and force the 
medicine down their throats. Without doubt, such a process causes the animal some 
distress, and it would be reasonable to conclude that at that moment a cat’s immediate 
well-being is reduced. However, most of us consider that it is perfectly permissible and 
even proper that we make the cat suffer in this way in order to increase her overall well­
being, making her life better in the long-term.
This overall sense of well-being measures the quality of life of an individual by the total 
amount of good in a life. I have argued that the good in animals’ lives are pleasant 
experiences. It thus seems reasonable to claim that an animal has more well-being 
overall in a life the more pleasurable experiences she has in that life. Importantly, it is 
clear that when an animal dies or is killed, the amount of possible good in her life is 
ended. We can thus conclude that ordinarily animals have an interest in continued life in
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order that they may have more pleasant experiences and greater overall well-being in 
their lives.158
5.3.2 The Strength of the Interest in Continued Life
Many animal rights proponents share my conclusion that sentient animals have an 
interest in continued life. In similar arguments to my own, such philosophers tend to 
argue that death harms animals because it forecloses animals’ opportunities for future 
valuable experiences.159 However, most of these philosophers regard the interest in 
continued life as one of the strongest that animals’ possess. Thus, the move from 
interest to moral right to life would be easy for such philosophers to make. But is the 
animal interest in continued life as strong as such philosophers tend to assume?
Earlier in the chapter I argued that the interest that animals have in avoiding pain is 
sufficient to ground a right in animals not to be made to suffer. Indeed, the interest that 
animals have in avoiding suffering is extremely similar to -  but not necessarily equivalent 
to -  the human interest in avoiding suffering. However, the foundation and strength of 
the human interest in continued life is quite different to that of non-humans. To explain, 
remember that an animal’s interest in continued life is founded on an overall assessment 
of the individual’s quality of life. Now the same is true of humans: overall, my life will be 
better the more valuable experiences I have over its course. However, there are at least 
two other factors that contribute to the value of continued life for human persons. First of 
all, continued life contributes to most humans’ immediate well-being. For example, it 
makes me now happy to think of my plans for this coming weekend and the visit of some 
friends. I can imagine being with my friends and having a good time, and such a thought 
makes me happy now. As argued above, putting oneself in the future like this is 
unavailable to non-human animals, and thus does not contribute to their interest in 
continued life. Secondly, as a person, I have certain aims, desires, projects and goals. 
Continued life provides me with the opportunity to pursue such ambitions, change them, 
and hopefully eventually to realise them. Again, as non-persons, animals do not 
possess such goals, let alone the ability to reflect on or realise them. Thus animals’ 
interest in continued life is not supported by life’s contribution to the shaping and
158 O f course, the other side of this means that i f  animals have no prospect for pleasant experiences, for 
example because o f some illness, they have no interest in continued life. For more on this, see my 
discussion of euthanasia in Chapter 7.
159 This view is put forward by David DeGrazia, Animal Rights -  a Very Short Introduction, pp. 59-64; 
Bernard E. Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality, p. 86; and S.F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason and 
Animals, p. 169.
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fulfilment of goals. From all this we can see that continued life is of more value to a 
person than to an animal. Perhaps then, we can say that an animal’s interest in 
continued life is weaker than that of persons.
However, we must remember that the value to the individual is not the sole determining 
factor of the strength of an interest, the level of psychological continuity between the 
individual now and when the goods will occur is also relevant. This provides a further 
reason to consider the animal interest in continued life to be weaker than that of human 
persons. For unlike the absence of suffering, continued life necessarily relates to a 
future good. And since, animals have lower levels of psychological continuity with their 
future selves, their interest in that future good is weaker. In sum then, while we can 
recognise that animals possess an interest in continued life based on the overall amount 
of good in their lives, we must recognise that such an interest at any particular time is 
weaker than that of human persons, since the connection between the animal now and 
when those goods will occur is weaker.
5.3.3 A Moral Right Not to Be Killed by Experimentation?
So what does all this mean for an animal’s putative right not to be killed by 
experimentation? Remember that in order to possess a right an animal’s interest must 
be sufficiently important to impose a duty upon us. Perhaps because an animal’s 
interest in continued life is only weak, it is insufficient to impose a duty on us not to kill 
them. However, to make such a claim would be a step too far. After all, the interest that 
animals have in continued life exists and cannot simply be ignored. Moreover, in some 
circumstances there may be an absence of competing interests, providing good grounds 
for acknowledging an animal’s right to life. For example, my cat’s interest in continued 
life certainly seems sufficient to ground a duty in me not to kill him. So there seems to 
be good grounds for acknowledging sentient animals’ prima facie right to life.
However, we must remember that if an animal’s interest in continued life is weak, then 
the basis of its subsequent right to life is also weak. Thus it might be proper not to 
assign it in cases where there are sufficiently strong and pressing competing interests at 
stake. Some would argue that the case of therapeutic animal experimentation is one 
context in which such sufficiently strong and pressing interests exist. For while it might 
be acknowledged that the interest we have in cosmetics or detergents is insufficient to 
trump the animal interest in continued life, the interests that are promoted by therapeutic 
experimentation, such as basic human health, are sufficiently strong.
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Unfortunately, there is a serious problem with this line of argument. An animal’s 
interest in continued life is weak because animals are non-persons: they do not have 
goals and projects to pursue, and they have weak psychological continuity with their 
future selves. But as has been mentioned many times before, there are also human 
non-persons who lack these capacities. So, human babies and the severely mentally 
disabled, like animals, must only have a weak interest in continued life. However, in 
spite of this weakness, most of us regard the interest of human babies and the mentally 
disabled in continued life to be sufficiently strong to ground a right not to be killed, even 
in situations where great benefits could be gained from killing them.160 If we follow the 
principle that I proposed in Chapter 3, that we judge the strength and sufficiency of an 
interest on its own merits, it appears that if we grant this right to human babies and the 
mentally disabled, we should also grant it to animals.
Before accepting this conclusion, however, we must consider two alternative proposals. 
First, we could simply conclude that it is permissible to conduct painless but deadly 
experiments on both animals and human non-persons. However, even utilitarians, 
aiming to maximise overall welfare balk from embracing such conclusions.161 Here, I 
believe is a situation where we have a considered judgement that is so strong that it 
stands in the way of going down this path. Alternatively then, we could try to build a 
case supporting the idea that human non-persons have a greater interest in continued 
life than animals do. If we establish this, it will be just a short step to arguing that this 
human interest is sufficient to impose on us a duty not to kill them, while that of animals 
is not.
One way of constructing such an argument is to return to the account of the relevant 
factors in determining the strength of an interest. You will recall that part of the strength 
of an interest depends on the levels of psychological connectedness between the 
individual now and the individual later when the goods will occur, and part depends on 
the value of the good for the individual in question. However, Jeff McMahan presents 
this latter factor in a slightly different way. He claims that the second determinant of the
160 For a notable exception concerning human infants (but based on desires rather than interests) see 
Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide” in Peter Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986).
161 R.G. Frey has faced up to the possibility of using human (and animal) non-persons in medical 
experiments based on the potential benefits to human persons. See his contribution in R.G. Frey and Sir 
William Paton, “Vivisection, Morals and Medicine: An Exchange” in Helga Kushe and Peter Singer (eds.), 
Bioethics: An Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002). However, he categorically rejects the use 
of humans in R.G. Frey, “Animals” in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The Oxford Handbook o f  Practical Ethics, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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strength of an interest is the ‘net amount of good’ that will occur from the satisfaction of 
that interest.162 In keeping with this account, many would make the reasonable claim 
that the net amount of good a human non-person will receive from future life will be 
greater than that which an animal will receive. As mentioned above, the added richness 
of experience that human beings are capable of could be pointed to as evidence of this 
greater level of good. For example, McMahan himself writes:
Because of their limited cognitive and emotional capacities, most animals lack the 
capacity for many of the forms of experience and action that give the lives of persons 
their special richness and meaning, and without which our lives would be greatly 
impoverished.163
In this way then, one might claim that the interest of human non-persons in continued life 
is greater than that of non-humans. In turn, perhaps human non-persons have a right 
not to be killed by therapeutic experimentation, but non-humans do not.
Unfortunately, this ‘extra goodness’ argument has some important problems. First, it 
assumes that all human non-persons’ lives will be capable of such richness in the future. 
However, while most babies and infants will come to have such capacities, those with 
permanent mental disabilities and those with degenerative conditions will not. The logic 
of this extra goodness argument thus concludes that the interest in continued life of 
human non-persons with permanent or degenerative disabilities is insufficient to ground 
a duty in us not to kill them in therapeutic experiments. This jars against our considered 
judgements and is a very unappealing conclusion.
However, I think there is another problem with the extra goodness argument that does 
not rely on an appeal to our intuitions. For when we talk about the ‘net amount of good’ 
in a life, this raises the question, good for whom? In McMahan’s account, when 
determining the strength of an interest the value of the good for the individual whose life 
it is does not matter, all that matters is that there is ‘more net good’. But this takes us 
away from the notion of interests and well-being as prudential values. If, as I have 
claimed, the interests of an individual relate to how well life goes for the individual whose 
life it is, then an interest must only be stronger if it relates to a good that is of more value 
for that individual.
For example, a baby usually has the opportunity to realise more good through 
continued life than a dog. The baby will grow to be able to act morally, have loving
162 Jeff McMahan, The Ethics o f  Killing, p. 233..
163 Ibid., p. 195.
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relationships, worship gods, write poetry, appreciate art and so on. A dog, on the other 
hand, while able to realise some goods, such as eating, exercising, companionship and 
so on, will produce ‘less net good’ compared to the human. These goods, we might 
concede for the sake of argument, are straightforwardly less valuable than those of the 
human. However, none of this says anything about the value of these goods for the 
human and the dog. The goods the dog receives may be less valuable than those of the 
human, but the value of these goods for the dog will be just the same as the value of the 
other goods are for the human. After all, both the dog and human have lives that can go 
well or badly, so each possesses from their point of view, an equivalent stake that they 
go well. If interests relate to how life goes for the individual whose life it is, the fact that 
babies can produce more net good does not by itself make their interest in continued life 
any stronger.
In conclusion, non-human animals possess a moral right not to be killed by 
experimentation. I have argued that most animals have an interest in continued life, 
albeit a weaker one than that of persons. However, the relative weakness of that 
interest does not mean that it can be thwarted without good reason. Of course, many 
would regard the benefits of experimentation for persons to be a sufficiently good reason 
to override this interest. But we do not think the same with regards to human babies and 
the mentally disabled. That is to say, most of share the considered judgement that the 
interest of human non-persons in continued life is still strong enough to ground in them a 
right not to be killed in therapeutic experiments. If we want to hold on to this judgement, 
to be consistent, we must also accept that animals have a moral right not to be killed by 
experimentation.
5.4 A Right Not to Be Used in Experimentation?
So far I have argued that animals’ interests in not suffering pain and in not being killed 
are both sufficient to ground in us a duty not to conduct experiments on animals that 
cause pain or result in death. However, perhaps animals have a more general interest in 
not being experimented upon: perhaps animals have an interest in not being used in 
experimentation. Such an interest would be founded upon the more general interest 
animals might have in being free. The claim that animals have an interest in being free 
can take one of two forms, each relative to the particular conception of freedom that is 
used. First, one might take a negative conception of freedom, and argue that animals
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have an interest in not being interfered with. Alternatively, one might take a positive 
conception of freedom and argue that animals have an interest in being in control of their 
own lives.164 Whichever conception of freedom is adopted, it is clear that experimenting 
on animals imposes on that freedom, because it both interferes with them and inhibits 
their ability to control their own lives. Importantly, if animals do have an interest in 
freedom, and if that interest is sufficient to ground a duty in us not to impose on their 
freedom, then we can say that all forms of experimentation on animals are morally 
illegitimate. For even if an experiment causes an animal no pain and does not result in 
death, we can be almost certain that by using an animal in an experiment we are 
necessarily interfering with the animal and inhibiting that individual’s ability to control his 
own life.165 Thus it is imperative to discover at the outset whether animals do have this 
interest in freedom.
5.4.1 Do Animals Have an Interest in Negative Freedom?
When philosophers talk of negative freedom they are referring to those times when we 
consider individuals to be free from constraints and interference.166 Without doubt, there 
are numerous ways in which experimentation interferes with an animal. First of all, an 
experiment might involve removing an animal from his natural habitat in order to take 
him to the laboratory for experimentation. This is a clear and obvious case of 
interference. However, it also makes sense to say that those animals that are bred in 
captivity for experimentation are interfered with and constrained. Being held in cages is
164 The notion that animals have an interest in freedom -  however it is construed -  is pervasive in the 
animal rights literature. For examples see, Paul W. Taylor, Respect fo r  Nature: A Theory o f  Environmental 
Ethics, pp. 106-108; Bernard E. Rollin, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and 
Science, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 173 and p. 203; Bernard E. Rollin, Animal Rights 
and Human Morality, p. 90; Evelyn B. Pluhar, The Moral Significance o f  Human and Nonhuman Animals, 
pp. 248-249; Paola Cavalieri, The Animal Question, pp. 88 and p. 138; Dale Jamieson, “Against Zoos” and 
“Zoos Revisited” in M orality's Progress: Essays on Humans, Other Animals, and the Rest o f  Nature, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 167 and pp. 179-180; Tom Regan, The Case fo r  Animal 
Rights, pp. 92 and pp. 97-98; Elizabeth Anderson, “Animal Rights and the Values o f Nonhuman Life” in 
Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum (eds.) Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, pp. 
283-284; and Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers o f  Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, p. 
345. David DeGrazia also explicitly recognises this interest, but in my opinion is more equivocal. See 
David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, pp. 233-234. Peter Singer claims that animals’ interests are 
exhausted by their preferences; hence liberty may or may not be in their interests. See Peter Singer, 
Practical Ethics, p. 13.
165 I say almost certain because it is conceivable that an ‘experiment’ could be conducted that simply 
involved observing the animal in its natural environment without interference. Whether such fieldwork 
should properly be referred to as an experiment, I do not know.
166 For the classic exposition o f the distinction between negative and positive liberty see, Isaiah Berlin, 
“Two Concepts o f Liberty”, in Anthony Quinton (ed.), Political Philosophy.
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a fairly obvious form of constraint, while being injected or force fed are clear cases of 
interference. What needs to be considered is whether this interference necessarily 
harms animals.
A difficulty in answering this question relates to the fact that these interferences and 
constraints almost always involve suffering. For example, taking animals from their 
natural habitat is usually traumatic for both the animals involved and often -  if they are 
social animals -  those animals that are left behind. Keeping animals in cages can inhibit 
movement, causing cramp and sores, as well as boredom, frustration and other forms of 
suffering. Finally, forcing animals to take particular substances by injection or other 
means will often be distressing for the animal subjects. So while we can say that in 
these examples the animals are being harmed by being interfered with and by being 
constrained, this is based on their fundamental interest in not suffering. To discover 
whether interference and constraint are in themselves harmful to animals, we need to 
consider those instances when such impositions do not involve the infliction of pain.
To help us ascertain whether interference and constraint are in themselves harmful to 
anirhals, it will be useful to look at why interference on human persons is usually 
considered harmful, and to see if the same applies to animals. By way of an example, 
imagine experimenting on a human person against her will. As we have discussed 
above, most of us consider such an experiment to be morally illegitimate. However, 
imagine that the individual is drugged so that she is caused no pain by the experiment 
and will have no memory of it (perhaps she is anaesthetised without her knowledge 
while asleep). Finally, suppose that we can somehow guarantee that the experiment will 
not affect that individual’s health in any way throughout the remainder of her life. Even 
with these provisos, most of us still regard this experiment to be morally wrong. And I 
:: believe that such a judgement is correct. The reason why this experiment would be 
wrong comes down to the fact that human persons have an interest in leading freely 
chosen lives, as autonomous beings. As I argued in Chapter 3, the well-being of 
persons depends on the existence of core capabilities in order to pursue a freely chosen 
life. Clearly, using individuals in non-consensual experimentation, even when it causes 
no suffering or distress, violates this interest of human persons.
However, the same is not true with regard to most non-human animals. As I have 
argued previously, animals lack the capacity for autonomy: the ability to frame, revise 
and pursue a conception of the good. Because of this, animals have no interest in 
leading freely-chosen lives. Rather, what matters to their well-being is that they have
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good experiences. In light of this, interfering with, constraining and using animals do not 
in themselves harm animals. Interfering with an animal does not violate that animal’s 
autonomy, simply because the animal lacks the capacity for autonomy. This, of course, 
has important implications for using animals in experiments. If an animal born in 
captivity is drugged and anaesthetised, experimented upon painlessly and without being 
killed, then that animal’s well-being is not affected. Thus such an experiment can be 
deemed to be harmless.
5.4.2 Do Animals Have an Interest in Positive Freedom?
I have concluded above that animals do not have an interest in avoiding interference. 
This is based on the fact that they are not autonomous beings and do not possess an 
interest in leading a freely chosen life. In light of this, the question of an animal’s interest 
in positive freedom -  being in control of one’s own life -  might seem obvious. That is to 
say, if animals are not autonomous beings, it would be extremely unlikely that they have 
an interest in being in control of their own lives. However, a slightly different 
understanding of positive freedom is often put forward in relation to animals, and is worth 
considering. This understanding of positive freedom is less about individuals having 
control of their own lives, but about individuals being able to exercise their natural 
capacities.
Indeed, other proponents of animal rights refute much of what I have said so far with 
regards to animal well-being. They claim that a purely hedonistic account of animal well­
being as put forward in this thesis is naive. Non-human animals, these thinkers suggest, 
have interests not just in avoiding pain and seeking pleasure, but also in exercising their 
natural capacities. Being used for experiments in a laboratory necessarily harms 
animals, so the argument goes, because such use violates the animals’ ability to 
exercise their natural capacities. Thus, the human use of animals, whereby animals are 
held in captivity and kept in conditions in which they cannot act naturally, is deemed to 
be wrong, even when they do not suffer pain.
Interestingly, one such argument has been put forward by Paul W. Taylor whom we 
encountered in Chapter 2, in the discussion over whether living things, such a plants and 
trees, have lives that can go well or badly for themselves. Taylor argues that one 
plausible way of understanding freedom is as the ability to pursue one’s ends. 
Moreover, although animals (and other living things) lack autonomy and so cannot 
choose their own ends, they nevertheless have their own biological ends which are
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valuable to them. Being free to pursue these ends, according to Taylor, is thus in the 
interests of animals.167
One problem with this argument, I believe, is determining what the biological ends of 
animals are. For example, what are the biological ends of an individual kangaroo? This 
is a hugely difficult question and poses an enormous problem for Taylor’s argument. 
However, for the sake of argument, it might be useful to concede some ground. After all, 
one reasonable proposal as to the biological end of kangaroos is that they are gene 
replicators; thus a kangaroo’s end might be to produce as many healthy offspring as 
possible. However, does this explain why it would harm a kangaroo to keep him in 
captivity or to use him for certain purposes? Unfortunately, it does not. For it would be 
quite possible to allow a kangaroo to breed while in captivity or while being used for 
some other purpose. Indeed, keeping the animal in captivity might allow for an 
increased opportunity for the kangaroo to fulfil his ends, by facilitating breeding 
programmes and engineering conditions so that his offspring have good survival 
chances.168
The more important problem with this argument over biological ends, however, is that it 
imposes aesthetic and perfectionist judgements on what makes animals’ lives go well. 
For example, many of us find it distasteful to keep animals in captivity, and many of us 
prefer to see animals in their natural habitats; but that does not mean that living in their 
natural habitats contributes to the quality of life for animals themselves. It is simply a 
mistake to regard that individuals’ lives necessarily go better when they fulfil their 
biological ends. As I argued in Chapter 3, an animal may be a better specimen of her 
kind if she engages in species traits like fighting with her rivals. However, if such fighting 
leads to painful injury, it is unclear how such fighting makes life better for the individual 
whose life it is. Animals are complex, phenomenally conscious creatures, but they are 
not autonomous in the way I have defined it. It thus remains something of a mystery as 
to why animals can be said to have an interest in positive (or negative) freedom for its 
own sake. Those who believe that freedom itself is a component of the well-being of 
animals must show that non-human animals are autonomous agents.
Of course, some philosophers have argued that sentient animals are autonomous 
agents, and thus do have an interest in liberty. For example, Tom Regan has argued
167 Paul W. Taylor, Respect fo r  Nature, pp. 106-109.
168 O f course such policies are pursued in many zoos and wildlife parks around the world. Rare species are 
taken into captivity and bred, in the hope that the resultant offspring will have a better chance of survival.
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that the definition of autonomy that I give (the ability to frame, revise and pursue a 
conception of the good) is not the only legitimate one. In fact, he labels my definition of 
autonomy as ‘Kantian’, and contrasts it with what he calls, ‘preference autonomy’. 
Regan argues that this latter type of autonomy resides in all those creatures who have 
preferences, and who are able to act in order to attempt to satisfy them.169 However, 
even if we accept this alternative understanding of autonomy, it does not warrant 
recognising an intrinsic interest in liberty for those who have it. After all, animals are 
perfectly able to act in order to satisfy their preferences even when they are unfree. For 
example, consider an animal in a well-run wildlife park, who has all of his desires met: he 
has no desire to leave the park and has his desires for food, company, stimulation, sex 
and the like ail satisfied.170 Clearly this animal is unfree, and yet he is also able to 
exercise his ‘preference autonomy’. However, as I argue above, the case is quite 
different for humans (or to be more accurate, persons): being unfree necessarily violates 
Kantian autonomy.
Of course, I should make it explicit that none of this suggests that holding animals in 
captivity or preventing them from exercising their natural capacities is always harmless. 
As I have pointed out above, such activities will often cause great suffering and distress. 
And this is certainly true of the practices carried out currently in animal experimentation. 
But it is important to bear in mind that this harm is caused by the pain inflicted, and not 
by the lack of freedom itself. Most animals are not autonomous beings with interests in 
leading freely chosen lives; they are creatures whose lives can better or worse based on 
their capacity for sentience. This means that any animal that is used or kept by humans 
should not be made to suffer. It does not mean that each and every animal kept or used 
by humans is harmed.
5.4.3 Human Non-Persons, Freedom and Experimentation
Of course, if animals do not have an interest in freedom because they are not 
autonomous creatures, the same must also be true of human beings who lack 
autonomy. Thus we can conclude that human non-persons such as babies and the 
mentally disabled have no interest in freedom and thus have no interest in not being
169 Tom Regan, The Case fo r  Animal Rights, p. 84. Similar arguments emphasising the importance of this 
kind of agency are put forward by Evelyn B. Pluhar, The M oral Significance o f  Human and Nonhuman 
Animals, pp. 248-249; and Paola Cavalieri, The Animal Question, pp. 137-138.
170 This example is inspired by a similar one given in David DeGrazia, Animal Rights -  a Very Short 
Introduction, p. 55.
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used in experimentation that is painless and which does not result in death. In other 
words, such forms of experimentation on human babies and the mentally disabled must 
also be morally legitimate.
While such a conclusion might at first sight seem odd, I do believe that it is valid. The 
first thing to make clear is the fact that such human experimentation would rarely be 
morally permissible. Human non-persons are usually part of families who have close 
ties of love and affection to them. They also usually have guardians or carers who have 
their own stake in how life goes for the individual. Clearly, if such individuals do not want 
their loved ones to be experimented upon, then those wishes should be taken into 
account. Secondly, any experimentation that takes place must be in keeping with the 
well-being of the individual being experimented upon. If an experiment will cause or 
threaten either immediate or long-term suffering, then it is impermissible, as is 
experimentation that results in death. So really, all we are talking about here is painless 
actions that will have no adverse harmful effect on the individual whatsoever.
To those who remain unconvinced by this, and still feel that non-autonomous humans 
have an interest in freedom, I would point out that we do regularly and uncontroversially 
impinge upon the freedom of non-autonomous humans. For example, we make children 
go to school, provide medical care for the incapacitated and deny the severely demented 
freedom of movement. Of course, it can be legitimately objected that all these examples 
are for the individuals’ own good; experimenting on babies and the severely mentally 
disabled, on the other hand, will not necessarily benefit those individuals. However, not 
all of our uncontroversial interferences in the lives of non-autonomous humans confer 
benefits on them. When we dress children in outfits that we think are attractive or that 
have been given as gifts, there is no definite benefit to the child. Similarly, when we hold 
naming ceremonies for children or encourage them to take up hobbies that we ourselves 
are interested in, this is rarely for the benefit of the children themselves. Also, when we 
get babies to perform ‘tricks’ such as pointing to their nose when asked, or saying ‘Dada’ 
on command, this is surely for the benefit of adults, rather than the children. Finally, full­
time carers will often make whomever they are looking after go and stay with someone 
else for a few days. This is not for the benefit of the individual with the disability, but to 
give the carer a break. In all these cases, however, it would be incredibly odd to say that 
any harm has been inflicted. These practices are perfectly permissible because they are 
in keeping with what is of value to the individuals in question: they restrict freedom, but 
they do not cause short or long-term suffering, and they do not inhibit future
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development and well-being. Given then that we already treat human non-persons as if 
they have no interest in freedom, perhaps using them in experiments that cause them 
absolutely no harm is not quite so unappealing.
In sum, I refute the suggestion that simply by using animals in experimentation we harm 
them. While I concede that using animals and keeping them in captivity can be wrong, I 
believe that this can be assessed solely on the basis of whether they are made to suffer 
or are killed. First of all, animals are not autonomous entities with an interest in leading 
freely chosen lives without interference. Secondly, arguing that it is in an animal’s 
interests to pursue his natural biological ends poses the enormous problem of 
discovering what these biological ends are. Moreover, it seems that animals can very 
successfully pursue what is natural to them in ‘artificial’ conditions. Since non-human 
animals do not have an interest in freedom itself, they cannot be said to possess the 
moral right not to be used in any form of experimentation. However, if this is to be our 
conclusion with regards to animal non-persons, the same must be true of human non­
persons. I believe that such a conclusion is acceptable. For when we consider how few 
such experiments would take place given family interests, the complete lack of harm that 
would be administered, and the fact that we regularly interfere with and constrain such 
individuals currently, out initial concern regarding the proposal subsides.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that painful experiments on non-human animals and those 
that end in death are morally illegitimate. Animals possess the moral right not to be 
subjected to experiments that cause them pain or that end in death. Since the vast 
majority of animal experiments cause pain and/or end in death we must conclude that 
most animal experimentation that takes place is morally unacceptable. Animal 
experimentation as it currently stands is an affront to the clear moral obligations we have 
to sentient animals. However, this does not necessarily entail an absolutist stance to the 
issue. Animal experimentation can be justified when animal well-being is respected; and 
I believe that animal well-being and animal experimentation are not mutually exclusive. 
If scientists can find ways of experimenting on animals that cause no pain and that do 
not end in death, then such experiments are permissible.
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6. Non-Human Animals and Agriculture
Of all our uses of animals, animal experimentation generates the fiercest debate. 
However, experimentation does not constitute our greatest use of animals. While 2.9 
million animals were used in scientific experiments in the UK in 2005171, around 913.6 
million farm animals were slaughtered in the UK in the same year.172 While the volume 
of farm animals slaughtered every year is staggering, it really should be of little surprise. 
After all, the most regular and direct contact many of us have with animals comes 
through eating their flesh, their milk and their eggs. In fact, for most people in affluent 
societies nearly every meal involves the consumption of some kind of animal product. 
To meet this demand, intensive farming techniques have been developed in order to 
raise productivity: that is, to extract as much protein out of the animals at as little cost as 
possible. The lives of intensively farmed poultry and dairy cattle illustrate this well. For 
example, in order to rear more birds per square metre, battery chickens are often held in 
cages so small that they cannot even stretch their wingspan. To get more meat from 
birds, broiler chickens are fed huge amounts to grow quickly and to unnaturally large 
sizes. Once again, to exploit the space, the birds are usually kept in darkened sheds 
together with both hundreds if not thousands of other birds (dead and alive) and their 
excrement. To get as much milk as possible from dairy cows, the cows are artificially 
inseminated, have their calves removed and are then milked several times a day. They 
are then inseminated again, milked until before they give birth, have their calves 
removed, and milked again. This cycle continues until the animals are ‘spent’ and 
slaughtered.
While the development of such intensive farming practices has undoubtedly reduced 
farming costs and resulted in the cheap meat, milk and eggs that so many of us now 
enjoy, it has undoubtedly come at the cost of animal welfare. For example, the cramped 
conditions to which poultry are subjected not only leads to the breaking of limbs, but also 
‘necessitates’ the painful process of debeaking. For if the beaks of confined poultry 
were not trimmed, the cramped conditions would lead them to simply peck each other to 
death. Additionally, not only does the dairy cow suffer from both her confinement (often
171 Statistics o f  Scientific Procedures on Living Animals: Great Britain 2005, (London: H M SO, 2006), p. 6.
172 This figure comes from combining the statistics from two sources: for slaughtered poultry, National 
Statistics, “Poultry and Poultrymeat Statistics Notice”, 30th November 2006; and for other slaughtered 
animals, “Slaughterhouse surveys, Defra, SEERAD, DARD (N I)”, 23rd November 2006. Both datasets are 
available from <www.defra.gov.uk>.
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she is kept indoors all her life) and the removal of her offspring, but she is also 
particularly vulnerable to mastisis, an infection of the udder.
For such reasons, many proponents of animal welfare have been campaigning for 
better conditions for farm animals, and the abolition of so-called ‘factory farming’. They 
favour a return to more traditional farming techniques where animals are given the 
freedom to move and exercise their natural capacities. At the same time, however, more 
radical animal rights advocates see animal agriculture as not something that can be 
‘fixed’ by improved welfare legislation. Instead, they see the practice of raising animals 
for food as in itself morally objectionable. Such groups claim that animal agriculture is 
necessarily exploitative and will always violate the rights of animals, whether free-range 
or not.
In this chapter, I will explore the permissibility of animal agriculture. In particular, I 
intend to examine whether animals have a right not to be raised for food. In so doing, 
the chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section I return to some of the claims 
I made regarding animal rights in the previous chapter and apply them to the case of 
animal agriculture. You will recall that I argued that animals have prima facie moral 
rights not to be killed or made to suffer, but that they have no moral right to liberty. Just 
what implications does this theory have for animal agriculture? Having argued that it 
implies that we have an obligation not to make animals suffer and not to kill them for 
food, in the subsequent sections I examine and rebut three possible objections to such a 
claim. In the first place, won’t resorting to a purely plant-based agriculture actually kill 
and harm more animals? Secondly, since non-human animals in the wild kill and eat 
one another, why can’t we do the same? Finally, how can farm animals be wronged by 
being raised for use in agriculture, when had they not been raised for use in agriculture, 
they would never have existed? In the course of refuting this final objection, I also 
examine the implications of this so-called ‘non-identity problem’ for the permissibility of 
genetically modifying farm animals.
6.1 Applying the Rights Theory to Animals in Agriculture
I have claimed that for an individual to have a moral right he or she must have an 
interest that is sufficient to impose a duty on another. In the previous chapter I claimed 
that the animal interests in avoiding pain and in continued life were indeed sufficient to 
ground animal rights not to be killed and made to suffer in experimentation. At the same 
time, however, I argued that animals have no intrinsic interest in liberty, and thus have
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no general moral right not to be used or interfered with by humans. This theory has 
profound implications for the moral permissibility of animal experimentation as it is 
currently practised. In this section I will briefly outline the implications of these 
conclusions for animal agriculture.
6.1.1 Factory Farming
If animals have a moral right not to be made to suffer, much of what we do to animals in 
intensive farming practices is morally impermissible. While it is true that I have argued 
that animals have no fundamental interest in liberty, this does not mean that we can 
confine them and use them in any way that we see fit. In particular, it does not mean 
that we can subordinate animal well-being in search of increased protein and increased 
profit. Animals may have no interest in liberty itself, but they do suffer from the 
confinements of the factory farm. In the introduction to this chapter, I gave examples of 
the ways in which chickens and dairy cows are intensively farmed. However, these are 
by no means the only ways in which these animals suffer, nor indeed are they the only 
types of .animal that suffer. To make the point, let us consider the suffering of an 
intensively reared pig. Pigs are useful to consider not just because so many people 
enjoy eating them in their sausages and bacon, but also because pigs are widely 
acknowledged as highly intelligent and social animals. Indeed, in terms of their 
intelligence and sociability, pigs compare favourably with domestic dogs. Given this, 
consider the behaviour sometimes evidenced in intensively farmed pigs who are housed 
indoors all their lives:
One type of behavioural abnormalities are so-called stereotypies, which are 
repetitive invariant behaviours, apparently without function. Stereotypies are often 
thought to develop as strategies to cope with the limited stimuli available in captivity.
In pigs stereotypies consist of bar biting, head-weaving, vacuum chewing, tail biting,
173rooting bare floor, and maintaining dog sitting position in relation to apathy.
Many practices of what has been labelled the ‘factory farm’ without doubt make animals 
suffer. From the rights perspective defended in this thesis, such suffering is prima facie 
unacceptable.
However, banning the rearing of animals in such ways will of course lead to the end of 
cheap meat, milk and eggs. As anyone thoughtful enough to have sought out the free-
173 Sam Millet et al., “Welfare, performance and meat quality of fattening pigs in alternative housing and 
management systems: a review”, Journal o f  the Science o f  Food and Agriculture, Vol. 85, No. 5, 15 April 
2005:709-719, p. 710.
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range products from the supermarket or local shop will tell you, animal welfare comes at 
a price. Perhaps then, this price counts against recognising an animal right not to suffer 
in factory farms. I find this argument unconvincing. Interests cannot be ignored and 
violated just because they are slightly burdensome. Moreover, animals have a strong 
interest in not being made to suffer. If living up to one’s moral obligations involves
having to pay a bit more for one’s shopping, then so be it. In any case, it is not
obligatory to choose meat, milk or eggs for your meal, and vegetables remain perfectly 
affordable to most.
6.1.2 Killing Animals for their Flesh
Of course, animals do not just have the right not to be made to suffer under my scheme, 
they also have a prima facie right to life. This has much more radical implications for 
animal agriculture than a simple end to factory-farming. It means that killing an animal in 
order to eat that individual’s flesh is a rights violation and thus ordinarily morally 
impermissible. Thus, even if an animal leads a good life under free-range conditions, it 
is still wrong to kill that animal for food. For as I have argued in Chapter 5, animals have 
an interest that their lives continue in order that they may have future valuable 
experiences. Essentially then, if this right to life is grounded, we should stop raising 
animals in order to kill them and eat their flesh. I wish to examine four common
objections that might count against assigning a right to life for farm animals.
First of all, it might be argued that granting such a right would be a gross violation of 
our fundamental human freedoms. It is often claimed that while some people may want 
to be vegetarian for whatever reasons, that is up to them. However, to force it on people 
is to impose a way of life that not everyone accepts. To stop people eating meat, it could 
be argued, is akin to making people follow the same religion: both are unwarranted 
infringements upon our liberty. However, this argument fails because it does not 
understand the purpose of this thesis. I am not outlining a theory of what I think is the 
good life. Rather, I am delineating a scheme of moral rights and obligations. If one of 
our obligations is not to kill animals for food, then this is an obligation for all. And yes, of 
course this limits our freedom, just as our obligation not to kill humans for food limits our 
freedom.
Secondly, it is sometimes claimed that if we cease killing animals for food, this will 
mean thousands of people losing their livelihoods. Farmers, farm labourers, 
slaughtermen, animal feed suppliers, animal transporters, butchers, restaurateurs, pet
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food suppliers and the leather industry all face losing their means of making a living. For 
some, the idea of a complete cessation to the killing of animals for their flesh comes at 
too great an economic price. In response to this, I think it is only reasonable to concede 
that there is a price to be paid for shutting down the meat industry. However, there is 
almost always some kind of cost to be paid for respecting the core interests of 
individuals, but this cost should not prevent us from following the morally right action. 
For example, there were economic costs in the abolition of slavery -  particularly in the 
southern states of the USA -  but that did not render abolition the wrong course of action. 
In any case, I am not advocating simply abandoning those that work in the meat 
industry. As when any industry shuts down, care must be taken to ensure that the 
process is gradual, that adverse impacts on communities and their families is kept to a 
minimum, and that sufficient resources are provided for retraining.
Third, it might be objected that we simply must eat meat in order to survive. This 
objection seems somewhat old-fashioned these days, for as so many lifelong 
vegetarians have shown, a diet without animal flesh is perfectly healthy. However, it 
might be countered that this does not answer every situation. For example, some ice­
bound people are simply unable to live off a plant-based diet: to survive they need to kill 
and eat animals.174 In such extreme cases of survival I think we can concede that the 
killing and eating of animals is permissible. After all, it is completely unreasonable to 
expect people to sacrifice themselves in order to respect another’s interests. That is why 
we allow people to harm others in cases of self-defence, for example. However, we 
must face the fact that the vast majority of us simply do not need to eat meat in order to 
survive.
The final objection probably lies behind most people’s refusal to give up eating meat: 
that is, the flesh of dead animals tastes nice. This objection is often dismissed by 
proponents of animal rights out of hand. They argue that our interest in eating the 
tastiest food is only trivial, whereas the interest that animals have in continued life is one 
of the most fundamental that they have. However, at first sight, it might appear that my 
rights theory is more sympathetic to the argument that dead animals taste nice. For in 
Chapter 5 I recognised that animals have an interest in continued life, but also claimed 
that it was weaker than that same interest of persons. So perhaps the human interest in 
eating animals outweighs the animal interest in continued life? Unfortunately it does not.
174 David Benatar, “Why the Naive Argument against Moral Vegetarianism Really is Naive”,
Environmental Values, Vol. 10, No. 1, Feb. 2001: 103-112, p. 106.
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Like other proponents of animal rights, I claim that the human interest in eating animals 
is only trivial, and certainly not a key welfare interest. In contrast, the animal interest in 
continued life -  while weaker than that of persons -  is fundamental. To explain, human 
beings can ordinarily lead exceptionally good lives with high levels of well-being without 
eating meat. Contrary to much popular opinion, vegetarians can even enjoy immense 
pleasures of the palate. The welfare costs of following a diet without meat are thus 
extremely low for human beings. Animals however, have a more fundamental interest in 
staying alive, as this is the only means by which they can actually lead good lives 
through having valuable experiences. The value of life to animals is thus high indeed. 
Unfortunately then, although the flesh of animals might well taste nice, this does not 
justify our raising and killing of them for food.
6.1.3 Raising Animals for their Milk and Eggs
It will be remembered of course, that I also claimed in Chapter 5 that animals have no 
prima facie right to freedom. In light of this, animals generally have no moral right not to 
be used by human beings. Given this then, it might seem that we are under no 
obligation not to raise animals to enjoy their milk and eggs. I believe that this is the 
case. However, we should be cautious here. The majority of milk and eggs presently 
consumed come from animals who suffer terribly. Indeed, I have already outlined some 
of the pains that are inflicted on intensively raised chickens and dairy cows. Thus if we 
are to raise animals for their milk and eggs, we must raise them in accordance with their 
well-being. This will require an end to intensive farming practices, some of which are 
outlined above, and of course will result in more expensive dairy products.
At this point, many proponents of animal rights will disagree. They argue that veganism 
is mandatory, and not only because pain is presently inflicted on farmed chickens and 
dairy cows. The claim is that even in ‘ideal’ free-range conditions, where animals do not 
suffer pain and have room to move about outdoors, deliberately raising them, confining 
them, and extracting food from them is exploitative and undermines their dignity. 
Furthermore, some would probably point out that the implications of my argument do not 
even lead to vegetarianism. For clearly, if an animal leads a good life and dies of natural 
causes, my thesis would ordinarily see no wrong in eating the flesh of that animal. Once 
again, it might be claimed that such a conclusion undermines the dignity of animals.
First of all, I should make it clear that I do accept this implication of my thesis: there is 
nothing wrong in itself with eating animals who have died naturally. Our obligations to
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animals relate to the interests of animals, and interests concern how life goes for the 
individual whose life it is. If the animal has no life to go well or badly, she has no 
interests. So while a living animal has a clear and discernible interest in not being killed, 
a dead animal has no interest in not being eaten (or in anything else). Our obligation is 
not to kill animals, rather than not to eat them once they are dead.
However, by eating animals do we fail to respect their dignity, as some have 
suggested? After all, if dead animals have no right not to be eaten, the same must be 
true for humans. And yet most of us see cannibalism as an affront to human dignity. I 
say more on the notion of dignity in the next chapter, but I should make it clear now that 1 
am unclear what dignity means. Appeals to dignity are ordinarily invoked when we find 
something distasteful. For example, in the field of bioethics some regard cloning, 
genetic engineering and embryonic research as all affronts to human (and sometimes 
animal) dignity. The point here is not that these practices necessarily violate rights or 
interests, or cause pain or suffering, but that they somehow violate some higher or 
natural order. The fact that so many of us feel distaste or disgust when we consider 
such practices, so the argument goes, is evidence that this order has been wrongfully 
disrupted and dignity undermined. Similarly, we feel disgust at cannibalism, and this is 
because it violates human dignity.
Nevertheless, the feeling of distaste by itself cannot be a valid argument for the moral 
impermissibility of an action. If so, all sorts of bodily functions, sexual practices and bad 
habits would have to come under censure. But if a feeling of disgust is not sufficient to 
signal a violation of dignity, then what is? To be truthful, I have no idea. The problem 
with relying on notions such as dignity rather than interests to formulate our obligations is 
that dignity is an ethereal quality, and is thus hard to pin down. I might see dignity in the 
flowering of a plant. Does that mean picking that flower is a violation of dignity and thus 
wrong? Or have I ascribed dignity where it is not warranted? Without falling back on 
some intrinsic property of the object in question -  such as its interests or welfare - it is 
difficult to know how to make a case either way. Dignity is simply too vague a concept to 
be the basis of our moral obligations. But if this is so, since human corpses have no 
interests, do we do no wrong in eating them? Fortunately, we do not have to rely on the 
notion of dignity to find good reasons not to make the flesh of dead humans available for 
consumption. The interests and wishes of the living seem sufficient to do the job: I for 
one do not want to be eaten after my death, and do not want my friends and relatives to 
be eaten. In other words, I am happier now for the knowledge that I will not be eaten
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once dead, and neither will those close to me. This seems like a good reason to prevent 
humans from dining on one another. But of course, this argument must cut both ways. 
If an individual does want to offer his dead body for consumption, I see no wrong done; 
just as I see no wrong done when people eat dead humans in survival situations.
However, perhaps my argument concerning eating dead animals could be objected to 
on ‘slippery-slope’ grounds: eating animals who have died naturally will provide an 
opportunity to maintain the meat industry, thereby inevitably leading to rights violations. I 
have to say that I am extremely sceptical that applying my argument would somehow 
prop up conventional animal farming. A farmer who breeds animals, lets them lead full 
lives of good quality, and then sells their flesh for food once they have died naturally will 
not be very profitable. For one thing, just how many of these corpses would be edible? 
Older animals produce tougher meat, which is why meat animals are slaughtered in the 
early stages of their life. Moreover, death by ‘natural causes’ often means death by 
disease. If this is the case, some flesh may be contaminated and thus inedible. 
Considering that the farmer would have to spend large sums of money on feeding and 
sheltering the animals for the whole length of their natural lives without much reward at 
the end, it would no doubt be more efficient for most to stick to cultivating plant crops. 
Nevertheless, if an individual does decide to take this route (maybe it would make more 
sense on a small-holding to feed one’s own family), I see no reason why it would 
necessarily encourage him or others to start violating animals’ rights.
In this section I have applied the rights theory of this thesis to the issue of animals in 
agriculture. I have argued that the rights theory demands that agriculture must change. 
While I cannot be absolutely certain how this new rights-respecting industry will look, a 
few things can be said. It will not be permissible to raise animals in ways that cause 
them to suffer. It will not be permissible to raise animals in order to kill them for their 
meat. Animals may permissibly be raised for their milk and eggs (and potentially, their 
corpses) provided that they have a good quality of life. What this means essentially, is 
that in order to respect animal rights, agriculture will have to focus its attention on the 
production of crops, and on free-range poultry and dairy animals. While I have 
examined some initial objections to these proposals, what I regard as three more 
substantial criticisms are examined in the following sections.
6.2. Animals Killed in the Field
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While it might seem obvious that a vegetarian diet does not involve the deaths of 
animals, unfortunately this is not true. Even if one adopts a purely vegan plant-based 
diet, animals will still be killed in order that one can eat. This is because many animals -  
particularly birds, mice and other small rodents -  are killed through working the fields. 
For anyone who has seen a modern harvester in action, this may not be much of a 
surprise. This fact has raised two specific objections to the idea that we are under a 
moral obligation to be vegetarian. First of all, one philosopher has argued that to meet 
everyone’s nutritional needs, a crop-only system of agriculture will kill more animals than 
one in which cattle are also killed. Secondly, it might be argued that if we are under an 
obligation not to violate the rights of field animals not to be killed, then we will perish. 
Since this absurd, it is argued that the whole case for vegetarianism is undermined. In 
this section I discuss and refute both of these objections.
6.2.1 Crop Cultivation and Numbers of Animals Killed
Steven L. Davis has claimed that more animals would be killed by following a vegetarian 
or vegan diet than following one that involves the consumption of large herbivores as 
well as plants.175 Davis compares two agricultural systems: one which involves only the 
cultivation of crops; and one which involves half crops and half ruminant pasture (e.g. 
grass-fed cows). Davis argues that tending to the ruminants will involve fewer animal 
deaths, given that the land devoted to this system does not need to be worked so much. 
In effect then, Davis claims that if we all switched to a diet whereby both large herbivores 
and crops were consumed, fewer animals would die than if we switched to a diet of 
plants only.
What can we make of Davis’s argument? In the first instance, it should of course be 
pointed out that even fewer animals would die if we did not eat those ruminant cattle 
used for grazing, but only used them for their milk. This rather obvious point seems to 
lend further weight to my advocacy of lactose-vegetarianism. However, Gaverick 
Matheny has made a much more devastating objection to Davis’s argument. Matheny 
argues that Davis’s comparison of animal deaths rests on a mathematical error:
Davis mistakenly assumes the two systems -  crops only and crops with ruminant- 
pasture -  using the same total amount of land, would feed identical numbers of
175 Steven L. Davis, “The Least Harm Principle May Require that Humans Consume a Diet Containing 
Large Herbivores, not a Vegan Diet”, Journal o f  Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Vol. 16, No. 4, 
2003: 387-397.
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people. In fact, crop and ruminant systems produce different amounts of food per 
hectare -  the two systems would feed different numbers of people.176 
Matheny’s essential point is that one can extract far more protein from a hectare of crops 
than from a hectare of cattle. Indeed, crop production uses so much less land than 
ruminant pasture to produce the same amount of protein, that fewer animals would 
actually be killed by a crop-only system than by a crop and ruminant pasture system. 
Thus, in actual fact, fewer animals would be killed by the mass adoption of a diet based 
on plants.
6.2.2 Crop Cultivation and Rights Violations
However, all this still leaves the issue of those animals that are killed in the field. For 
surely it is the case that field animals have an interest in continued life, just like any other 
animal. Moreover, I have argued that this interest is sufficient to ground a prima facie 
moral right in animals not to be killed. Given this, it appears that by working the field to 
cultivate our crops, we are violating the rights of many animals. Does the rights theory 
outlined in this thesis demand then that we stop cultivating crops?
The rights theory outlined in this thesis does not demand that we stop producing crops 
in order to avoid the deaths of animals in the field. We must remember that I have 
argued that the rights of animals not to suffer and not to be killed are prima facie. Thus, 
we say that the animal interests in avoiding pain and in continued life are ordinarily 
sufficient to ground in us a duty not to cause them pain and not to end their lives. 
However, whether these interests ground duties in any particular instance depends on a 
range of factors. For example, in Chapter 5 I evaluated whether the human interest in 
therapeutic advances trumped the animal interest in not being killed by experimentation. 
I claimed that it did not, based on the fact that this would be inconsistent with our 
considered judgement that lethal experiments on non-autonomous humans are 
impermissible. The circumstances in this context are, of course, quite different. It is 
certainly true that field animals have an interest in continued life which would be set back 
if we killed them while cultivating crops. However, we as humans need to eat to survive, 
and need to cultivate crops in order to survive. In effect then, our interest in continued 
life clashes with the field animals’ interest in continued life. Given the arguments I made 
in the previous chapter about animals having a weaker interest in continued life than
176 Gaverick Matheny, “Least Harm: A  Defense o f Vegetarianism from Steven Davis’s Omnivorous 
Proposal”, Journal o f  Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2003: 505-511, p. 506.
126
human persons, it is evident that the field animals’ interest in continued life is insufficient 
to ground in us a duty not to cultivate crops. Quite simply, field animals have no moral 
right not to be killed by us when we cultivate crops.
To conclude this section I wish to claim that the argument from killings in the field does 
not undermine the case for vegetarianism. In the first place it is simply false that more 
animals will die if we adopt a vegetarian or vegan diet. Moreover, given the fact that 
humans must cultivate crops in order to survive, field animals’ interest in continued life is 
insufficient to ground in them a moral right not to be killed by us when we cultivate crops.
6.3. The Predation Argument
Rather than entering into complex assessments of how many animals are killed in the 
field, it might be argued that there is a much more straightforward objection to my 
proposal that we should not kill animals for their flesh. This is simply the point that some 
animals kill other animals in order to eat, so why shouldn’t we? The argument is 
sometimes put in terms of a supposed reductio ad absurdum: if vegetarians are correct 
and we have an obligation to refrain from killing animals to eat them, then we must also 
have the seemingly bizarre obligation to prevent predator animals from killing their prey. 
In this section, I examine the argument from predation by evaluating three common 
rebuttals that have been put forward by advocates of vegetarianism. First, it has been 
argued that animals are not moral agents. So it is argued that while we - as humans and 
moral agents - have an obligation not to kill other animals, we are under no duty to 
prevent animals from so doing. Second, it is pointed out that predator animals need to 
kill in order to survive while we do not, making their killings permissible and ours 
impermissible. And finally, some argue that if we were to interfere with predator-prey 
relations we would actually end up causing more overall harm to sentient animals. I 
argue that while the first objection fails, the second and third rebuttals effectively defeat 
the predation argument against vegetarianism.
6.3.1 Animals Are Not Moral Agents
It is sometimes claimed that there is an important difference between the killing of 
animals by humans, and the killings perpetrated by predator animals. As moral agents, 
humans are able to reflect upon and decide on the appropriate moral action. Animals, 
on the other hand, lack such capacities. Thus, while most humans can be held morally
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accountable for the killing they inflict, animals cannot. So the claim is that when we as 
humans kill animals for food, we are blameworthy and such killing should be prevented; 
but when animals kill other animals for food, they are not blameworthy and this should 
not be prevented.
However, this argument suffers from a significant problem. As several thinkers have 
pointed out, while it seems clear that moral agents cannot be held accountable for their 
actions, that does not mean to say that we should not prevent them from causing harm 
to others.177 To illustrate this point, Peter Alward gives the following example:
Consider, by way of analogy, a child too young to know the difference between right 
and wrong, attempting to slit the throat of his sleeping father. If the child succeeded 
in his attempt, he would have performed a morally wrong act albeit one for which he 
ought not to be blamed. However, despite the lack of blameworthiness for his act, 
we would be morally required to prevent the child from slitting his father’s throat if we 
could.178
The simple fact that children and animals are not moral agents does not mean that we 
should prevent them from causing harm. And predator animals do cause harm when 
they kill their prey: prey animals have an interest that their lives continue. Moreover, if 
this interest is sufficient to ground a right to life for animals in agriculture and in 
experimentation, why should it not be sufficient to ground a right for prey animals in the 
wild? Of course, this putative right to life of prey animals would not be held against their 
predators: predators are not moral agents, so cannot have moral duties. Rather, it would 
be held against us: we are moral agents, and can act to prevent their deaths.
So all this seems to suggest that if it is true that we should not kill animals to eat their 
flesh, then maybe we should also act to prevent predator animals from killing their prey. 
However, perhaps there is an alternative moral difference between the deaths that 
humans inflict and the deaths that predator animals inflict.
6.3.2 Kilting for Survival and Overall Harm
While the vast majority of humans do not need to kill animals in order to survive, 
predatory animals do need to kill to stay alive. This, I think, marks an important moral 
difference between the deaths we inflict upon animals, and those that are caused by 
predatory animals. One might argue that the killings of predatory animals are
177 S.F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals, p. 230; and Peter Alward, “The Nai've Argument against 
Moral Vegetarianism”, Environmental Values, Vol. 9, No. 1, Feb. 2000: 81-89, p. 83.
178 Ibid., p. 83.
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‘necessary’, while those of humans are ‘unnecessary’. Thus prey animals have a moral 
right not to be killed by us to be eaten, but have no right not to be killed by predator 
animals to be eaten.
However, there remains a difficulty with this argument. Dale Jamieson has correctly 
observed that not all the kills enacted by predators on prey animals are strictly 
necessary.179 Sometimes predators will kill more animals than they need to survive. 
Moreover, and as owners of pet cats will testify, in the process of killing, predatory 
animals will often inflict more pain on an animal than can be deemed necessary for 
survival. Given this, Jamieson wonders whether it would thus be better if we as humans 
raised the prey animals, killed them humanely, and then fed them to the predator 
animals ourselves.
I believe that the vegetarian can resist this conclusion by pointing out that to interfere 
with the predator-prey relationship would undoubtedly cause more overall harm in the 
long-term. To avoid the unnecessary harms inflicted on prey animals we would either 
have to segregate the prey animals as Jamieson considers, or segregate the predator 
animals. Both options seem impossible in practical terms. Nevertheless, even if we 
could do either, the impact on the ecosystems in which they reside would be 
catastrophic. For example, if we were to remove predator animals to avoid the 
unnecessary harms they inflict, there would be many so-called ‘cascade effects’. First of 
all, many scavenger animals who once fed on the corpses of the prey would suffer and 
die. Second, the prey animals would become abundant and out-compete other species 
for the best habitat, again leading to the suffering and death of animals from rival 
species. Moreover the prey animals might begin to decimate particular plant species. 
This might deny an important food source to other animals, who again would suffer and 
die. Such harms are also inevitable if the prey species are segregated: predator animals 
and scavengers would start to roam miles in the vain search for food; rival species would 
grow in number and decimate other populations; and the vegetation they once fed on 
might become abundant, adversely altering the habitat of other species.
Given all this, it is better that we do not interfere with predator-prey relations. While this 
will inevitably result in some unnecessary killings, where animals are killed and suffer 
without necessarily contributing to the survival of their predator, in the long run it will lead 
to far less harm to sentient animals. For this reason, we can say that in general prey
179 Dale Jamieson, “Rights, Justice, and Duties to Provide Assistance: A Critique of Regan’s Theory of 
Rights”, Ethics, Vol. 100, No. 1, Jan. 1990: 349-362, p. 354.
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animals have no right against us that we prevent their deaths at the hands of predator 
animals. As a final point, however, I should stress that where it is clear that killings by 
predator animals are unnecessary for survival, and where we know that we will not 
cause more harm in the long term, we do have an obligation to interfere. So, for 
example, cat owners ordinarily have an obligation to try to prevent their cats from killing 
and inflicting pain on other sentient animals.180
The conclusion of this section is that it is wrong for us to kill animals to eat their flesh, 
despite the fact that some animals kill and eat one another. This is not because humans 
are moral agents, and animals are not. Rather, it is because predator animals need to 
kill their prey to survive, and we do not. While it might be objected that not all of their 
killing is necessary for their survival, we simply have to face up to these unfortunate 
deaths. For the alternative -  greatly interfering with predator-prey relations -  comes at 
too great a cost.
6.4. The Non-Identity Problem and Farm Animals
So far in this discussion I have argued that farm animals have certain rights: the right not 
to be made to suffer and the right to continued life. We thus have a moral duty not to kill 
farm animals and not to make them suffer. However, there remains a problem with this 
overall line of argument that has not yet been addressed. How can animals who are 
killed or who suffer under intensive farm practices be wronged, when without such 
practices they would not have existed in the first place? Non-vegetarians make this 
point regularly: “If I and others didn’t eat chickens, there simply wouldn’t be any 
chickens.” In this section I discuss and refute this so-called non-identity objection. I 
claim that animals can still be wronged by the pain and killing they suffer at the hands of 
agricultural practices, despite the fact that they owe their existence to those practices. I 
also consider the implications of this claim for the permissibility of modifying farm 
animals whether by selective breeding or genetic engineering.
6.4.1 The Non-Identity Problem
Consider a chicken who is raised on a battery farm. If that chicken would not have 
existed had that farm not been intensively rearing chickens, can the chicken 
meaningfully be said to be wronged by the practices of the battery farm? In one set of
180 Sapontzis makes this same point. See S.F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals, p. 232.
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circumstances, the chicken can quite obviously be said to be wronged. For example, if 
the chicken suffers so much under these conditions that her life is not worth living, then 
the chicken clearly has been wronged. Given the terrible suffering that many intensively 
raised animals live under, I think that we can plausibly argue that millions of farm 
animals have lives that are not worth living and are thus wronged.
However, that still leaves those many farm animals whose lives are worth living. Take 
the example of a different chicken living on a farm under free-range conditions. Let us 
assume that the chicken has a good quality of life replete with valuable experiences. We 
can also safely assume that her life will inevitably be cut short (remember that she is 
killed young, so that her meat is tender) in order that humans may eat her flesh. Is it 
wrong to raise this chicken for the purpose of killing her? Of course, I have argued that 
ordinarily it is wrong to kill chickens. But the problem here is slightly different: is raising a 
chicken to be killed wrong? For if the farm had not been raising and killing chickens in 
this way, that chicken would never have existed, and never have led a valuable life.
At this point many might be tempted to declare that no wrong has been done. 
However, they would probably be more reluctant to reach the same conclusion if the 
problem were recast with humans instead of chickens. So, imagine a programme in 
which we produce groups of humans (to remove family ties, we might do this in vitro 
from anonymous volunteer donors), raising them and letting them lead independent lives 
of good quality. However, at some point throughout their lives we kill them -  if you find 
the idea of slaughtering them for their meat too implausible, perhaps we might slaughter 
them for their organs which will be used in transplants.181 Can we claim that a wrong 
has been done to these individuals by bringing them into existence? For without this 
programme of raising and killing humans, these individuals would never have existed 
and never led valuable lives. This question of doing wrong by bringing people into 
existence with worthwhile lives is what Derek Parfit has referred to as ‘the non-identity 
problem’.182
I think it is perfectly plausible to claim that a wrong has been done in both the chicken 
and human examples. In fact, two different types of argument have been put forward by 
philosophers to defend the notion that a wrong is done in such cases: person-affecting
181 This example borrows a little from Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel, Never Let M e Go, (London: Faber and 
Faber, 2006).
182 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
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arguments, and impersonal arguments.183 Person-affecting arguments claim that one 
can be harmed or have one’s rights violated by an action (and thus be wronged) even if 
one is on balance no worse off as a result of that action.184 So, we might claim that the 
humans are wronged by the transplant programme, despite the fact that they are better 
off for the programme’s existence. And again, the chicken too might be wronged by 
being raised to be killed for her meat, even though she is better off for having been so 
raised.
Impersonal arguments, on the other hand, see the wrong done not in terms of how the 
action affects the individuals concerned, but in terms of how it affects the amount of well­
being in the world.185 So, raising humans and killing them for their organs is wrong 
because it leads to a world with lower well-being when compared to one in which 
humans are born and not killed for their organs. Similarly, raising chickens and killing 
them for their flesh is wrong because it leads to a world with lower well-being when 
compared to one in which chickens are raised but not killed.
Clearly, however, there is a rather obvious problem with the latter approach. It only 
seems to work in ‘same-number situations’: that is, when we compare the actual world 
with an alternative world in which there are the same number of individuals. For 
example, it demands that we compare the world in which x number of chickens are 
raised and killed, with a world in which x number of chickens are raised but not killed. 
Unfortunately, though, the case of farm animals does not seem to be a same-number 
situation (and neither does the human transplant programme). Free-range farmers raise 
chickens, after all, in order to kill them. If they cannot kill them, farmers would simply not 
bother raising them. So the problem we face is a ‘different-number situation’: we must 
compare the actual world where chickens are raised, lead valuable lives and are 
inevitably killed, with the alternative world where chickens are not raised. Moreover, if 
the impersonal argument is concerned with the amount of well-being in the world, it 
would have to say that the world in which chickens are raised and killed for their flesh
183 Because the vast majority o f this literature has been written on humans, the terminology has been 
framed with regards to ‘persons’. However, the arguments are equally applicable to ‘non-persons’ 
(whether human or otherwise): so maybe the terms ‘individual-affecting’ and ‘non-individual-affecting’ 
would be better. For convenience, though, I will stick with the common terminology.
184 For an example o f this approach, see James Woodward, “The Non-Identity Problem”, Ethics, Vol. 96, 
No. 4, July 1986: 804-831, pp. 810-811.
185 For an example of an impersonal approach, see Dan W. Brock, “Preventing Genetically Transmitted 
Disabilities while Respecting Persons with Disabilities” in David Wasserman et al. (eds.), Quality o f  Life 
and Human Difference: Genetic Testing, Health Care and Disability, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005).
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would be best. Given that it would also say that a world in which humans are raised and 
killed for their organs would be best, this seems improbable.
We are left then to consider the person-affecting explanation of the wrong. One 
version of this argument would say that the chicken on the free-range farm and the 
humans in the transplant programme are wronged because being raised to be killed 
inevitably violates their rights, and this is true even though they are better off for having 
been raised to be killed. Is this argument reasonable? Some philosophers have argued 
that it is not. They claim that this argument has a rather implausible outcome: it implies 
that a wrong is committed when we violate someone’s right in the process of saving their 
life.186 So, as an example, imagine that we are scaling a remote mountain and you get 
your arm stuck. The only way that I can possibly free you is to break your arm. If I do 
not free you, you will undoubtedly die as there is an icy storm on its way that you will be 
exposed to. If bringing into existence a chicken (or human) to kill her wrongs her by 
inevitably violating her rights, it must also be the case that my saving you (keeping you in 
existence) wrongs you by inevitably violating your right not have your arm broken.
However, I do not think that this argument defeats the person-affecting response to the 
non-identity problem. For given the account of rights offered in this thesis, it is extremely 
difficult to accept that you have a right not to have your arm broken in this 
mountaineering example. If anything, it seems that you actually have an interest in 
having your arm broken, and that this is strong enough to ground a duty on my part to 
break it! Moreover, and as Doran Smolkin has argued, the two cases are quite radically 
and importantly different.187 In the rescue case, I am faced by a presently existing 
person in desperate need of help. It would of course be wrong not to offer assistance -  
even if that assistance involves inflicting some ‘harm’. However, in the chicken case I 
am not faced with a presently existing person in desperate need of help. Rather, I am 
faced with a problem of whether to bring an individual into the world. This is a different 
type of problem altogether. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suggest that this problem is 
best approached not just by considering whether her life will be worthwhile, but also 
whether she will have her rights respected.
To be clear then, I have argued that it is wrong to raise individuals when their rights will 
inevitably be violated, even though those individuals are no worse off for having been so
186 For example see, Jeff McMahan, “Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality o f Causing People to Exist” 
in John Harris (ed.), Bioethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 454.
187 Doran Smolkin, “Toward a Rights-Based Solution to the Non-Identity Problem”, Journal o f  Social 
Philosophy, Vol. 30, No. 1, Spring 1999: 194-208, pp. 200-201.
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raised. This brings up the question of whether these individuals have a right not to be 
raised. To discover if such a right exists, we need to establish whether these individuals 
have a sufficiently strong interest in not being raised when their right to life will inevitably 
be violated. Since individuals must have a sufficiently strong interest in continued life to 
ground the right to life in the first place, I think there is good reason to believe that they 
have a very strong interest in not having that right violated. However, in response to 
this, many will reason along the following lines: overall, the interest in existing with a 
valuable life must surely outweigh the interest in not having one’s rights violated. That is 
to say, is it not better to have led a worthwhile life with violations of one’s rights, than 
never to have lived at all? If this is the case, the interest in not having been raised 
seems insufficiently strong to ground a corresponding right in not having been raised. I 
believe that this objection can be overcome. For importantly, one can have one’s rights 
violated by the performance of some action, even if overall one is left no worse off by the 
performance of that action. To illustrate, consider an example put forward by James 
Woodward:
Suppose that Smith, who is black, attempts to buy a ticket on a certain airline flight
and that the airline refuses to sell it to him because it discriminates racially. Shortly
188after, that very flight crashes killing all aboard.
Here, I believe is a clear case where Smith’s interest in not being racially discriminated is 
sufficient to ground in him a right to be sold a ticket on equal terms to everyone else. 
Moreover, this interest still remains sufficient to ground the right even though its setback 
can reasonably be said to leave him better off overall. Likewise, individuals such as 
free-range chickens and humans raised for their organs, can be said to have a right not 
to be raised when their other rights will inevitably be violated, even though the violation 
of that right might leave them better off overall.
Having said all of this, if this right not to be raised is ascribed, isn’t that tantamount to 
assigning rights to unborn individuals? Assigning rights and interests to unborn 
individuals would be particularly problematic for this thesis, since I have claimed that 
only those entities with phenomenal consciousness possess interests, and thus can 
possess rights. Given this, it would seem that I will either have to retract much of what I 
have said about our obligations regarding raising individuals who will inevitably have 
their rights violated, or I will have to relax my commitment to the claim that the capacity 
for phenomenal consciousness is necessary to possess interests. In response to this, I
188 James Woodward, “The Non-Identity Problem”, p. 810.
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wish to claim that individuals do have a right not to have been raised when their rights 
will inevitably be violated, but also that this right is held by phenomenally conscious 
individuals, not the unborn. To make it plain then, the right should not be regarded as a 
right of the unborn not to be raised when their other rights will inevitably violated. 
Rather, it is the right of existing individuals not to have been raised when their other 
rights will inevitably be violated.189 In other words, the right is held by existing sentient 
individuals that those events should not have happened in the past. And yet, a problem 
remains: does this mean that there is no right to violate when we consider whether to 
raise a free-range chicken, thus rendering such a policy permissible? No it does not. 
For we must recognise that we cannot fulfil our future obligation to respect the chicken’s 
right if we raise that chicken.190 This renders the policy of raising such chickens 
impermissible. With this change in emphasis, it is perfectly possible to assign the right 
not to be raised, while maintaining that interests and rights can only be possessed by 
entities with the capacity for phenomenal consciousness.
6.4.2 Is Modifying Animals Inherently Wrong?
To recap then, I have argued that one can be wronged by an action, even if that action 
does not make one worse off overall. This means that it is wrong to raise animals to kill 
them, even when they will have worthwhile lives. However, this conclusion has an 
impact on another contentious issue in animal agriculture: deliberately producing animals 
that have capacities that suit human ends. Is it permissible to breed or genetically 
modify farm animals so that they have capacities (reduced or otherwise) that benefit 
humans? Before looking at how the implications of my claims concerning the non­
identity problem affect this issue, it will first be valuable to consider whether modifying 
animals is simply wrong in and of itself.
It is clear that domesticated farm animals are far removed from their wild ancestors. 
The process of domestication has involved the deliberate breeding of animals which has 
radically altered their nature. Without fail, this change has been engineered for human 
purposes: so that hens lay more; so that cows produce more and leaner meat; so that 
sheep produce more wool; and so on. With the technology of genetic engineering now
189 This line of reasoning is influenced by the argument found in Allen Buchanan et al., From Chance to 
Choice: Genetics and Justice, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 236.
190 The idea that we can partly assess the permissibility o f current actions on how they impact on our ability 
to meet our future obligations is proposed by Steve Vanderheiden, “Conservation, Foresight, and the Future 
Generations Problem”, Inquiry, Vol. 49, No. 4, Aug. 2006: 337-352.
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at our disposal, even greater opportunities to alter the nature of farm animals to better 
suit our goals are available: goats that produce hormones in their milk to cure human 
disease; pigs that grow bigger and leaner than any of their ancestors; turkeys that do not 
get broody and thus lay more; and even sheep that produce their own insecticide in their 
skin to prevent the need for dipping.191 Is there any reason to think that such alterations 
are just inherently wrong? There seems to be three possible routes one might take.
First off, one might claim that these alterations offend nature and are thus wrong. In 
this spirit Michael Fox writes:
To change that which is natural is to alter the harmony within living beings and the 
harmony in their relationship with the external environment. This is the meaning of
192harm: to cause injury by disrupting the harmony of life.
It will probably be evident from some of my previous arguments that I disagree with Fox. 
Harm cannot be simply equated with disrupting the natural. As I have argued in Chapter 
5 and elsewhere, disrupting the natural can in actual fact often be ethically valuable, 
such as when we prevent the realisation of humans’ murderous instincts. However, 
Fox’s argument is not quite as simple as this quotation suggests. He sees the wrong in 
modifying animals not in the disruption of nature generally, but in the fact that we disrupt 
animals’ telos; that is, their ‘nature or beingness’.193 Unfortunately, such arguments take 
a rather static view of species and their individual members. According to evolutionary 
theory, the ‘natures’ of both individuals and species change all the time. Given this, it is 
unclear why nature’s alterations are permissible, but ours are not.
Second we might argue that altering animals for our purposes in ways such as these 
fails to treat animals with the appropriate respect.194 Here ‘respect’ might involve 
something like the Kantian injunction that we should not treat others only as means but 
also as ends. Of course, by treating someone as an ends, Kant means that we should 
respect the autonomy, rationality and moral agency of persons. Since animals are non­
persons, this type of respect argument needs to be modified. Perhaps then, we might 
define treating an animal as an ends as having proper concern for the animal’s well­
being. In this case, respecting an animal would mean that we should not simply use an
191 These examples are taken from a useful summary given in Michael J. Reiss and Roger Straughan, 
Improving Nature? The Science and Ethics o f  Genetic Engineering, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), pp. 166-174.
192 Michael Fox, “Transgenic Animals: Ethical and Animal Welfare Concerns” in Peter Wheale and Ruth 
McNally (eds.), The Bio-Revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora’s Box, (London: Pluto Press, 1990), p. 33.
193 Ibid. p. 31.
194 I talk more about this idea of respect in the next chapter.
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animal however we see fit, but must pay due consideration to her own interests. Now, 
by modifying animals solely for our own ends, it might well be argued that we are using 
animals as mere instruments, thus failing to show them respect. However, there is a 
problem with this claim. For while altering animals for our purposes is an uncontroversial 
case of using animals as means, it is not clear that such alteration also necessarily 
involves denigrating their ends. In other words, to treat something as a means or as an 
instrument is not incompatible with showing it respect.195 For example, imagine 
genetically engineering a dairy cow so that she is resistant to mastisis. Ultimately, we 
might do this so that we can extract more milk from the cow, and in this way we 
obviously use the cow as a means. However, if we allow the animal to lead a life of high 
quality with a full range of valuable experiences, it seems that we are also respecting the 
cow’s well-being, and treating the cow as an ends. In other words, altering animals need 
not involve treating them with disrespect.
Finally, it has been argued that modifying animals is wrong because it fails to show 
humility. David Cooper argues that humility is a virtue for human beings because it turns 
us away from mere selfish concerns. However, when we, “...programme animals with 
ends to suit ourselves and otherwise bend them to our will”196, we wrong animals by 
abandoning our ‘proper humility’.197 Clearly, this argument rests on a judgement of the 
actions and attitudes of the modifiers, rather than the interests and well-being of the 
entity being modified. However, this focus leads to some rather strange implications. 
For example, consider a brilliantly talented yet supremely arrogant surgeon who 
performs many life-saving operations over the course of any week. Let us assume that 
his success rests on the satisfaction he takes from his skills conquering nature and 
cheating death, rather than any concern for his patients. It is probably safe to assume 
that.this surgeon fails to show ‘proper humility’. Despite this, however, it would be 
extremely odd to judge his actions impermissible, given the lives he saves. Humility may 
often be a virtue, but it should not hold us back from facilitating great benefits at no cost.
6.4.3 Is Modifying Animals Ever Wrong?
195 Alan Holland makes this same point in, Alan Holland, “The Biotic Community: a Philosophical Critique 
of Genetic Engineering” in Peter Wheale and Ruth McNally (eds.), The Bio-Revolution: Cornucopia or  
Pandora s Box, p. 170.
196 David Cooper, “Intervention, humility and animal integrity”, in Alan Holland and A. Johnson (eds.), 
Animal Biotechnology and Ethics, (London: Chapman and Hall, 1998), p. 155.
197 Ibid.
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I have argued then that there is nothing inherently wrong with modifying animals. 
However, is it ever wrong? In answering this, we return once again to the non-identity 
problem, and our previous conclusions will prove useful here.
First of all, and in keeping with my argument above, we can claim that animals who are 
modified and then have lives that are not worth living have been wronged. We should 
not create animals whose lives are full of pain and suffering just to suit ourselves. 
Unfortunately many farm animals that are currently genetically engineered do have such 
lives. The classic example is that of the Beltsville pigs, named after the US Department 
of Agriculture research station where they were bom. The pigs had a human growth 
hormone gene inserted into them so that they would grow faster and leaner. In some 
respects, they were a success: the pigs’ rate of gain increased by 15%, their feed 
efficiency by 18%, and their carcass fat was reduced by 80%.198 However, these ‘gains’ 
came at considerable costs to the pigs’ own well-being. For not only did the pigs suffer 
from liver and kidney problems that shortened their lives:
The animals also exhibited a wide variety of disease and symptoms, including 
lethargy, lameness, uncoordinated gait, bulging eyes, thickened skin, gastric ulcers, 
severe synovitis, degenerative joint disease, heart disease of various kinds, nephritis 
and pneumonia.199
We have an obligation not to produce animals who suffer so terribly in this way. And 
while it might be objected that these side-effects were unwanted, that provides little 
excuse. Adopting a ‘precautionary principle’ seems apt when we are embarking on 
such radical alterations of sentient beings: when we have little idea concerning the 
effects of an alteration, we should refrain from making it. Given the somewhat random 
nature of genetic modification, this precautionary principle would indeed be prohibitive. 
To explain, the genetic modification of animals usually involves the technique of 
pronuclear microinjection. This is the injection of the prospective gene into the single 
cell embryo of the prospective animal. The procedure breaks up the chromosomes in 
the cell, and in the process of self-repair, the gene is incorporated. It is hard to tell 
exactly how these genes will be incorporated, and very often the process is lethal, with 
those that do survive regularly suffering from serious pathologies.200 Given all this, the
198 Bernard E. Rollin, Science and Ethics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 169.
Ibid.
200 This summary is taken from, Ben Mepham, “ ’Wurde der Kreatur’ and the Common Morality”, Journal 
o f  Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2000: 65-78, p. 67.
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onus must be on those who wish to make genetic alterations to animals to prove that 
their changes will not cause harm.
Clearly, however, not all farm animals who are modified -  genetically, or more 
conventionally through breeding -  have lives that are not worth living. Many animals in 
actual fact have valuable lives. So what about the permissibility of altering animals for 
our purposes, but who have lives worth living? Well, if one of our purposes is to kill 
them, or violate their rights in some other way, then that would be wrong. As I argued 
above, animals have a right not to be raised to be killed, even if they would not have 
existed had they not been raised to be killed. Really then, this leaves the question of 
modifying animals who will not be killed or have their rights violated, and who will have 
worthwhile lives: is that permissible? I believe that much depends on the type of 
modification that is being considered. To help us then, we might consider two extremes. 
First, we might alter an animal in such a way so that she has very similar opportunities 
for well-being compared to her predecessors. So, take the example given above of 
altering sheep so that they produce their own insecticide. If this alteration had no other 
effects, and if it is neither inherently objectionable to raise sheep for their wool nor to 
alter them (and I do not think that it is), then such an alteration would be permissible.
On the other hand, we might alter an animal so that she has limited capacities and 
reduced opportunities for well-being compared to her predecessors. So, imagine 
creating a chicken with reduced capacities: let us say that she is incapable of spreading 
her wings and has no desire to nest. If the animals does not suffer as a result, and has 
a worthwhile life, would such action be wrong? Bernard E. Rollin thinks not. His 
‘Principle of the Conservation of Welfare’ concentrates only on the absence of suffering: 
Any animals that are genetically engineered for human use or even for 
environmental benefit should be no worse off, in terms of suffering, after the new
traits are introduced into the genome than the parent stock was prior to the insertion
201of the new genetic material.
But if it is permissible to reduce the capacities of animals so long as they do not suffer, 
surely then the same must also be true for humans? This raises the repugnant idea of 
producing happy idiots, as envisaged in Brave New World. However, Rollin thinks that 
we cannot alter humans in this way, and that this is because reason and autonomy are
201 Bernard E. Rollin, The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social Issues in the Genetic Engineering o f  
Animals, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 179.
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nonnegotiable ultimate goods for humans.202 But we can question Rollin’s reasoning 
here. While I agree that rationality and autonomy are intrinsic goods for most humans, 
they are not so for all humans. As I have argued before, autonomy is of no value to 
someone who is not autonomous, such as a young baby for example. So if autonomy 
and rationality are only valuable for autonomous and rational creatures -  which seems 
plausible -  is there any problem with deliberately creating non-autonomous and non- 
rational humans who have worthwhile lives?
I think that there is a problem with deliberately creating humans who will never be 
autonomous or rational. The problem here is in deliberately creating individuals with 
fewer capacities than most other humans. And this is problematic because fewer 
capacities means fewer opportunities for valuable experiences. True, these individuals 
will have lives that are worth living. Also true, had they not been created with reduced 
capacities they would not even have existed at all. But as I argued above, one can be 
wronged even if one is left no worse off overall. When we are confronted with the 
question of whether to bring an individual into existence, we must not just consider 
whether they will have a life worth living. Nor must we only consider whether they will 
have their rights respected. We must also consider whether they have sufficient 
opportunities for well-being.
This begs the question, what counts as sufficient? Quite simply, a sufficient number of 
opportunities equates to those available to an individual with ‘species-typical normal 
functioning’.203 Of course, basing the threshold of sufficiency on ‘normality’ raises the 
difficult question of determining what normal is. However, I do not think that this difficulty 
is insurmountable, for we do often have clear ideas as to what counts as normal 
functioning. So to take an example, imagine considering whether to modify a human 
being so that she will have permanent mental disabilities which are such that she will 
never be autonomous, but she will have a life worth living. I claim that such deliberate 
creation would be wrong, because the individual will have insufficient opportunities for 
well-being. Her opportunities are insufficient because they are lower than the normal 
functioning of human beings.
Let us now return to the question of modifying chickens; modifying them so that they 
have reduced capacities but worthwhile lives. Remember that our example concerned
202 Ibid., p. 173.
203 The concept of species-typical normal functioning is taken from Norman Daniels’s work on justice and 
healthcare. See for example, Norman Daniels, “Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice”, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 1981: 146-179, p. 153.
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deliberately creating birds who cannot spread their wings and have no desire to nest. In 
this case, the same argument as outlined above must apply. Do these chickens have 
sufficient opportunities for well-being? To answer this, we must compare the birds 
against their species-typical normal functioning. In short, chickens normally are able to 
spread their wings, and normally are able to nest; and ordinarily these are valuable 
experiences for chickens. By reducing the capacities of these chickens, we have 
reduced their opportunities for well-being. On this basis, and contrary to Rollin, it would 
be impermissible to deliberately create such chickens.
Before concluding this section, we must once again consider whether individuals have 
a right not to have been modified so that they have insufficient opportunities for well­
being. Do individuals have an interest in not having been modified with reduced 
capacities that is sufficient to impose a duty on others not to conduct such modifications? 
I believe that they do. After all, sentient beings of all types have a very strong interest 
that their capacities are not reduced during their lives. Quite rightly, we consider it to be 
a very serious harm when someone is injured or suffers from some disease that 
significantly reduces their capacities for well-being. This harm is not simply explained by 
the reduction in their capacities however, but also by the fact they have fewer capacities 
compared to the species norm. Accordingly, I think it makes good sense to say that 
individuals, including animals such as chickens, have a strong enough interest to impose 
on us a duty not to modify them with insufficient capacities for well-being. In short, 
animals have a moral right not to have been modified with significantly reduced 
capacities.
To end this section, I want to briefly summarise its main conclusions. First of all, I have 
argued that the fact that farm animals would not have existed had we not deliberately 
raised them to kill them, does not justify raising animals to kill them. For one, many 
animals suffer so terribly under intensive farming that existence is simply of no benefit to 
them. Moreover, those animals that do lead worthwhile lives can still be wronged and 
have their rights violated by farm practices, even though they may be no worse off for 
having been brought into existence. Indeed, it makes sense to say that animals have a 
moral right not to have been raised when their other rights will inevitably be violated. 
Secondly, I have claimed that there is nothing inherently wrong with modifying animals 
for human ends. However, and finally, I have argued that not all modifications are 
permissible. For example, if we are modifying animals to kill them or modifying them so
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that they suffer terribly, such modifications are wrong. Moreover, those modifications 
that lead to animals possessing worthwhile lives but with insufficient opportunities for 
well-being are also impermissible. In fact, animals have a moral right not to have been 
modified so that they possess insufficient opportunities for well-being.
6.5 Conclusion
Given the numbers of farm animals we raise and slaughter, the issue of animals in 
agriculture is indeed pressing. In this chapter I have applied the rights theory as initially 
sketched in Chapter 5 to the question of farm animals. I argue that animals have a right 
not to be killed and not to be made to suffer by agricultural practices, but have no right 
not to be used in farming at all. This has two radical implications: an end to a great 
many intensive farming methods, and an end to raising animals for their meat. The 
objection that more animals will be killed by the mass adoption of vegetarianism fails: the 
agricultural system that will kill fewest animals is actually a ‘crop-only' one. The 
objection that animals kill one another, so we should be able to, also fails: predator 
animals need to kill to survive whereas we do not. The fact that not all predator kills are 
strictly ‘necessary’ is unfortunate, but we have to accept that interfering with them may 
cause more harm than good. Finally, the objection that farm animals would not exist at 
all had they not been raised to be killed also fails: one can still be wronged by a policy 
even if one benefits overall from it. This final conclusion has implications for our 
modifications of farm animals. Importantly, we can still wrong an animal by creating an 
animal with reduced capacities, even if that animal does not suffer. We will see that this 
latter argument is of relevance to the breeding of animals in another context: animals 
used in entertainment. It is to this topic that I turn in the next chapter.
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7. Non-Human Animals and Entertainment
In the last two chapters I have claimed that non-humans animals possess prima facie 
moral rights not to be killed and not to be subjected to pain. Given that the infliction of 
pain and death are often intrinsic elements of animal experimentation and modem 
industrial farming techniques, the implications of my theory for these practices was 
reasonably clear. In this chapter, however, I wish to examine a more complex use of 
animals: their use in our entertainment. This use includes such practices as pet- 
keeping, displaying animals in zoos, keeping them in safari parks, making them perform 
in circuses, and using animals in sport. I say that this use is more complex than that of 
experimentation and farming, because these entertainment activities affect animal well­
being in such different ways. For example, the well-being of a dancing bear who is 
chained and beaten every day is markedly different to that of a cosseted pedigree cat. 
However, the bear and the cat are alike in that they are both being kept and used for the 
entertainment of human beings. In this chapter I wish to examine whether such use is 
permissible. Or, to put it another way, do animals have a moral right not to be used to 
entertain human beings?
To address this question, the chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section I 
again outline the rights theory that I have developed so far in the thesis and apply it to 
the question of using animals in entertainment. If, as was argued in Chapter 5, animals 
have no right not to be used by humans, but do have rights not to be killed or made to 
suffer when they are so used, what implications does this have for the ways in which we 
use animals to entertain us? Secondly, I examine four possible objections that might 
be raised against my proposal, all of which claim that it is too permissive. The first three 
all relate to the notion of ‘respect’: first, that it is disrespectful to use animals to entertain 
us because it undermines their dignity; second, that it is disrespectful in that it involves 
our having a flawed attitude towards them; and third, that it is disrespectful to treat 
animals as property -  and most animals used in entertainment are very much the 
property of others. The final objection argues that using animals for entertainment 
violates animals’ interest in exercising their natural functionings. I claim that all of these 
potential objections fail, and thus that my conclusion that animals have no moral right not 
to be used in entertainment is valid. First however, I need to say more about how I 
reach this conclusion, and I do this at the beginning of the next section.
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7.1 Implications of the Rights Theory for Animals in Entertainment
I have claimed in both Chapters 5 and 6 that animals have prima facie moral rights not to 
be made to suffer and not to be killed. However, I have also argued that because 
animals have no fundamental interest in liberty, ordinarily they have no right not to be 
used by human beings. Perhaps the most obvious implication of this theory is that I do 
not condemn any use of animals for entertainment per se. Such a claim stands in 
opposition to many other proponents of animal rights. For although only some of these 
proponents condemn the practice of pet-keeping204, the vast majority of philosophical 
and political advocates of animal rights regard keeping animals in zoos and making them 
perform in circuses as necessarily harmful and thus morally illegitimate.205 I do not 
share these views. I claim that none of these practices are intrinsically harmful to 
animals. However, this does not mean that they are never harmful. Often these 
practices result in the infliction of suffering and the loss of life; in these cases, we have a 
moral obligation to amend our ways. Indeed, for the remainder of the section I look more 
closely at just how we should amend our ways.
7.1.1 Pet-Keeping
With regards to pet-keeping, keeping animals as pets is permissible so long as it does 
not lead to the infliction of suffering and the loss of life. While this does not sound very 
demanding to most of us, given the love and affection so many of us heap on our non­
human family members, it is evident that the practice of pet-keeping involves a 
significant amount of animal pain and death. For example, in the UK reported cases of 
cruelty to pet animals are going up. The RSPCA reported a 77% rise in the number of 
animals it dealt with in 2005. Of the 94,130 abused animals that the RSPCA saw in 
2005, 24,000 were dogs and 11,400 were smaller domestic animals.206 Moreover, pet 
animals also suffer from less obvious acts of cruelty. For example, millions more 
animals are kept in inappropriate conditions that cause harm. Animals need sufficient
204 For two notable examples see John Bryant, Fettered Kingdoms, (Winchester, Hants.: revised ed., Fox 
Press, 1990); and Gary L. Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?, (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2000). These two authors should be commended for facing up to the implications 
of their theory. In my view too many other proponents o f animal rights propose an animal interest in 
liberty and yet ignore the implications of this claim for the practice o f pet-keeping. This inconsistency is 
also pointed out by Stuart Spencer et al., “History and Ethics of Keeping Pets: Comparison with Farm 
Animals”, Journal o f  Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Vol. 19, No. 1, Feb. 2006: 17-25.
205 Two examples of such a view can be found in Dale Jamieson, “Against Zoos” and Mark Rowlands, 
Animals Like Us.
206 The Guardian, “RSPCA reports year o f shocking animal abuse”, July 26th 2006.
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room to move around, sufficient stimuli to prevent becoming frustrated and sufficient 
company to prevent being bored. They also need the right type and amount of food, and 
the opportunity to exercise. The amount of bored, frustrated and/or morbidly obese pet 
animals is not a statistic that the RSPCA produces. However, the number of animals 
suffering in this way is surely vast. For example, obesity is causally linked to health 
problems such as diabetes, and heart, kidney and liver damage, and yet it has been 
estimated that one third of Britain’s pet dogs is obese.207 In terms of boredom, some 
argue that confining birds such as parrots in cages for all of their lives frustrates them as 
they are unable to carry out significant aspects of their behaviour such a flocking, social 
interaction and foraging for food.208 At this stage, it might be objected that to assign 
such conditions as boredom and frustration to animals is to anthropomorphise. 
However, when one considers that many of these animals are, like us, naturally social 
animals, and have similar neurological structures, it is little surprise that they have similar 
emotional responses. Indeed, the biologist Michael W. Fox argues that this explains why 
domestic dogs suffer from similar behavioural disturbances to humans, such as, 
compulsive eating, sympathy lameness, sibling rivalry, extreme jealousy, aggression, 
depression and refusal to eat.209 Animals have a moral right not to be made to suffer in 
such ways, and this requires more on our part than simply housing, feeding and 
refraining from beating them.
The practice of pet-keeping also results in huge numbers of animals being killed. 
Ignorance about what keeping a pet involves often means that humans take on pet 
animals with little thought. However, once the costs of owning a pet are realised, or a 
family is started, or a move of house is undertaken, many pets are abandoned. This 
abandonment might take the extreme form of dumping them with the rubbish or in the 
canal, but more often involves leaving them in the street to become strays, or handing 
them to a rescue home. Many strays, including those in rescue homes, are killed. For 
example, according to a report by the Dogs Trust, 100,000 stray dogs were found in the
207 Roger A. Mugford, “Canine Behavioural Therapy” in James Serpell (ed.), The Domestic D og: Its 
Evolution, Behaviour and Interventions with People, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 
15°.
208 M . Engebretson, “The welfare and suitability of parrots as companion animals: a review”, Animal 
Welfare, Vol. 15, No. 3, August 2006: 263-276.
209 Michael W . Fox, The Dog: its Domestication and Behaviour, (New York and London: Garland STMP 
Press, 1978), pp. 258-9.
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UK in 2005, and 7,800 were killed.210 Animals have a moral right not to be killed simply 
because we have gone off them or are moving home.
If animals have a moral right not to be made to suffer or be killed by their use as pets, 
then the practice of pet-keeping as it currently stands is morally unjustifiable. However, I 
do not believe that this necessarily leads to the conclusion that pet-keeping must be 
entirely phased out. Rather, I believe that pet-keeping must be regulated much more 
rigorously. One good suggestion that has been put forward is the idea of licences for 
pet-ownership.211 If humans wish to keep an animal as a pet for their entertainment, 
then they have a moral obligation to take responsibility for the well-being of that animal. 
That does not just mean they must refrain from beating the animal or prevent him from 
starving. Instead, potential pet-owners should be made to prove that they have the 
appropriate accommodation, time and knowledge to care for that particular animal. After 
all, when we entrust human children to foster guardians or adoptive parents, great care 
is taken that those individuals will act in the best interests of the child. It seems to me 
that similar steps should be taken for those wishing to have pet animals.
Of course, the practice of pet-keeping raises three further and more complex issues 
that have rarely been discussed in the literature: euthanasia, neutering and breeding. 
These are common practices amongst pet-owners, and it is necessary to assess them in 
the context of the rights theory. I believe that the issue of euthanasia can be handled 
quite straightforwardly by the rights theory established in this thesis. Animals have an 
interest in continued life on the sole basis that they may have future valuable 
experiences. If an animal is so sick that she has no opportunity for future valuable 
experiences, and instead will suffer for the remainder of her life, then her interest in 
continued life fades, her right to life is not grounded, and killing that animal, other things 
being equal, is permissible.212 However, huge numbers of sick animals are killed every 
single day even though they still have the opportunity foc.future valuable experiences. 
Presumably this is because the owners cannot or do not wish to pay for the necessary 
operation and/or subsequent care of the animal. This is wrong. If an animal has the 
opportunity for valuable experiences, then she has an interest in staying alive that 
cannot simply be ignored on the grounds of cost alone. As mentioned above, pet-
210 Figures from the “Stray Dog Survey 2006” conducted by GfK NOP on behalf of Dogs Trust, 
<http://www.dogstrust.org.uk/press_office/stray_dog_survey_2006/>.
211 In the U K  it used to be necessary to have a licence to own a dog. However, this was phased out in 1987.
212 We ordinarily refer to the killing o f sick animals as ‘putting them down’ . Presumably this phrase is used 
(just as the term ‘culling’ is used) because it is easier to stomach than ‘killing’ . I w ill mainly stick with the 
term ‘killing’ in this discussion to avoid the bias inherent in these ‘softer’ terms.
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owners have a responsibility for the well-being of their animals. Perhaps then, as a 
necessary condition of being awarded their licence, pet-owners should be made to take 
out insurance for their pets so that they can cover the costs of illnesses and accidents 
when and if they occur.
Of course some might object to this account of the permissibility of euthanasia on the 
grounds of its implications for killing humans. For if it is permissible to kill animals if they 
have no opportunity for future valuable experiences, surely the same must be true for 
humans. Given the current legislation on euthanasia in most states around the world, 
such a claim is hugely controversial. There is not the space here to provide a full 
account of the permissibility of human euthanasia. Nevertheless, a few words are in 
order. First of all, unlike an animal, a human may lack the capacity for future valuable 
experiences but still have an interest in continued life. This might be based on his desire 
to stay alive, his future projects and his interest in being a self-governing agent. 
Secondly, even if the human no longer has any interest in continued life, it may still be 
impermissible to kill him: his wishes before he was incapacitated, and perhaps the 
interests of his family, merit consideration. Third, however, just because these other 
interests merit consideration, that does not mean that they finally determine the 
permissibility of killing the individual in question: his pain could be such that he actually 
has a moral right to be killed, despite the presence of these other factors. Finally, while 
this latter conclusion runs contrary to many people’s intuitions, it is nevertheless a 
conclusion worth accepting. For I believe that the intuition against permitting human 
euthanasia is insufficiently reflective, often grounded in something like the Christian 
doctrine of the sanctity of life. However, my considered judgement sees no sanctity in 
prolonged and intolerable suffering.
Returning to animals then, let us consider the more difficult issue of neutering. For if 
we are concerned with the well-being of animals, might we not claim that pet animals 
have a moral right not to be neutered? There are several ways in which such an 
argument could be made. First, it might be claimed that animals suffer from the process 
itself. However, this argument seems to be negated by the fact that anaesthetic can be 
used to make the process painless. Second, it could be argued that animals have an 
interest in not being interfered with and in being made to undergo such surgery without 
their consent. But as I have argued in Chapter 5, animals do not have a fundamental 
interest in this kind of negative liberty. Perhaps then, it might be argued that neutering 
animals is a constraint on their ability to control their own lives. Once again, however, as
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non-autonomous beings, it is extremely difficult to maintain that animals have an interest 
in being ‘self-governors’. Fourthly, it might be claimed that it is wrong to change animals, 
so that they are prevented from having their natural sexual desires and from acting upon 
them. But this argument once again assumes that what is natural for an individual is 
equivalent to what good for an individual. And as I have argued in several chapters -  
notably in Chapter 5 - this simply is not the case. Finally, and perhaps most 
persuasively I think, it might be claimed that neutering diminishes an animal’s 
opportunities for well-being. This claim is significant given one of the arguments of 
Chapter 6. There I claimed that modifying an animal with reduced capacities for well­
being was wrong, even if that animal has a worthwhile life. If this is true, surely it must 
also be true that operating on a pet animal to reduce his or her capacities for well-being 
is wrong, even if that animal subsequently has a life worth living. Animals, we might 
argue, have an interest that they not be neutered in order that they may have 
opportunities for well-being which are equivalent to the species norm. What are we to 
make of such an argument?
If this argument is valid, it needs to be shown that both mating and rearing young 
necessarily contribute to the well-being of pet animals. This is an extremely difficult 
topic. However, I think we can make several remarks. There is evidence that some 
animals take pleasure from sexual intercourse in much the same way as human beings. 
Dolphins and bonobos, for example, are both well known for engaging in sexual relations 
simply for the pleasure of it, rather than solely for the purpose of reproduction.213 
Furthermore, Jonathan Balcombe has recently argued that a whole range of animal 
species can and do enjoy sex.214 And if animals can suffer like us, perhaps it should be 
of little surprise that they also receive pleasure like us. However, in spite of this, we 
should be hesitant in believing that the possession of sexual desire and sexual 
capacities necessarily makes life better for domestic pet animals. Take the case of pet 
cats, for example. It is doubtful that female cats take much pleasure from sexual 
relations, since the penis of the male cat is barbed and scratches the walls of the vagina 
in order to induce ovulation. And while male cats may enjoy the act itself, it is 
questionable whether this outweighs the suffering their sexual urges bring about. For 
example, the bites and scratches that tomcats suffer from fighting with rival males often
2,3 Frans De Waal, "Bonobo Sex and Society", Scientific American (March, 1995): 82-86.
"I4 Jonathan Balcombe, Pleasurable Kingdom: Animals and the Nature o f  Feeling Good, (Basingstoke, 
Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
148
cause great pain and infections. These animals can also be driven to travel many miles 
in order to satisfy their urges, often leading to attacks from other cats defending their 
territory, as well as the possibility of traffic injury and malnutrition. In terms of rearing 
young, we should again be cautious to assume that female cats necessarily take great 
value from the act itself. For one thing, cats can easily become pregnant, often 
producing 2-3 litters a year. Producing such volumes of offspring can be a great strain 
on the cat’s body and leads to unsprayed female cats living much shorter lives than their 
spayed counterparts.
Turning to dogs, it is certainly possible that dogs take more pleasure than cats from 
sexual intercourse itself. However, it is still doubtful that dogs have an interest in not 
being neutered on the basis of increased opportunities for well-being. Once again, the 
value that dogs take from the sexual act must surely be outweighed by the frustration 
and suffering that such sexual desires induce, and the greater likelihood of disease and 
injury. For example, in keeping with cats, rates of cancer in both male and female dogs 
are greatly reduced by spaying, although there is evidence that the process should not 
be enacted too early in the animal’s life.215 For all of these reasons, I am sceptical of the 
claim that pet animals have an interest in not being neutered in order that they may have 
opportunities for well-being equivalent to the species norm. Given this, pending further 
evidence to the contrary, I claim that ordinarily pet animals have no moral right not to be 
neutered.
Now, if we combine the idea that pet animals have no moral right not to be neutered 
with the fact that thousands of unwanted domestic animals are being killed each year, 
might we not conclude that we all have a moral obligation to neuter our pet animals? 
This is certainly the claim of those animal charities that have to deal with the grave 
problems of strays and overpopulation generally. However, we must bear in mind that 
the problem that these charities faces comes down to the fact that these animals are 
unwanted, rather than from the breeding itself. In other words, if the animals were 
wanted and were well looked after, then there would be no problem. Given this, perhaps 
we might claim that our obligation is not necessarily to neuter our animals, but to 
guarantee the welfare of any offspring if we do allow our pets to reproduce.216 Once
215 C. Victor Spain, Janet M . Scarlett, and Katherine A. Houpt, “Long-term risks and benefits o f early-age 
gonadectomy in dogs”, Journal o f  the American Veterinary M edical Association, Vol. 224, No. 3, February 
1 2004: 380-387.
216 This same argument can be found in Keith Burgess-Jackson, “Doing Right By Our Animal 
Companions”, The Journal o f  Ethics, Vol. 2, No. 2, June 1998: 159-185, pp. 183-184.
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again, this could easily be woven into the conditions for granting licences to potential 
pet-owners.
Finally, we come to the issue of breeding. As I discussed in the previous chapter, 
domestic animals are far removed from their wild predecessors. Domestic animals have 
been bred for particular purposes, and many of these breeds have become popular as 
pets. For example, different breeds of dog have been established for fighting, hunting, 
sheep-herding, looking pretty and countless other reasons. Some human beings prefer 
to keep a particular breed of animal for a pet rather than a mongrel, and have continued 
these lines of breed through deliberate mating. I argued in the previous chapter that 
there is nothing wrong in itself with breeding (or even genetically engineering) animals in 
this way. However, I also claimed that animals can be wronged when creating them will 
inevitably lead to their rights being violated (they will be killed or made to suffer), and 
when creating them will cause them to have reduced opportunities for well-being. 
Unfortunately, some pet animals do inevitably suffer from their breeding. For example, 
both Manx cats and Dachshunds suffer from spinal defects, boxer dogs are more 
vulnerable to cancers, and bulldogs suffer from breathing difficulties. In all cases, these 
sufferings are the result of the deliberate mating of animals to reproduce genetic traits.
Now it might be claimed that Manx cats, Dachshunds, boxers, bulldogs and so on do 
not lead lives of complete misery and suffering. Rather, these animals are still capable 
of a reasonable quality of life. In this case, it might be argued, we cannot claim to have 
harmed these animals, because by bringing them into existence we have given them 
some positive quality of life. However, as I argued in Chapter 6 it is perfectly possible to 
harm an individual, violate an individual’s rights, and wrong an individual even if one 
benefits them overall. And because these animals have insufficient opportunities for 
well-being and suffer because of their breeding, such breeding is impermissible. Such a 
conclusion of course places limits on the freedom of breeders, and even requires the 
phasing out of some breeds. Again, the implication in practical terms seems to lean 
towards much tighter regulation than we have now.
To sum up this rather long section, I have argued that it is permissible to keep animals 
as pets so long as they are not killed or made to suffer as a result. Rather than a 
justification of the status quo, however, this conclusion demands a radical transformation 
of the practice of pet-keeping as it currently stands.
7.1.2 Circuses and Zoos
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Once again, the implication of my theory is that it is permissible to use animals in zoos 
and circuses so long as they are not killed or made to suffer as a result. Of course, 
circuses and zoos have historically come under attack for cruel practices. Clearly, such 
practices are illegitimate and should cease. However, what we need to consider is 
whether keeping animals in zoos and circuses is permissible even if such acts of cruelty 
do not take place.
First of all then, do animals kept in zoos and circuses necessarily suffer? It is hard to 
see how the traditional circus animals -  elephants, lions, tigers, monkeys, horses, dogs 
and so on -  can have much quality of life when in a circus. Even if these animals are 
trained successfully in a way that does not cause them to suffer (which itself seems far­
fetched given the bizarre tasks they are made to do), and perform acts that are not 
dangerous or onerous, it would be practically impossible to provide these animals with 
the type of living conditions they require in order to live well. Circuses travel, meaning 
that the performing animals must also travel. None of the animals mentioned above 
could live well when locked up in a cramped cage on a trailer. They are all large, 
intelligent and social animals that need plenty of room to exercise and follow their 
instincts. I cannot envisage a travelling circus being able to meet such requirements. 
However, this is not to say that it is impossible to produce an ethically permissible circus. 
If the circus did not travel, or did not travel much, and the animals were kept in the 
appropriate conditions -  including many acres of space -  then it might be possible for a 
circus to violate no rights. However, whether such a circus would be economically viable 
is quite another matter. Indeed, it may well be that adopting practices that cause no 
suffering to animals simply makes the use of animals in circuses not worthwhile.
Given that zoos do not travel, it seems much more possible to envisage an ethically 
permissible zoo. Once again, however, to be permissible, the conditions of the zoo must 
be absolutely appropriate to the animals involved. This requires much more space and 
much more thought on stimulation for the animals than has traditionally been provided. 
Furthermore, it may even be the case that some species of animal necessarily suffer 
from being held in captivity. For one, as I have mentioned in previous chapters, it is 
possible that some animals such as the great apes and cetaceans will one day be 
shown to be sufficiently autonomous to have an interest in freedom. If this is proven to 
be the case, then such animals have an interest in leading their own lives and must 
never be held in captivity, including in zoos. Secondly, it might be incredibly difficult in 
practice to provide for the well-being of some non-autonomous animals in captivity. For
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example, polar bears and elephants are often cited as animals that need quite specific 
and unique environments to have their interests satisfied. However, as the zoologist 
Brian Bertram argues, “there is no reason in principle why it is not possible to build a 
polar bear...enclosure of such a scale and design that almost everyone would consider it 
adequate.”217 Once again, it may well be that implementing these conditions is not so 
much impossible as impractical given financial constraints.
Of course, many zoos claim to function not just for the entertainment of human beings, 
but also to keep rare species alive. What does the rights theory presented in this thesis 
make of such claims? First of all, I should reiterate a point I made in Chapter 2: that is, 
species themselves have no moral status. You will recall that I argued that moral status 
resides in those entities that have a life that can go well or badly for themselves. Since a 
species is not such an entity, we have no direct obligations to them. However, this is not 
to say that we have no obligations regarding species. I can think of at least two good 
reasons for preserving species that do not rely on the notion that we have obligations to 
species themselves: first, the loss of a species will have an impact on the ecosystem in 
which it resides, which will very often adversely affect other sentient animals to whom we 
do owe obligations; and second, the diversity of life is a source of great pleasure to 
many human beings, to whom we also have direct moral obligations. Of course, these 
are not good reasons to use zoos for breeding programmes, but are simply good 
reasons to have breeding programmes. Nevertheless, whichever environment such 
breeding programmes take place in, the interests of the individual animal must be 
respected. The animal has rights, and these rights cannot be violated simply to maintain 
the species. This reminds us that the best way to keep species alive is to respect the 
rights of individual animals in the first place. This does not involve granting whole 
species moral status. But it does involve respecting the rights of individual animals, and 
thus not destroying their habitats so that humans may profit.
7.1.3 Sport and Hunting
Using animals for sport is permissible so long as they are not killed or made to suffer as 
a result. The fate of hunting, and sports such as cock-fighting, bear-baiting and bull­
fighting is thus fairly obvious. Each of these activities causes pain and death and should 
cease. However, what about less obviously cruel sports? First we must look at fishing, 
one of the most popular sports in the UK, and which is not commonly regarded as cruel.
217 Brian Bertram, “Misconceptions About Zoos”, Biologist, Vol. 51 (4), Winter 2004: 199-206, p. 205.
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Indeed, many fishermen would no doubt be opposed to practices such as hunting with 
hounds and cock-fighting. However, fishing necessarily involves the painful capture of 
sentient animals and often involves their death. Quite simply then, fishing violates the 
rights of animals and should be condemned as such. Perhaps the reason that fishing is 
regarded as morally unproblematic by so many comes down to the fact that it does not 
involve mammals. Indeed, many are reluctant to accept that fish can feel pain. Others, 
judging by the vast numbers of people who refer to themselves as vegetarian but who 
eat fish, are even reluctant to admit that fish are animals. However, fish clearly are 
animals, and as I pointed out in Chapter 2, the latest scientific evidence strongly 
suggests that they can feel pain.218 The routine suffering that the practice of fishing 
involves renders the sport ethically impermissible.
Other hugely popular sports in which animals are used include greyhound-racing, 
horse-racing and equestrianism generally. The implications of the rights theory is that 
these sports are permissible so long as they do not lead to the suffering or death of the 
animals involved. Once again, however, these sports as they currently stand routinely 
involve the suffering and death of animals. For one thing, many of the methods used to 
train animals for use in these sports involve instilling discipline by causing pain. For 
example, traditional methods of ‘breaking’ a horse have usually involved the use of 
violence. However, once again the fact that these types of training techniques are 
currently used does not mean that using animals in sport is necessarily wrong. For one 
thing, it is perfectly possible to train a horse or a dog without inflicting pain on the animal. 
The rights theory defended in this thesis demands that such non-painful training 
methods be adopted.
Not only is the animal interest in avoiding pain relevant to these sports, but so too is the 
animal interest in continued life. For example, those horses and dogs who are past their 
peak, and those that never attain the required level of achievement, are routinely killed. 
Although retirement homes for horses do exist, as do rehoming centres for greyhounds, 
the lucky animals that end up in these places are very much in the minority. A concrete 
figure for the number of animals that are killed once their racing life is over is hard to 
come by, but The Sunday Times recently claimed that one builder’s merchant in County 
Durham had killed over 10,000 dogs in the last 15 years.219 A recent investigation by
218 See also Quirin Schiermeier, “New evidence that fish feel pain”, Nature, 30th April 2003; and James 
Randerson, “Fish ‘capable of experiencing pain” ’, New Scientist, 30th April 2003.
219 Daniel Foggo, “Revealed: the man who killed 10,000 dogs”, The Sunday Times, 16th July 2006.
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The Observer newspaper found that around 7,000 racehorses are killed per annum in 
the UK, with many being sold abroad as meat. In the United States the figure is as high 
as 90,000.220 With so many animals being killed within these sports, a radical overhaul 
of them is required. At present the horseracing industry spends just £250,000 per 
annum on retired animals.221 This sum is paltry. Animals have a right not to be killed 
even when they cannot run as fast or jump as high as they used to. Upholding these 
rights will be costly, but that does not diminish their moral validity.
The implications of the rights theory demand not only tight regulation on the training of 
these animals and the way they are kept, but also the establishment of suitable 
provisions for when these animals are past their peak or get injured. Animals cannot be 
discarded when we have finished with them. The owners of animals that are used in 
sport must guarantee the quality of life for their animals for their entire lifespan. Without 
doubt these measures will be costly; indeed these sports will inevitably have to 
downscale dramatically. Moreover, some of the uses of animals where death and injury 
are simply inevitable, as is the case with the Grand National, should stop. Animals have 
rights not to be made to suffer and not to be killed, and these rights cannot be violated 
just for our amusement.
Despite my attacks on current practices concerning the use of animals in entertainment, 
and the challenges they pose to the status quo, it nevertheless remains the case that my 
position puts me outside of the animal rights orthodoxy. Many proponents of animal 
rights will attack my claim that animals have no right not to be used for our entertainment 
for being too permissive. For this reason, in the next section of the chapter I wish to look 
at some of the possible objections that can be raised against my position.
7.2 Objections to Using Animals for Our Entertainment
Some thinkers claim that animals do possess rights not to be used to entertain us. Many 
argue that this is because animals have an intrinsic interest in liberty. Since I have 
refuted this claim elsewhere in the thesis, I will not repeat myself here. Instead, I will 
examine four alternative objections to the use animals in entertainment: three claim that 
using animals to entertain us is wrong because it is disrespectful, and the other claims 
that animals have an interest in exercising their natural capacities. I refute these
220 The Observer, ‘The slaughtered horses that shame our racing’, 1st October 2006.
221 Ibid.
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objections in turn and maintain that pending further argument to the contrary, animals 
have no right not to be used in entertainment.
7.2.1 Respectful Treatment: Dignity
Some will claim that using animals in entertainment is inherently wrong because it is 
disrespectful. Respect is a rather nebulous concept and is cashed out differently by 
different philosophers. However, one common understanding of it relates back to 
dignity, which I discussed briefly in Chapter 6. It might be argued that we fail to respect 
an individual when we ignore or undermine that individual’s dignity. In this sense, failing 
to respect someone need not necessarily involve causing them to suffer, or involve 
affecting their well-being in some other way; it can also involve negating their dignity, 
which is distinct from an individual’s well-being. This idea is pertinent in the case of 
using animals in entertainment. For while it might be the case that practices such as 
keeping animals as pets or confined in zoos do not cause them suffering, they might 
nevertheless be wrong on the basis that they are disrespectful and undermine animal 
dignity. Just such an argument is put forward by Dita Wickins-Drazilova who compares 
putting animals in zoos for human entertainment with the 18th and 19th century practices 
of opening mental asylums to the paying public.222 Wickins-Drazilova argues that 
although the patients did not seem to mind the visitors, and thus did not have their well­
being adversely affected, the practice came to an end because, “...we perceive using 
the mentally ill for entertainment as bad, because we respect their dignity.”223 So if the 
dignity of non-autonomous humans is undermined by being on display for the 
amusement of others, perhaps the same is true for non-autonomous zoo animals.
However, as I mentioned in Chapter 6 ,1 am rather unclear as to what dignity is. Balzer, 
Rippe and Schaber say that for human beings, dignity comes down to the capacity for 
self-respect.224 But if that is the case, why does Wickins-Drazilova assign the capacity 
for dignity to the seriously mentally disabled, who presumably lack the cognitive 
capacities for this kind of self-respect? It is because Wickins-Drazilova’s understanding 
of dignity is somewhat different to that of Balzer et al, and is much closer to a simple 
notion of well-being. Indeed, Wickins-Drazilova herself describes dignity as a
222 Dita Wickins-Drazilova, “Zoo Animal Welfare”, Journal o f  Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 
Vol. 19, No. 1, Feb. 2006: 27-36, p. 32.
223 Ibid., p. 32.
224 Philipp Balzer et al., “Two Concepts o f Dignity for Humans and Non-human Organisms in the Context 
of Genetic Engineering”, Journal o f  Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2000: 7-27.
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combination of the self-interest of the being, and the respect of an outside party. So she 
explains:
...good zoos that provide sufficient living conditions for animals enable the animals 
and the keepers to maintain their dignity. But a bad zoo makes it impossible for the 
animals to keep their dignity if it prevents them from their basic natural behaviour, 
like cleaning themselves, or socializing with their own kind.225 
However, by allowing interests back into the discussion, Wickins-Drazilova has now 
conceded that good zoos can respect animals’ dignity. It seems then, that ‘dignity’ has 
just collapsed here into respect for interests.
But if dignity is unable to do much work in these arguments, and we are left with the 
consideration of interests, is there nothing wrong with opening the care homes of the 
mentally disabled to the paying public? It seems to me that there are good reasons not 
to open up these homes, but reasons based on the interests and rights of individuals 
rather than on appeals to dignity. It is wrong first of all, because in practice it must surely 
affect the well-being of the mentally disabled individuals that live there. These 
individuals may not be fully autonomous and rational, but I find it hard to believe that all 
of them would be oblivious to and unaffected by being put on display for tourists. 
Nevertheless, let us for the sake of argument imagine that they would be so unaffected. 
There seems to be a second powerful reason why it would be wrong to open these 
homes in this way: the family and friends of these individuals would surely have strong 
objections to their loved ones being displayed like this. The interests of these individuals 
provide good reason not to open these homes to the public. However, this might seem 
to imply that if some of these individuals had been abandoned by their friends and 
family, or simply had none, then it would it be permissible to display them provided that 
they did not thereby suffer. But I think that we can resist this conclusion on the basis of 
our own self-interest. For example, an accident or a disease could lead to you or I 
becoming severely mentally disabled, and it is possible that our families might decide to 
have nothing to do with us. When we think about this possibility, most of us would hope 
that we were looked after in a decent home, and most of us would hope that we were not 
displayed to the paying public. In fact, it makes us happier now to think that we could 
never be so treated. So once again there is a third reason not to open the care homes 
of the mentally disabled: the interests and well-being of current individuals. However, 
the astute will note that all of this still leaves open one final possibility: displaying those
225 Dita Drazilova, “Zoo Animal Welfare”, p. 34.
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who will not suffer or be harmed by being put on display, who have no friends or family, 
and who are and always have been permanently mentally disabled. Our own self- 
interest cannot do the same work here, as we could never end up in the same situation 
as these permanently disabled individuals. Here my arguments run out. Such displays 
would be permissible, as there is simply no possibility of any harm being caused. 
However, we are talking about such a distinct and small group of individuals, one 
wonders how any such practice could be operationalised. And in any case, in terms of 
the paying public, who on earth would want to be ‘entertained’ in this way?
So, despite the arguments of Wickins-Drazilova, one can effectively maintain that there 
is a difference between displaying animals in zoos and displaying the mentally ill. The 
question is not one of dignity, but rather the concrete interests and well-being of the 
patients themselves, their loved ones, and society at large. While my argument does 
leave open the door for the theoretical permissibility of a tiny number of human displays, 
I think this is preferable to invoking the mystical concept of ‘dignity* for the simple 
purpose of affirming our intuitions.
7.2.2 Respectful Treatment: Virtue
Wickins-Drazilova does not just see dignity as something that resides within particular 
individuals, however. She also sees it inherent within the individual giving the respectful 
treatment. In this case, part of the problem or wrongness in disrespecting another is the 
act of disrespect itself; that is, it is more than the fact that one offends or undermines a 
property of the individual in question. David DeGrazia has something similar in mind 
when he discusses the role of respect in animal ethics. DeGrazia takes it for granted 
that we can harm animals and that such harm is a prima facie wrong. However, 
DeGrazia wonders whether it is possible to disrespect animals, irrespective of whether 
the animal is benefited or harmed, and if so, whether we have a duty not to show such 
disrespect.226 To illustrate his point DeGrazia offers the following example of a potential 
instance of disrespect shown to animals:
(A) A family dyes its white-haired poodle in the colors of the American flag on the 
Fourth of July and walks him in the town parade. The dog shows no sign of 
distress...227
226 David DeGrazia, “Animal Ethics Around the Turn of the Twenty-First Century”, Journal o f  Agricultural 
and Environmental Ethics Vol. 11, No. 2, 1998: 111-129, p. 128.
227 Ibid. p. 128.
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This act may not cause the dog to suffer, but perhaps it is a sign of disrespect, and 
objectionable as such. DeGrazia explains:
I am inclined to believe that the human conduct described in ( A ) ... (is) objectionable 
for evincing disrespect towards the animals. If this and similar judgments are
defensible, an adequate account may implicate virtue ethics, which connects the
228manner in which we act, our attitudes, and our character.
Maybe then, dyeing poodles, keeping them as pets, displaying them in zoos, using them 
for our entertainment and so on are all instances of disrespect and thereby wrong in that 
they illustrate flaws and defects in our character. However, this is not what DeGrazia 
thinks. For he also considers the example of creating a massive zoo that meets:
...the physical and psychological needs of its animals, and provides them with lives 
at least as good (long, healthy and satisfying) as the lives they would probably have 
in the wild.229
Such a zoo, DeGrazia claims, is not obviously disrespectful and would probably be 
permissible. So, not all uses of animals in entertainment are disrespectful according to 
this account. Some are impermissible, like dyeing poodles, and others are permissible, 
like keeping them in good zoos. DeGrazia presumably bases this judgement on the fact 
that the zookeepers act out of concern for the animals, and thus somewhat virtuously; 
while the poodle’s owners act for their own amusement, and thus viciously.
However, we should be extremely sceptical of judging the permissibility of actions on 
the virtuous attitude or character of those behind them. For example, imagine a film star 
who decides to devote a considerable amount of time to promoting some worthwhile 
charity. Suppose further that because of her involvement, the charity raises more money 
than it would have otherwise been able, and uses that money to improve the lives of 
many individuals. At this point, not only does this act seem permissible, but positively 
virtuous. However, imagine now that we somehow found out that this star had no 
concern for the charity’s goals whatsoever. Instead, she spent her time in this way 
because she had a new film to promote, and was actually using the charity work to boost 
her profile and that of the film. Clearly, this changes our attitude to the character of the 
film star: we would no longer find her virtuous, and many would see her actions as 
exploitative and vicious. Nevertheless, I find it hard to believe that anyone would 
actually want to stop the film star from working for the charity. Her motivation may be 
unfortunate, but surely the film star’s actions are perfectly permissible. They are
228 Ibid. pp. 128-129.
229 Ibid., p. 128.
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perfectly permissible because no harm (and indeed, a great deal of good) has been 
done by her actions.
So why then do so many of us have the intuition that the poodle owners should not dye 
their dog? We intuitively think that the poodle is wronged by the dyeing comes down to 
much the same reason as we think that the mentally disabled are wronged by being put 
on display to the paying public: we simply cannot imagine how the poodle or mentally 
disabled individuals would not be harmed by such actions. It is true that the poodle is 
not autonomous like you or I, but he is sentient and social creature that needs affection. 
If he is being mocked and laughed at, it is extremely likely that he will be able to sense 
that, and will suffer as such. On the other hand, because the zoo animals in DeGrazia’s 
example have a high quality of life, we can legitimately maintain that no wrongdoing has 
taken place. Once again, we can explain these differences in terms of the interests and 
well-being of individuals, without having to rely on much more dubious ideas of 
respectful attitudes and character.
7.2.3 Respectful Treatment: Property Status
The most famous invocation of respectful treatment in animal ethics focuses not on the 
attitude of the respect-giver, but the properties and welfare of the respected party. For 
Tom Regan, those beings with what he calls ‘inherent value’ have a fundamental right to 
respectful treatment. Regan argues that all entities who are ‘subjects-of-a-life’ - that is, 
those entities with beliefs and desires, perception and memory, the ability to feel pain 
and pleasure, the ability to initiate action, an individual welfare and so on -  possess a 
value in and of themselves, irrespective of their value to anyone or anything else.230 
This inherent value grounds Regan’s respect principle: “We are to treat those individuals 
who have inherent value in ways that respect their inherent value.”231 Essentially, this is 
a Kantian injunction whereby, “...individuals who have inherent value must never be 
treated merely as means to securing the best aggregate consequences.”232
I have made similar arguments to Regan in this thesis, even if the terminology has 
been somewhat different. For example, what Regan calls ‘inherent value’, is roughly 
equivalent to what I have been referring to as ‘moral status’ throughout this thesis. If an 
entity has moral status or inherent value it means that we have obligations to that thing
230 Tom Regan, The Case fo r  Animal Rights, p. 243.
231 Ibid., p. 248.
232 Ibid., p. 249.
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for its own sake. As I argued in Chapter 2, entities whose lives can go well or badly for 
themselves (phenomenally conscious animals, for example) possess moral status and 
are owed certain obligations as such. Since we owe such entities direct obligations, we 
cannot treat them only as means to the achievement of the best overall consequences. 
Rather, we must pay due heed to what we owe them for their own sake. For example, I 
cannot torture a cat to entertain a group of sadists: if I did, the aggregate consequences 
might be higher levels of pleasure overall, but I would be ignoring the important interests 
of the individual cat. Thus, to this extent I can endorse Regan’s respect principle. But 
does using animals for our entertainment violate this norm of respect?
Gary Francione thinks that it does. Francione claims that the respect principle logically 
entails the animal right not to be the property of others.233 This is because he claims 
that once a thing is the property of another, it is necessarily treated in a purely 
instrumental way:
The status of animals as property renders meaningless our claim that we reject the 
status of animals as things. W e treat animats as the moral equivalent of inanimate 
objects with no morally significant interests or rights. W e bring billions of animals 
into existence annually simply for the purpose of killing them. Animals have market 
prices. Dogs and cats are sold in pet stores like compact discs; financial markets 
trade in futures for pork bellies and cattle. Any interest that an animal has is nothing 
more than an economic commodity that may be bought and sold when it is in the 
economic interest of the property owner. That is what it means to be property.234 
This argument has obvious implications for using animals in entertainment, for most 
animals kept as pets, in zoos, circuses and for sport are usually considered to be 
‘property’.
However, notwithstanding the rhetorical force of Francione’s argument, we must 
question whether owning a piece of property necessarily leads to disrespecting it. For 
once we start to analyse the criteria of ownership, we soon see that things are more 
complicated than Francione suggests. For example, A.M. Honore has famously listed
233 Gary L. Francione, “Animals -  Property or Persons?” in Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum 
(eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, p. 124. Steven M . Wise is another important 
writer who argues that animals’ property status necessarily renders them being treated as a ‘thing’ . See 
Steven M . Wise, Rattling the Cage, and, Unlocking the Cage -  Science and the Case fo r  Animal Rights, 
(Oxford: The Perseus Press, 2002). Since his argument is more concerned with legal rather than moral 
rights, my discussion focuses on Francione.
234 Gary L. Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?, p. 79.
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twelve standard incidents of ownership.235 These incidents include such things as the 
right to exclusive physical control of that property, the liberty to use that property at one’s 
discretion, and the power to sell or destroy that property. If such incidents are present 
without any qualification in each and every case of ownership, then Francione’s claim 
concerning the necessary connection between ownership and disrespect must be valid. 
That is to say, if one can control, sell and destroy one’s property as and when one 
wishes, then the property status of animals would seem to obstruct the goal of 
respecting animals’ interests. However, as Jeremy Waldron has pointed out, the 
incidents outlined by Honore should not be regarded as the necessary or jointly sufficient 
conditions of ownership, but are rather the general and qualified features of 
ownership 236 Thus, just because the power to sell a piece of property or the liberty to 
use it as one wishes might be very limited in some situations, that does not mean that it 
would be wrong to acknowledge ownership of that thing. For example, I sometimes 
have to let state officials onto my land, I cannot sell beer from a barrel to passers-by on 
the street, and I cannot burn down my listed cottage; but none of these facts mean that I 
do not own my land, my barrel and my cottage.
What I am getting it at here is that people can be said to own property, without being 
able to do what they like with that property. Accordingly, Francione is wrong to contend 
that the property-status of animals necessarily means that animals will not be respected. 
For example, most people regard pet-keepers to own their animals. However, pet- 
keepers do not usually treat them ‘merely as means to securing the best aggregate 
consequences’. For as noted before, torturing a cat for the pleasure of sadists might 
lead to the best overall consequences, but not many cat-owners would consider 
performing such an act. The cat may well be property, but that does not necessarily lead 
to treating, ‘animals as the moral equivalent of inanimate objects with no morally 
significant interests or rights’, as Francione contends.
Francione’s more persuasive argument, however, is that even if we recognise that 
animals possess significant interests, so long as they remain property, their interests will 
always be subordinate to those of property-owners:
235 A .M . Honore, “Ownership” in A.G. Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1961).
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As property, animals are chattels, just as slaves once were. And just as in the case 
of human slaves, virtually any interest possessed by animals can be ‘sacrificed’ or 
traded away as long as the human benefit is sufficient.237 
Unfortunately, just as the ownership of animals does not necessarily entail ignoring their 
interests, nor too does it necessarily entail subordinating their interests. As Cass 
Sunstein has pointed out, it is perfectly possible for us to protect and support animal 
interests, and even grant them rights, without necessarily declaring that they cannot be 
owned.238 Indeed, some of the suggestions I make above with regard to tighter 
regulations and licences for owning animals can be regarded as examples of such 
interest-protection.
However, perhaps the more important aspect of Francione’s claim is his analogy of 
owned animals with human slaves. Because slaves and animals are owned, we might 
maintain that both are dominated.239 Thus, even if we treat slaves and animals well and 
protect their interests, as property they still remain second-class beings who are 
dependent on our benevolence and goodwill for the protection of their interests.
But while this domination argument works well for adult humans who are autonomous 
beings, it is not convincing in the case of non-autonomous animals. Most humans have 
a clear and important interest in being free from domination. This is based on the value 
of autonomy for human beings: they have an interest in being in control of their own lives 
and choosing their own ends in life. As I have argued elsewhere, however, autonomy 
holds no such value for animals. As non-autonomous beings, animals have no intrinsic 
interest in being in charge of their own life and pursuing their own self-chosen ends. 
Given this, there seems to be no reason why animals have an intrinsic interest in being 
free from domination.
However, if all this is true with regards to animals, then presumably it must be true for 
non-autonomous humans. In which case, does the argument I present here make it 
permissible to treat non-autonomous humans as mere property, who can be bought and 
sold on the market? No, it does not. First of all, while I have argued that it is permissible 
to own animals, my argument does not justify the existing property status of animals. 
What I mean by this is that there should be many more restrictions on the freedom of 
animal owners than are currently present. Importantly, the rights theory defended in this
237 Gary L. Francione, Rain Without Thunder, p. 127.
238 Cass R. Sunstein, “Introduction: What are Animal Rights?” in Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions , p. 11.
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thesis prevents animals from being bought and sold at will. Animals have prima facie 
rights not to be made to suffer, and without doubt being bought and sold can cause 
suffering. For example, distress is often caused by uprooting animals from a familiar 
environment and settled social group. Thus under this scheme, neither animals nor 
children can be bought and sold on the whim of their parents or owners; their best 
interests must take priority.
Nevertheless, this leaves one remaining problem: my position is that animals cannot be 
bought and sold at will because it often causes suffering. Of course, the flip-side of this 
is that it is permissible to buy and sell animals when no such suffering is caused. Does 
this also mean that parents can sell their young children so long as their best interests 
are protected or promoted? Strictly, this does seem to be the implication of my 
argument. However, I find it hard to conceive of many situations in which infants would 
benefit (or not be harmed) from being bought and sold. First of all, the distress caused 
by being so uprooted would for most children be overwhelming. Secondly, there is the 
additional factor that human infants are ‘potential persons’. In other words, the trauma 
from being bought and sold may well come later in life, with individuals feeling huge 
resentment at being so treated. Indeed, non-commercial adoption often causes great 
distress for the adopted individual, with feelings of loss, grief and anger all common, 
together with the difficulty for individuals of forming a coherent sense of self.240 If such 
feelings are engendered by adoption where money is not exchanged, it is likely that the 
realisation that money was exchanged may exacerbate such resentment. Thirdly, the 
parents and the children are not the only relevant interested parties in the human 
context. Family and friends surely have some stake in the future of the child, and may 
have strong objections to the selling of the child. Finally, we must ask what impact such 
child-trades would have on society as a whole. Would it encourage treating children as 
mere ‘things’, whose interests are insignificant? Personally, I doubt it, but if this can be 
shown, it would further diminish the case for such exchanges. So while the implication 
of my argument is that non-autonomous infants can be bought and sold when their 
interests are protected, the number of permissible trades would in fact be miniscule.
To sum up this section then, I have argued that although animals can be said to have an 
interest in respectful treatment, this does not entail that animals cannot be used to
240 B. J. Lifton, “The Adoptee’s Journey”, Journal o f  Social D istress and the Homeless, Vol. 11, No. 2, 
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entertain us. Rather, in Regan’s words, it means that animals cannot be used ‘merely as 
means to securing the best aggregate consequences’. In other words, we can use 
them, but we must not use them in ways that violate our obligations to them. That does 
not involve awarding them ‘dignity’, having a ‘virtuous attitude’ towards them, nor does it 
entail rejecting owning them. Instead, it involves protecting animals’ fundamental 
interests: that is, not making them suffer and not killing them.
7.2.4 The Interest in Exercising Natural Functionings
Several proponents of animal rights claim that animals have natural functionings that 
they have an interest in exercising. Thus, to domesticate animals and keep them as 
pets, to display them as exhibits in zoos, to train them to perform acts in circuses, and to 
make them compete against each other for our amusement, are all violations of the 
interest that animals have in exercising such capacities.
We have seen in Chapter 5 that Paul W. Taylor puts forward just this type of argument 
in relation to freedom and the ‘biological ends’ of animals. I have criticised such 
arguments throughout the thesis for erroneously treating the well-being of animals in a 
perfectionist way. I have pointed out that well-being is a prudential value and thus that 
determining the interests of animals must be based on what makes an individual’s life go 
better for him or herself, rather than on what makes an individual a better example of his 
or her kind. So, to claim that we cannot use animals to entertain us because they have 
an interest in living as nature intended, is to mistakenly impose a perfectionist standard 
on what makes animals’ lives go well.
However, a more recent functioning-based argument has been put forward by Martha 
C. Nussbaum. While this theory was referred to in Chapter 3, it has not yet been fully 
considered, and has direct relevance for the issue of animals in entertainment. 
Nussbaum claims that animals are entitled to a ‘dignified existence’ which involves the 
ability of an animal to flourish as the kind of being that he or she is.241 Interestingly, 
however, unlike other thinkers concerned with the natural functionings of animals, 
Nussbaum does not see animals’ entitlement to dignified existence as prohibiting the 
use of them for our entertainment. Indeed, Nussbaum explicitly maintains that 
paternalism is permissible for animals, so long as it is in keeping with their flourishing.242
241 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers o f  Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, p. 325.
242 Ibid., p. 376.
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Thus zoos and animal parks can be permissible243, as can the training of horses and 
dogs for their use in sport.244 As noted, however, for Nussbaum it is crucial that such 
use does not violate the ability of the animal to flourish as the kind of being she is.
But none of this means that my position and Nussbaum’s are identical. Indeed, while I 
claim that we can use animals to entertain us so long as we do not kill them or cause 
them pain, Nussbaum claims that we can use animals to entertain us so long as we 
allow them to flourish as the types of entity they are. However, for Nussbaum, 
flourishing involves more than just being free from pain and continuing to live. 
Nussbaum writes that:
It seems plausible to think that there may be goods they (animals) pursue that are 
not felt as pain and frustration when they are absent: for example, free movement 
and physical achievement, and also altruistic sacrifice for kin and group. It is also 
possible that some animal pains may even be valuable: the grief of an animal for a 
dead child or parent, or for the suffering of a human friend, may be a constituent part 
of an attachment that is intrinsically good...245 
But while some of these ‘attachments’ might be valuable in some perfectionist sense, it 
is far from clear that any of them are valuable for individuals themselves. Clearly, free 
movement and physical achievement are valuable for animals, but only insofar as they 
contribute to pleasure and feelings of satisfaction. Thus, the physical achievement of a 
gazelle outrunning a lion is clearly valuable for the gazelle, but only to the extent that the 
achievement leads to the survival of the animal. It is simply bizarre to claim that the 
anxiety, stress, pain and fear of the chase are in themselves valuable for the gazelle. As 
for the pain induced by an altruistic sacrifice or the loss of kin, again I see no reason why 
these make life better for individual animals themselves. Nussbaum might hold altruistic 
sacrifice and grief as instances of some moral ideal, but she must surely acknowledge 
that such suffering ordinarily makes life worse for individual animals themselves.
So, as with other theories that emphasise the fulfilment of one’s natural ends or the 
exercising of one’s natural functionings, Nussbaum erroneously imposes perfectionist 
values on what it means for an individual’s life to go well. Animals have no intrinsic 
interest in exercising their natural capacities, or in flourishing as the types off being that 
they are. Thus, to use them for our entertainment is not in itself harmful.
-4j Ibid., p. 375.
244 Ibid., p. 377.
245 Ibid., p. 345.
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7.3 Conclusion
I have argued that animals have no moral right not to be used for the entertainment of 
humans. However, this is not a justification of the status quo. Many of the ways in 
which we currently use animals to entertain us violate their rights. We violate the animal 
right not to be made to suffer by keeping pets, zoo, circus and sport animals in 
conditions that while convenient and cost-efficient for us, ignore their basic needs. We 
violate the animal right to life by killing them when they have become too costly and have 
served their purpose. However, the problem here is not that we use animals to entertain 
us and thereby disrespect them or fail to allow them to flourish. Rather, the problem is 
that we ignore their interests and fail to uphold their rights. For this reason I propose 
amending rather than prohibiting the use of animals in entertainment.
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8. Non-Human Animals and Culture
I have argued that animals have prima facie moral rights not to be killed and not to be 
made to suffer. These rights are prima facie because in some contexts, other 
considerations will count against the ascription of either right. Given that circumstances 
and competing interests are so important to the grounding of these animal rights, it is 
crucial to look at one last controversial context of animal usage: culture.
Some cultural groups have claimed that they should be allowed to continue with their 
traditional practices, even when it appears that such practices cause harm to animals, 
and even when such practices violate the state’s animal welfare legislation. Several 
such claims have been made in recent years. Fox-hunters in the UK have claimed that a 
ban on fox-hunting is an attack on the rural way of life.246 Native peoples in North 
America, Greenland and Russia have argued that bans on hunting whales threaten their 
very existence. Jewish and Muslim groups in several states claim that legislation 
requiring the stunning of farm animals prior to slaughter violates their religious freedom. 
Representatives of the Santeria religion have gone to the Supreme Court in the USA 
arguing that state legislation banning animal sacrifice prevents them from following the 
traditions of their faith. Advocates of bullfighting in Spain have claimed that attempts to 
reform the practice to make it more humane involve importing, “Anglo-Saxon 
prejudices”.247
All such calls have been controversial and have been opposed by animal welfare 
groups. Moreover, and interestingly, these cultural claims have achieved markedly 
different levels of success. For example, on the one hand, Jewish and Muslim 
communities are exempted from UK law which requires animals to be stunned in order 
that they are rendered unconscious before they are slaughtered. This is because:
The Government is committed to respect for the rights of religious groups and 
accepts that an insistence on a pre-cut or immediate post-cut stun would not be
246 It might be claimed that fox-hunters do not constitute a cultural group. Perhaps instead, they are a group 
who share a common source o f enjoyment, much like football supporters. There is simply not the room in 
this chapter to discuss the extremely difficult issue o f what counts as the necessary and sufficient conditions 
of culture. For this reason, I w ill simply assume that all o f the groups mentioned in this chapter can 
justifiably be referred to as cultural groups.
247 Giles Tremlett, “Bullfight reform plan is red rag to aficionados”, The Guardian, 21st December 2006.
167
compatible with the requirements of religious slaughter by Jewish and Muslim
°48groups.
On the other hand, the UK government has not seen fit to overturn or allow exemptions 
to recent legislation on banning hunting with dogs, despite hunters’ claims that it is a 
traditional cultural practice. In fact, in direct response to such claims DEFRA publicly 
states that, “There is no right to be cruel.”249
Perhaps the UK government’s differing reactions to these two issues is based on there 
being a relevant difference between the two types of claim. After all, cultural groups 
usually assert one of three quite different types of argument when making their case. 
The first type of argument is the one often made by fox-hunters: quite simply, the human 
interest in culture trumps the interests of animals. For it might be argued that what is at 
stake here is something more than the therapeutic benefits garnered by animal 
experimentation, the pleasures of the palate offered by animal agriculture, or the 
amusement we gain from using animals in entertainment. Rather, the very integrity and 
survival of a cultural group is in question. Given this, it might be claimed that animal 
rights not to be killed and not to be made to suffer are not grounded in the context of 
culture, because the rival human interests are so strong and pressing.
The second type of claim made by cultural groups invokes religion, and this is clearly 
the type of argument made by Jewish and Islamic groups regarding animal slaughter. In 
these claims, groups argue that treating animals in certain ways and using them for 
certain purposes is integral to their religion. Thus to prevent such treatment or to restrict 
such uses is effectively to undermine the ability of religious believers to practise their 
faith. As in the case of culture above, it might well be argued that the human interest in 
freedom of religion trumps the interests of animals, thus negating the ascription of animal 
rights in this context.
A final type of claim made by some cultural groups is that it is illegitimate to judge one 
culture’s practices by a different culture’s ethical standard. In short, some groups claim 
that so-called Western standards of animal welfare and rights simply do not apply to 
them. In this chapter, I will not discuss this latter type of claim, for it assumes that ethical
248 DEFRA, Government's Final Response to the Farm Animal Welfare Council Report, 8th March 2005, 
available from: <http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/welfare/farmed/final_response.pdf>.
249 Quotation taken from DEFRA website, “Hunting with Dogs -  Questions and Answers”, 
<http://www.defra.gov.uk/rural/hunting/hunting_qa.htm>.
168
standards are relative to the culture in which they are formed. Like many others, and as 
I point out in Chapter 1, I regard such cultural relativism to be mistaken, and believe that 
some ethical standards can be applied universally. Unfortunately, given the limits of this 
thesis, this rejection of relativism will have to remain as an assumption.
So we are left then with the possibility that the human interests in culture and freedom 
of religion should take precedence over the interests of animals. If such an argument is 
correct, animal rights not to be killed and not to be made to suffer are not established in 
the context of cultural practices involving animals. The interests in culture and freedom 
of religion will be examined in turn. I will argue that while the human interests in culture 
and religious freedom are strong, they do not automatically trump the pressing interests 
of animals: animal rights are still grounded in the context of cultural practices. Moreover, 
throughout the chapter I argue that it is a mistake to overestimate the conflict between 
animals’ rights and the human interests in culture and religion. For abiding by the rights 
theory outlined in this thesis will not lead to the destruction of vast numbers of cultures, 
nor will it prevent significant numbers of people from practising their faith.
8.1 The Interest in Culture
My claim has been that animals have strong interests in not being killed and not being 
made to suffer, but these only ground moral rights when those interests are sufficient to 
impose duties on others. As I have noted above, it might be claimed that in the context 
of culture, these animal interests are insufficient to ground rights. In other words, it could 
be claimed that the human interest in culture trumps the interests of animals. In this 
section I assess just such a claim. To this end, the section is divided into four. First, I 
consider the strength of the human interest in culture. Second, I consider the competing 
interests at stake in cultural practices that cause pain to animals. Third, I evaluate the 
competing interests at stake in cultural practices that kill animals. And finally, I assess 
whether prohibiting cultural practices will lead to the annihilation of some cultures. I 
conclude by arguing that although culture is of great value to humans, it does not trump 
animals’ interests in avoiding pain or in continued life. Furthermore, I claim that because 
it is extremely unlikely that any cultural group’s identity is defined solely in terms of its 
practices relating to animals, the cessation of these practices will not lead to the 
destruction of cultures.
8.1.1 The Strength of the Human Interest in Culture
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Virtually every philosopher who has addressed the topic of culture acknowledges that 
living within a cultural context is of great importance to the well-being of individuals. 
Clearly, humans are social animals and culture provides a context within which they can 
flourish: humans can pursue projects, plans and ideals that would never be available to 
them in isolation. For example, this very project of outlining our moral obligations to non­
humans depends very much on a culture in which intellectual endeavour and ethical 
debate is valued and supported. In this way, my culture increases my well-being by 
helping me pursue and realise a project of mine.
However, it is not just the support that culture offers to one’s personal plans that 
contributes to well-being; individuals also often take great satisfaction from living by the 
communal norms of their culture. Thus, religious believers benefit from being able to 
worship with individuals who share their faith, ethnic communities benefit from 
performing customs that celebrate their shared heritage, individuals within nation-states 
benefit from the taking part in the joint support of a national sporting team, and so on. 
Clearly then, these communal cultural practices make an important contribution to the 
well-being of human individuals. And this is no doubt true for those cultural practices 
that involve the use of animals. But are such practices permissible?
From the arguments that I have presented so far in this thesis, my conclusions 
regarding cultural groups simply using animals should be clear. Animals have no 
fundamental interest in liberty and thus have no interest in not being used for certain 
purposes. Thus, if a cultural practice involves the use of an animal, and that use does 
not cause that animal pain or death, then that practice is permissible. So, if a cultural 
group claims that racing pigeons, riding horses, using dogs to pull sleighs, and so on are 
traditional practices of theirs, such uses of animals are permissible so long as they do 
not cause the animals to suffer, and do not result in their death. However, what about 
those cultural practices that do cause harm to animals?
In the first instance, I wish to claim that the interest that an individual has in performing 
a cultural practice does not serve as an absolute trump that always takes priority over 
any competing interest. For example, imagine a cultural group claiming that a practice of 
theirs is ‘honour killing’, where women are murdered for supposedly bringing shame on 
their family. No sensible person would suggest that the group’s interest in performing 
honour killings should take priority over the interests of the potential victims in continued 
life. That is to say, surely we can all agree that in this instance the potential victim’s 
interest in continued life trumps the perpetrators’ interest in performing the cultural
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practice. However, perhaps this conclusion is more controversial than I am making out. 
Chandran Kukathas, for example, has argued that freedom of association is of such 
value to humans that groups who have freely associated should be left to run their affairs 
and conduct their practices with the minimum restriction.250 Indeed, in one paper, he 
argues that these restrictions should be so minimal that:
...there would in such a society be (the possibility of) communities which bring up 
children unschooled and illiterate; which enforce arranged marriages; which deny 
conventional medical care to their members (including children); and which inflict 
cruel and ‘unusual’ punishment.251 
Maybe then, Kukathas’s framework provides means to argue that the human interest in 
culture is so great that it can justify practices involving ‘cruel punishments’ such as 
honour killings. However, upon closer examination of Kukathas’s writing we see that 
despite the value he places on free association, it cannot permit all cultural practices. 
For example, he writes that group members are bound and restrained by the norms of 
the wider communities to which they belong.252 Thus, honour killings would not be 
permissible if conducted by a cultural group residing in the UK, because wider UK values 
forbid such practices.
Unfortunately, with this type of reasoning, Kukathas seems to be taking us into strange 
and dangerous territory. In effect, he is arguing that honour killing is only impermissible 
when a community (like the UK) says it is. This would mean that honour killing is 
perfectly permissible in a culture that values its version of moral propriety over the lives 
of women. But such an argument is bizarre. Honour killing is wrong everywhere and 
should not be permitted anywhere. Quite simply, this is because a woman has an 
interest in continuing to live that trumps her family’s interest in avoiding shame or 
ridicule. Usually, individuals get over feelings of shame or being ostracised, and if they 
cannot, can still lead lives of extremely high quality. However, there is no hope of 
overcoming death, and thus no opportunity to have a decent quality of life.
I want to put forward the reasonable claim that sometimes the human interest in 
performing a cultural practice can be defeated by a competing interest. What remains
250 Chandran Kukathas, “Are there any Cultural Rights?” in W ill Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights o f  Minority 
Cultures, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
251 Chandran Kukathas, “Cultural Toleration” in Ian Shapiro and W ill Kymlicka (eds.), NOM O S X X IX :  
Ethnicity and Group Rights, (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 87.
252 Chandran Kukathas, “Are there Any Cultural Rights?”, p. 251, and, The Liberal Archipelago, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 141-145.
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then, is to examine which interests win out in the case of cultural practices that involve 
animals.
8.1.2 Cultural Practices that Cause Animals to Suffer
Some cultural practices involve the gross infliction of pain on animals. For example, take 
the Indian equivalent of bullfighting which takes place in the state of Tamil Nadu. 
‘Jallikattu’, as the practice is known, differs from Spanish bullfighting in two crucial 
respects. First, the primary purpose of jallikattu is not to fight with the bulls, but to grab 
prizes that have been tied to their horns. Secondly, no bulls are intentionally killed in the 
Indian practice, unlike in Spanish bullfighting. Despite these differences, however, it is 
perfectly clear that just as bulls suffer from bullfighting, so too do they suffer from 
jallikattu. Individuals will go to great lengths to obtain the prizes that are tied to the bulls, 
tormenting them, clinging to their horns, and throwing stones at them. The suffering that 
the hundreds of bulls used in jallikattu endure from anxiety, harassment and injury is 
without question. However, it is also clear that many of the people of Tamil Nadu have a 
strong interest in participating in this practice. Indeed, they even fight with one another 
for a chance to approach the bull, and put their own health and lives at risk for the sake 
of a prize. In fact, in 2005 5 people were killed and over 200 were injured during the 
fights.253 Moreover, organisers of jallikattu claim that it is a sacrosanct tradition that has 
been carried out for over 2,000 years. Given then the strong interest that the people of 
Tamil Nadu have in this cultural tradition, might we argue that the bulls’ interest in not 
suffering is insufficient to ground a duty in the participants to stop the practice? Do bulls 
have no right not to be made to suffer from the practice of jallikattu?
Although the interest of the people of Tamil Nadu in jallikattu is undoubtedly strong, I 
fail to see how it can take priority over the interest of the bulls in not suffering. You will 
recall from Chapter 5 on animal experimentation that suffering is a serious harm for both 
humans and animals. Certainly, their extra cognitive capacities might make humans 
capable of the more extreme forms of suffering, such as severe depression. However, 
such capacities also provide humans with the opportunity to rationalise their pain (for 
example, they might be able to see an end to it in sight), and take comfort from other 
goods (for example, relationships, art, culture, the pursuit of ambitions and so on), thus 
mitigating the overall effect of pain on their lives.
253 Sampath Kumar, “Dangers of taming the bull”, BBC News, 21st January 2005, 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/4188611 .stm>.
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With all of this in mind, imagine a cultural group who practised a ‘human jallikattu’ 
where prizes are tied to individuals, who are then mauled, beaten and generally 
tormented against their will. Every reasonable person would condemn this practice for 
violating the fundamental rights of the victims in not suffering. And such condemnation 
would stand even if the practice was ancient and greatly enjoyed by the cultural group. 
However, maybe we can acknowledge this human right, but deny it to bulls, because in 
this case the human’s interest in not suffering is much greater. I am sceptical of such a 
claim. For even if we concede that in one sense the human victim will suffer more from 
the practice because of added feelings of shame and rejection (and personally I’m not 
convinced that bulls in jallikattu do not also have such feelings), it can be replied that this 
additional suffering is balanced by the fact that the human victim is likely to understand 
the value of the cultural practice, that the suffering will soon be over, and ultimately that 
he or she will survive. A bull has no such resources to draw upon, and will be consumed 
by terror. For these reasons, it is most reasonable to regard the bull’s and the human’s 
interest in not suffering as roughly equivalent. Since the interest of humans is sufficient 
to ground a human right not to be made to suffer by cultural practices, the interest of 
bulls must also be sufficient to ground an equivalent animal right.
8.1.3 Cultural Practices that Kill Animals
It will be remembered that I claimed in Chapter 5 that the animal interest in continued life 
is ordinarily weaker than that of humans. Perhaps then we might argue that the interest 
of individuals in performing cultural practices that kill animals trumps the animals’ interest 
in continued life. One problem with this line of argument comes from the fact that those 
cultural practices that involve killing animals also invariably include the infliction of pain. 
For example, hunting foxes with hounds ends with the fox being ripped apart by the 
hounds. Even though this means of death is now banned in the UK, meaning that the 
fox must be killed ‘humanely’, it would be absurd to claim that the fox does not suffer 
from being chased for miles by dozens of humans, horses and dogs. Whaling is another 
practice where the primary purpose is death, but where the infliction of pain is inevitable. 
Indeed, in a recent study by Steve Kestin it was found that some whales live for up to an 
hour after being harpooned, and Kestin claims that he cannot, “currently visualise an 
acceptably humane way of killing whales.”254 Moreover, it goes without saying that while
254 Alex Kirby, "Harpooned whales ‘seldom die instantly’", BBC News, 14th March 2001, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk71/hi/sci/tech/1218720.stm>.
173
most bullfights culminate in death (including those in Portugal, where the killing is not 
conducted in the ring), the majority of the spectacle itself involves tormenting and injuring 
the bull. In a Spanish-style bullfight, for example, lances are first speared into the bull, 
sticks with harpoon points are then driven into the bull, the bull is then made to chase 
and circle his agitators until exhaustion, before the matador finally kills him with a sword. 
Cultural practices that involve killing animals also involve the infliction of extreme pain on 
animals, and are impermissible as such.
However, let us consider the possibility of a cultural practice that kills animals but which 
does not involve the infliction of pain. For example, imagine a group that wants to kill a 
pig as part of some kind of public celebration, which ultimately culminates in a hog-roast. 
Imagine further that this practice involves the infliction of no pain on the pig: the pig is 
not tormented, harassed or injured before his death, and he is killed in a manner that 
causes no pain, say by a shot through his head while he is sleeping. If this group has a 
strong interest in this cultural practice, might it trump the pig’s interest in continued life? I 
believe that it would not. While it is true that an animal’s interest in continued life is 
ordinarily weaker than that of most humans, it is still strong and must be considered 
fairly. Indeed, I argued in Chapter 5 that some humans like young infants have an 
interest in continued life equivalent to that of animals. Given this, consider the not 
implausible notion of a cultural group claiming that infanticide is a traditional custom of 
theirs. They might argue that as part of the ceremony a child must be taken to special 
spot and sacrificed painlessly. Without doubt, this child’s interest in continued life is 
weaker than that of most adult humans. Furthermore, the group has a strong interest in 
performing this practice; imagine for example that the child’s parents have willingly 
consented to it, or will even perform the sacrifice themselves. Do these considerations 
mean that the child has no right not to be killed in such a ritual?
I claim that they do not. The interest of infants in continued life is weaker than that of 
adult humans. However, ‘weaker’ does not mean ‘non-existent’. Moreover, the interest 
of infants in continuing to live is sufficient to ground a moral right to life even when there 
are very strong competing interests. For example, the therapeutic benefits offered by 
conducting deadly experimentation on infants might be huge, and certainly more 
beneficial than relying on results obtained from rats and mice. However, I argued in 
Chapter 5 that these potential benefits do not destroy human infants’ rights to life. 
Accordingly, it seems not unreasonable to propose that an infant’s right to life is also 
grounded even when a group has a strong desire to sacrifice that infant as part of a
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cultural practice. Furthermore and to be consistent, if an infant’s interest in continued life 
is sufficient to ground a right not to be killed by a cultural practice, so too must an 
animal’s interest in continued life. On this basis, the pig execution and hog-roast are 
impermissible.
8.1.4 The Destruction of Cultures?
If, as I have argued, animals have moral rights not to be killed and not to be made to 
suffer by cultural practices, what impact does this conclusion have for the future of 
particular cultural groups? Some communities have claimed that prohibiting such 
practices is tantamount to destroying their cultures. In light of this, and since I have 
argued that the existence of culture is important to the well-being of humans, we might 
still have a reason to deny these animal rights in the context of the cultural use of 
animals.
One way of refuting such an argument would be to claim that while the existence of 
culture is important to the well-being of individuals, the existence of any particular culture 
is not so important. Thus, if one culture dies out, this is not problematic as long as there 
is another culture to take its place. So, for example, it might be claimed that we need not 
be concerned if the ‘traditional rural way of life’ in Britain dies out, since individuals living 
in the country can adopt more modern British values. This argument essentially claims 
that it is the general context of culture that matters for individuals’ well-being, rather than 
the particular details of the culture. However, this type of rebuttal is unconvincing for two 
reasons. First, it can plausibly be argued that the details of culture do matter, that the 
existence of different cultures is a good thing in itself, and that such diversity is valuable. 
Secondly, and more importantly for the purpose of delineating interests, individuals 
usually have close bonds with and interests in their own culture. Having to switch 
cultures then, often incurs considerable costs to one’s well-being.255 Thus, if ending 
certain cultural practices leads to the destruction of some cultures, this is a serious 
cause for concern.
However, we can question whether prohibiting certain uses of animals really will result 
in cultural destruction. In actual fact, in the vast majority of cases, claiming that an entire 
culture will be destroyed by the prevention of certain practices relating to animals is 
something of an overstatement. As Brian Barry writes:
255 This point is made in W ill Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 107.
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...we can at least reject the idea that the elements in a way of life are so rigidly 
locked together that no part can change without causing the whole to disintegrate.256 
For example, it would be bizarre to suggest that the Spanish culture is so bound up with 
the practice of bullfighting that it would simply disintegrate if bullfighting ended.
Having said all of this, however, several native peoples in Greenland, Canada, the 
United States and Russia do claim that whaling is so central to their culture that to 
prevent it would mean destruction. I believe that we should treat such claims with great 
caution. After all, when the Makah tribe in the United States asserted their 'cultural right' 
to kill whales in 1999 they had survived as a people despite having not killed a whale for 
over seventy years.257 Nevertheless, it is not too far-fetched to imagine that there might 
be a community or communities whose group identity is so bound up with whaling that to 
prevent it would threaten their very existence. In such a case, should such groups be 
permitted to harm animals through whaling?
First of all, we must ascertain just how this group is under threat, and separate the 
different possible means of destruction: destruction of groups via starvation, destruction 
from destitution, and destruction of a cultural way of life. Often these three types of 
threat are conflated when whaling peoples make their claims. Given this then, if a group 
needs to kill whales for subsistence, then the rights theory defended here permits such 
killing. As I argued in Chapter 6, animals’ rights to continued life are not grounded when 
human survival is at stake. We need not sacrifice ourselves for the sake of animals’ 
interests. However, if a community kills whales because whale meat is their only source 
of income, then such killing is impermissible. Once again, I argued in Chapter 6 that 
economic benefit does not trump animals’ interest in continued life. Both meat-farmers 
and whalers need to change their activity and find new sources of income; while this will 
undoubtedly be costly and sometimes painful, and assistance from other communities in 
easing these burdens should be provided, that does not make any such change less 
required.
But what if a community kills whales, not primarily for subsistence or money, but 
because they define themselves entirely as whaling people, and because whaling is their 
entire way of life?258 In other words, to prevent this group from whaling would mean that 
a discrete cultural community is lost, and that the individuals comprising that community
256 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp. 256-257.
257 Janet Williams, "US Judge Blocks Tribal Whaling", BBC News, 4th May 2002, 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/americas/1967677.stm>.
258 Once again, I should point out that I am extremely sceptical that there is any such community.
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might suffer a crisis of identity and a subsequent severe diminishment of well-being. 
First of all, I should point out that although cultural diversity is valuable, it is not valuable 
at any cost. If some cultures are defined fundamentally in terms of causing serious harm 
to others - and whaling is a serious infliction of harm - then the loss of such cultures 
cannot sensibly be considered regrettable in itself. Secondly, while I concede that 
preventing the individuals of such a group from hunting whales would impose 
considerable costs on them, I deny that it would lead to a complete loss of identity and 
the disintegration of their well-being. People change cultural communities all the time, 
and not only do not suffer irreversible breakdowns, but often flourish and have increased 
well-being.259 A particular culture may be a source of well-being for individuals, but it is 
by no means the only source. Because of this, even if preventing a cultural practice that 
causes harm to animals results in the loss of that culture, animal rights not to be killed 
and not to be made to suffer are still grounded.
To end this section I would like to summarise its main points. I have evaluated whether 
the human interest in culture trumps animals’ interests in avoiding pain and in being 
killed. I have concluded that it does not. Although humans have a strong interest in 
living within a cultural context generally, and their own cultural context specifically, this 
does not excuse every possible cultural practice. Just as we would not let humans suffer 
intolerably in the name of culture, nor should we let animals. And just as we would not 
let human infants be killed in the name of culture, nor should we let animals. Some 
might argue that such restrictions on cultural practices will lead to the destruction of 
certain cultural communities. I am extremely sceptical of such arguments: I can think of 
no community whose entire identity is based on a particular use of animals. However, 
even if such a community could be found, it would still not mean that that community 
could permissibly harm animals. The loss of a culture that is defined entirely by the 
harm it causes to animals is not much of a loss; and humans can lead lives of extremely 
high quality even when they change cultures.
8.2 The Interest in Freedom of Religion
If the human interest in culture does not trump animals’ interests, what about the interest 
humans have in religion? Freedom of religion is widely recognised to be a human right.
259 Michael Hartney, “Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights”, in W ill Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights 
o f  Minority Cultures, p. 206.
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It is rightly argued that individuals should not be persecuted or discriminated against 
because of their religion. Moreover, the right to religious freedom also means that 
individuals should ordinarily be free to practise their religion and live by the customs and 
values of their faith. However, it is clear that some religious practices violate the 
standard of animal rights that I have outlined in this thesis. In light of this, we must 
examine whether the interest that humans have in religious freedom trumps the interest 
of animals. Of course, at this stage one might claim that given the close connection 
between religion and culture, this interest does not merit separate attention. That is to 
say, we might simply argue that because the human interest in culture does not trump 
the interests of animals, nor can the interest in religious freedom. However, because 
some people have argued that the human interest in religion is of the highest order, and 
something stronger and more pressing than mere culture, a specific examination of the 
interest in religious freedom seems warranted.
In undertaking this examination, this section of the chapter is divided into four. First of 
all, I briefly spell out the basis for the human interest in religious freedom and evaluate 
which religions actually require harm to be inflicted on animals. I then look at some 
possible justifications for the idea that the interest in religion is special and merits priority, 
including: religion makes claims on the whole lives of believers; religion transmits ethical 
values; religious practice permits individual integrity; and religious belief has throughout 
history been especially persecuted. Thirdly, I assess whether the interest in religious 
freedom should be considered stronger and worthy of priority on the basis of equal 
opportunity. Finally, I evaluate the claim that it is simply hypocritical and unfair to 
prevent religious groups from conducting their practices that harm animals when other 
harmful practices are ignored. I argue that none of these arguments justify giving the 
human interest in religious freedom a special status and priority over other interests. 
Thus, pending further evidence to the contrary, I argue that animals have rights not to be 
killed and made to suffer by religious practices.
8.2.1 Freedom of Religion and the Requirement to Harm Animais
I have claimed that most adult humans have an interest in liberty. As autonomous 
beings they have an interest in not being interfered with and in framing and pursuing 
their own conception of the good. Given that religion is very much a conception of the
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good, we might claim that freedom of religion is fundamental to human well-being.260 In 
other words, preventing someone from exercising their chosen religion and living by the 
terms of their faith is ordinarily a serious harm. Unfortunately, religious freedom 
sometimes leads to harm being caused to animals.
For example, consider the method of slaughtering animals for kosher and halal meat as 
advocated by Judaism and Islam respectively. There has been much controversy 
around these practices, because stunning animals before slaughter -  a requirement 
under UK and EU law for animal welfare reasons -  is forbidden under Jewish and 
Islamic methods. Currently these religious groups are exempted from the requirement to 
stun before slaughter in the UK on the basis of freedom of religion. However, even 
though Jewish and Islamic leaders invoke religious freedom to defend and justify their 
exemption, such arguments are extremely dubious. Quite simply this is because neither 
Judaism nor Islam demands that its followers slaughter animals to eat meat; 
vegetarianism is perfectly permissible under these religions.261 All these faiths do require 
is that if an animal is slaughtered to be eaten it must be killed in a particular way. Thus, 
preventing Jews and Muslims from killing animals in the first place -  as a prima facie 
application of my animal rights theory mandates -  does not prevent free religious 
practice. Clearly this application would be burdensome to those Jews and Muslims who 
enjoy eating meat, as it would be burdensome to other individuals who enjoy eating 
meat, but it would not interfere with religious freedom.
Of course, that still leaves us with those religious practices that cause harm to animals, 
and which are required by the mandates of the faith. Interestingly, and I would argue 
fortunately, these are few and far between. However, perhaps the clearest example is 
the animal sacrifice conducted by the Santeria religion. Paula Casal provides a useful 
summation of the religion’s history and beliefs:
Santeria, or the Way of the Saints, is a syncretic religion from the nineteenth century.
It originated when hundreds of thousands of the Yoruba people were brought as 
slaves from West Africa to Cuba, and conjoined Catholic iconography and 
sacraments to their traditional religion in order to escape persecution. Santeria now 
counts on 50-60,000 practitioners in Dade County, Southern Florida, and has many 
more in other states and countries. Santeros worship orishas, living spirits of African
260 Martha Nussbaum essentially makes this argument, but phrases it as ‘the intrinsic value o f religious 
capabilities’ . See Martha C. Nussbaum, “A Plea for Difficulty” in Susan Moller Okin et al., Is 
Multiculturalism Bad fo r  Women?, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 107.
261 This same point is made by Brian Barry. See Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 45.
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origin which, they suppose, can help people fulfil their destinies. Orishas are 
powerful but not immortal, and their survival depends on animal sacrifices.262 
The exact numbers of animals slaughtered each year by the religion are unknown. 
However, one of its churches in Florida has estimated that it alone kills over 10,000 
animals each year as part of its services, including goats, sheep, guinea pigs, ducks and 
turtles.263
Without doubt, preventing these sacrifices would interfere with the religious freedom of 
Santeros, which I claim to be key human interest. On what grounds, if any, could this 
interest of free religious practice trump the interests of the animals who are killed?
8.2.2 Freedom of Religion as a Special Interest
It might be claimed that the interest human beings have in freedom of religion merits 
priority because it is somehow ‘special’. Indeed, it is certainly undeniable that for many 
people in the world their religion is one of their most pressing concerns. To justify the 
idea that our interest in religion is special and thus merits being given priority, we need to 
point to something about it that differentiates it from other interests. Several candidates 
have been put forward in the literature which might make the interest in religion ‘special’. 
They run as follows: religion makes claims on the whole lives of believers; religion is 
based on immanent beliefs; religious-based desires are intense; religion provides a 
context for self-understanding; religion transmits ethical values; religious practice permits 
individual integrity; and finally, religion has been the focus of particularly acute acts of 
persecution and oppression.264 I will consider each of these candidates in turn.
First of all, it is pointed out that religious believers cannot turn their values on and off, 
like others can, but must abide by them for life. This, one might claim, makes the 
interest in living by those beliefs special and worthy of priority. However, this argument 
is not very persuasive. In the first place, religious beliefs can be changed: individuals 
can abandon religion, and even swap religion, thus altering their beliefs. Furthermore, 
those without ties to religion can also have beliefs which last all of their lives. For
262 Paula Casal, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Animals?”, The Journal o f  Political Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 
1,2003: 1-22, p. 6.
263 F. Barbara Orlans et al., The Human Use o f  Animals: Case Studies in Ethical Choice, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 307-311.
264 I have taken these candidates from four main sources: Paul Bou-Habib, “A  Theory o f Religious 
Accommodation”, Journal o f  Applied Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 1,2006: 109-126, pp. 114-121; Kent 
Greenawalt, “Freedom of Association and Religious Association” in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Freedom o f  
Association, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 121-122; Martha C. Nussbaum, “A  Plea 
for Difficulty”, p. 106; and Paula Casal, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Animals?”, pp. 14-15.
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example, a white supremacist might have the sincere belief lasting his entire life that 
black people are criminally-minded and that lynching is permissible as such. However, 
we would not want to assign any force to this man’s desire to perform lynchings, let 
alone grant it primary importance.
Secondly, it could be argued that religion is based on beliefs about the divine and the 
spiritual realm, thus giving the interest in acting upon such beliefs much more 
importance than our ‘Earthly’ interests. However, this claim really just begs the question: 
for why are our spiritual interests more important? Perhaps it might be responded that 
our very salvation depends on religious freedom and practice, thus making it the highest 
interest of all. Unfortunately, there seems to be no way of proving that there is such a 
thing as salvation, let alone that certain practices necessarily lead to it. It thus seems 
difficult to maintain that free religious practice is our highest interest because it leads to 
salvation.
However, this argument might be recast in terms of the intensity of religious belief: it is 
not the fact that a particular practice does lead to salvation that gives it priority, it is the 
fact that individuals believe it to lead to salvation. And because they believe it to lead to 
salvation, individuals’ desires to perform the practice are incredibly intense and thus 
deserve priority. There are two obvious responses to this. First of all, it is extremely 
dangerous to grant priority to an interest just because it rests on an intense belief. For 
example, religiously-motivated suicide bombers no doubt have an intense belief that 
their actions will lead to salvation. However, it would be perverse to grant the bombers’ 
interest in carrying out such actions priority over their victims’ interest in continued life. 
Secondly, one can question the idea that religious beliefs are always more intense than 
non-religious beliefs. After all, religiously-motivated suicide bombers are not the only 
individuals prepared to bear high costs for their beliefs. Consider, for example, the many 
cases of individuals who go on hunger strikes for certain political causes.
The fourth and fifth candidates for granting the interest in religious freedom special 
status and thus priority are as follows: that religion provides a context for self- 
understanding; and that religion transmits ethical values. I put these two candidates 
together because I think they both suffer from the same problem: they do not prove that 
religion is special, because humans can achieve self-understanding and learn ethical 
values in the absence of religion. While religion is often an important source of identity, 
so too are nationality, culture, gender, race, family, ambitions, talents and so on. 
Moreover, although many individuals learn their ethical values from religion, many also
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learn them from family, friends, society, school, books and so on. Clearly then, religion 
is not special in either of these regards. Moreover, if we were to grant priority to our 
interests in all of these different goods, we would have no means of resolving inevitable 
clashes between them.
Sixth is the idea that our interest in religious practice merits priority because it allows us 
to live a life of integrity, where integrity is defined as living in accordance with one’s 
perceived duties.265 Chandran Kukathas certainly seems to regard this notion of integrity 
as of the highest importance, although he frames it in terms of adherence to one’s 
conscience:
If there are any basic human interests, that interest is at a minimum, an interest in 
living accordance with the demands of conscience. For among the worst fates that a 
person might have to endure is that he is unable avoid acting against conscience -  
that he be unable to do what he thinks is right.266 
So, to prevent religious believers such as the Santeros from practising their religious 
customs denies them the opportunity to do what they think is required of them, which 
has the most serious impact on their well-being. In response, it must be pointed out that 
leading a life in line with one’s perceived duties or conscience is not unique to religious 
believers. If it is integrity that makes religion special, it also makes other ways of living 
special. However, granting special status and priority to all religious and non-religious 
practices because they encompass integrity is problematic. For example, consider 
someone -  and there are surely many such people - who truly believes in the mandate, 
‘an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth’. If the interest in leading a life of integrity is 
special and merits priority, then this man should have the moral right to enact his own 
form of justice whenever he is transgressed. However, granting such a right would 
plainly be wrong. This is because the interest of individuals in having a fair and impartial 
trial trumps the interests of individuals whose conscience demands immediate justice. It 
seems very unlikely then that our interest in integrity always merits priority.
The final claim that the interest in religious freedom is special and should take priority is 
based on the fact that religious groups have been persecuted in the past. However, 
while we can acknowledge that serious crimes and harms have been inflicted upon 
religious groups in the past, it seems odd to atone for that by awarding absolute priority 
to the interest in religion. For one thing, if persecution in the past means priority now,
265 Paul Bou-Habib, “A Theory of Religious Accommodation”, p. 117.
266 Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, p. 55.
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then priority must also be granted to individuals' interests in culture, nationality, gender 
and so on. Moreover, given that animals have been persecuted and seriously harmed in 
the past, then on the basis of this argument, their interests too must merit special status 
and priority. Once again, it appears that the argument for special status proves too 
much.
In sum, I can find no justification for the view that humans’ interest in religion is special 
and thus merits priority. This, of course, is not to deny that freedom of religion is an 
important interest of humans. Rather, it is merely to point out that religion cannot be 
invoked as some kind of absolute trump to defeat any competing interest. Given this, if 
Santeros wish to argue that their interest in religious freedom trumps the interests of 
animals in not being killed and not being subject to pain, they will have to find another 
way.
8.2.3 Freedom of Religion and Equal Opportunity
One course that the Santeros could take is to argue that their interest in religious 
freedom should be given extra weight on the basis of fairness and equality. This is 
because without such extra weighting Santeros will have a diminished opportunity to 
pursue their conception of the good, something that I have argued is so crucial for 
human well-being.267 So, to focus on the example of the Santeria religion in Florida 
specifically, the argument might run as follows. Established groups and religions in 
Florida have ample opportunity to pursue their conceptions of the good and live by its 
mandates: Catholics can take the sacrament at mass; Baptists can gather to sing in 
worship; Muslims can congregate for prayers; and so on. The animal rights theory that I 
have outlined does not restrict any of these practices, thus allowing members of such 
groups to lead what they consider to be a good life. However, the theory I am proposing 
has the clear potential to outlaw a core Santeria practice, thereby denying its adherents 
the opportunity to pursue their conception of the good. Thus the burden of abiding by 
this animal rights standard falls much more heavily on members of the Santeros than it 
does on other groups. This, so the argument might go, is unfair, unequal, and must be 
rectified by giving greater weight to the interest in religious freedom of the Santeros.
267 Basing minority rights on the value o f equality is proposed by W ill Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 
pp. 108-115. Basing them specifically on equality o f opportunity is advanced by Jonathan Quong,
“Cultural Exemptions, Expensive Tastes and Equal Opportunities”, Journal o f  Applied Philosophy, Vol. 23, 
No. 1,2006:53-71.
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One easy way of rebutting this suggestion would be to suggest that religion is a matter 
of choice. If religion is chosen, we cannot claim that adherents of Sanetria have a 
diminished opportunity to pursue their conception of the good. Rather, they possess an 
opportunity equal to that of every other individual; but because they choose to follow the 
Santeria religion, they cannot avail themselves of that opportunity. However, this 
rebuttal is far from convincing. For one thing, given that many individuals are born into a 
particular religion and brought up and educated in terms of its norms, it is far from clear 
that all followers of a religion have straightforwardly chosen it. If this is the case with 
followers of Santeria, as it surely is, we might still justifiably say that an application of my 
animal rights standard will lead to many Santeros possessing a diminished opportunity to 
pursue their conception of the good.268
However, at this stage we must ask how far we are prepared go for equal opportunity. 
Looking back at some of the examples given so far in this chapter, it is extremely 
doubtful that we would allow any type of religious practice in the name of equal 
opportunity. For example, if a religion claimed that human jallikattu, honour killing or 
infant sacrifice were all practices of theirs, I cannot think of anyone who would seriously 
suggest that religious groups should be permitted to conduct such practices in the name 
of equal opportunity. Rather, we would Say that opportunity to pursue one’s conception 
of the good is justifiably diminished for groups who want to carry out these and practices 
like them. For example, Jonathan Quong advocates exemptions for minority groups on 
the basis of equal opportunity, but quite rightly mandates that for a practice to even be 
considered for exemption, “...(it) must not violate any basic rights...”269 This of course, 
raises the question as to what these basic rights are, and when they are grounded, but 
the point is clear enough. Similarly, Paul Bou-Habib who makes a case for religious 
exemptions on the grounds of integrity, argues that such exemptions, “...cannot come at 
the expense of other people’s equal opportunity for well-being”, and that, “...religious 
practices that harm others severely...may not be accommodated.”270 We can agree then 
that the goal of permitting individuals to have equal opportunity to pursue their 
conception of the good has its limits. One obvious limit is infanticide, for example. And if
268 For more on equal opportunity and the chance-choice distinction see Sue Mendus, “Choice, Chance and 
Multiculturalism”; and David Miller, “Liberalism, Equal Opportunities and Cultural Commitments”; both 
in Paul Kelly (ed.), Multiculturalism Reconsidered, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
269 Jonathan Quong, “Cultural Exemptions, Expensive Tastes and Equal Opportunities”, p. 58.
270 Paul Bou-Habib, “A  Theory o f Religious Accommodation”, p. 123.
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we accept this limit, we must also accept the limit of animal sacrifice. For as you will 
recall, animals’ and infants’ interests in continued life are equivalent.
Thus, we might concede that imposing this standard of animal rights impacts upon the 
interests of Santeros: it constrains their religious freedom, and diminishes their 
opportunity to pursue their conception of the good. However, this fact does not count 
against recognising that animals possess a moral right not to be killed. As I have argued 
throughout the thesis, there are often costs to be paid for upholding rights.
8.2.4 Harming Animals and Hypocrisy
Having said all of this, I can think of one final response that followers of Santeria might 
make to support their claim that they should be allowed to continue with the animal 
sacrifices. They might argue that to disallow their religious practice on the basis of 
animal rights is hypocritical given all the violations of animal rights going on around 
them.271 That is to say, they could point to the factory-farms, slaughter-houses, animal 
laboratories, and so on in and around Florida, and argue that if these practices are 
permitted, so too should theirs. In other words, they might claim that to outlaw their 
practices alone is discriminatory and inegalitarian.
One response to such arguments has come from Paula Casal, who argues in effect 
that two wrongs do not make a right:
Under present circumstances, insisting that nothing be prohibited unless everything 
comparable is prohibited is tantamount to lifting all existing prohibitions on 
comparable forms of cruelty. Such reasoning would oppose most gradual reforms 
and incapacitate incremental political change.272 
Here Casal makes the perfectly sensible point that in the real world, legislation 
conforming to a certain ethical standard will often have to be piecemeal. Accordingly, 
some groups will have to suffer the burdens of this legislation sooner than others. Since 
Santeria animal sacrifice is straightforwardly in violation of the animal welfare standard 
set out, Santeros have no legitimate complaint when they are targeted sooner than 
others.
While I agree with Casal on this point, I believe that the validity of such an argument 
depends on one crucial premise that she fails to mention: there must be good reason to 
believe that the standard will eventually be applied to all groups. For if we do not have
271 Undoubtedly, other religions and non-religious cultural groups might also make this claim.
272 Paula Casal, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Animals?”, p. 17.
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good reason to think that all groups will eventually come under legislation enforcing this 
standard, Santeros can quite justifiably ask why they are being targeted specifically. In 
such circumstances, singling out Santeria would not be part of overall ‘incremental 
change’, but would simply be change for them and them alone. Now if we return to the 
present situation in Florida, we can see that there is no significant political will to outlaw 
other practices that cause significant harms to animals, such as factory farms. 
Politicians are not drawing up plans to close down factory-farms, nor are they under 
huge pressure from the public to do so. To target the Santeros specifically then, does 
not appear to be part of a general and piecemeal application of animal welfare 
standards; rather, it seems inconsistent and inegalitarian. In other words, the claim that 
it is hypocritical to prevent the Santeros from conducting their religious practices is well- 
founded.
Importantly, however, none of this means that the interest of Santeros in religious 
freedom should be granted extra weight and take priority over the interests of animals. 
Just because it would be unfair to target Santeria specifically, does not give its followers 
a moral right to conduct animal sacrifices. On the contrary, as I have argued above, 
there is no reason to believe that their interest in religious freedom should trump the 
interests of animals. Animals still have a moral right not to be killed by Santeria animal 
sacrifice. What it does mean, however, is that the animal rights theory that I have 
outlined should be applied to all groups and individuals. It should not be used as a stick 
with which to beat cultural and religious minorities, who quite justifiably often feel 
persecuted as it is. So while, piecemeal application of the rights theory will inevitably 
land on some individuals and groups before others, we must be sure that such 
application is piecemeal, rather than discriminatory.
To sum up this section I wish to outline once again its key points. I have evaluated 
whether the human interest in freedom of religion trumps animals’ interests in avoiding 
pain and in being killed. I have concluded that it does not. First of all, very few religions 
actually require their followers to harm animals. Thus, the animal rights theory of this 
thesis only has the potential to impinge upon religious freedom on a very rare number of 
occasions. When religious freedom and animal interests do clash, however, we can 
concede that humans have a strong interest being free to practise their religion. 
However, the interest in religion cannot be regarded as ‘special’, meriting priority over 
any other competing interest. Nor can the goal of equalising individuals’ opportunity to
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pursue their conception of the good take priority over all other claims. Just as we would 
not let humans suffer intolerably in the name of religion or equal opportunity, nor should 
we let animals. And just as we would not let human infants be killed in the name of 
religion or equal opportunity, nor should we let animals. While it might justifiably be 
objected by some groups that it is hypocritical to target their practices specifically while 
so many other actions that cause significant harms to animals are allowed to flourish, 
that does not make their practices any more permissible.
8.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, I once again want to reiterate that the human interests in culture and in 
freedom of religion are strong and pressing. Indeed, as far as possible these interests 
should be accommodated. Unfortunately, however, both of these interests sometimes 
clash with the interests of animals. Cultural and religious practices sometimes involve 
inflicting serious harms on animals. I have argued that the human interests in culture 
and religion cannot simply take priority in these circumstances. While these interests are 
pressing, they are by no means absolute. Having cultural support and living by a 
communal way of life are important to individuals, but not all that are important. And 
while the diversity of cultures in the world is to be celebrated, we should not rigidly 
preserve this diversity at any cost. In any case, the animal rights theory defended in this 
thesis is not much of a threat to such diversity. Similarly, the rights theory defended here 
is not much of a threat to religious freedom: few religions demand harming animals. 
However, when they do, religion cannot act as a simple trump. There are no grounds for 
regarding the interest in religious freedom as ‘special’, and, like our interest in culture, it 
must be weighed fairly against other competing interests. When we undertake such 
weighing we see that there are limits to religious and cultural practices. If we believe 
that torture and infanticide are such justified limits, then we must also accept that the 
interests of animals in avoiding pain and death are justified limits. In other words, 
animals have a moral right not to be killed or made to suffer by cultural and religious 
practices.
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9. Conclusion
In this thesis I have argued that animals can and do possess moral rights. In particular, 
they possess prima facie rights not to be killed and not to be made to suffer. However, 
unlike most other proponents of animal rights, I have claimed that these rights do not 
extend to a prima facie right to liberty. Given that rights ground duties according to the 
interest-based theory that I have proposed, these animal rights have delineated some of 
our obligations to non-humans. Of course, I say ‘some of our obligations’, because this 
account is not exhaustive. Rather, and given the restrictions of space, I have had to be 
selective. Thus, I have discussed the obligations we have to animals in those contexts 
that involve the greatest numbers of animals and which I believe to be the most 
controversial. Those issues are: experimentation, agriculture, entertainment and culture. 
However, there remain other interesting contexts in which our behaviour towards non­
humans is up for debate. For example, consider the following topics: our obligations to 
the environment; the preservation of endangered species; the permissibility of 
therapeutic hunting; pest control; the use of ‘working animals’ such as guide dogs and 
police horses; and our obligations to other non-human entities such as robots. While 
there is insufficient room to discuss all of these issues fully, it is worth bringing them up 
as future possible avenues of research, and to see what the theory I have outlined would 
say about them. In this conclusion then, I aim to do two things: first, I will make explicit 
what I have claimed our moral obligations to non-humans are; and secondly, I will 
introduce and discuss some other contexts in which these claims might be applied.
9.1 Our Moral Obligations to Non-Humans
This project is entitled ‘Moral Obligations to Non-Humans’, and yet many non-humans 
are left out of the bulk of the discussion. For example, this thesis does not provide an 
account of our obligations to trees, rainforests, endangered species and ecosystems. 
Quite simply, this is because I denied in Chapter 2 that we have any obligations to such 
entities. This denial was based on the fact that entities that lack the capacity for life to 
go well or badly for themselves - a capacity which non-sentient entities like trees and 
ecosystems lack -  do not possess moral status. So while we may well have quite 
extensive obligations regarding these types of thing, such obligations are based on their 
value to other entities that do possess moral status. Thus, I am not denying that we 
have an obligation not to destroy ecosystems, to preserve rare species, or refrain from
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building on beautiful tracts of wilderness. As we shall see in the next section, these 
obligations may well exist. However, the point is that these obligations are not owed to 
ecosystems, species, or tracts of wilderness; rather, they are founded on the obligations 
we have to entities such as sentient animals and humans who have lives that can go 
well or badly for themselves.
Having established that we have moral obligations to sentient animals, the purpose of 
Chapter 3 was to provide an account of what makes animals’ lives go well or badly. In 
that chapter I defended hedonism as the appropriate account of animal well-being: an 
animal’s life goes well to the extent that an animal enjoys life and does not suffer. 
Importantly, this account can be contrasted with what makes life go well or badly for 
persons. Since persons are entities for whom autonomy is valuable, pleasure and pain 
are not the sole factors in personal well-being: authenticity, freedom and choice are all 
important factors. This makes the capabilities approach the best philosophical account 
of personal well-being. Because sentient animals are non-persons - meaning that they 
are not self-governing agents who are able to frame, revise and pursue a conception of 
the good -  it would be a mistake to account for animal well-being using the capabilities 
approach. For example, it does not matter for animals and other non-persons that they 
are capable of being well-fed, but simply that they are well-fed. This important difference 
between persons and non-persons forms the basis of the thesis’s claim that animals 
have no fundamental interest in liberty.
Of course, to know who has moral status and what makes their lives go well does not 
then lead to a definitive list of our moral obligations to non-humans. Instead, we need 
some kind of ethical framework with which to determine what morally ought to be done. 
For this reason, Chapter 4 outlined and defended an interest-based rights approach. 
This Razian approach asks whether an individual has an interest that is sufficient to 
ground a duty in another; if it is, a right is established. In effect then, the ethical 
framework is one of examining and evaluating interests. Unlike a utilitarian framework, 
however, the rights-based approach does not simply aim at maximising aggregate 
interest-satisfaction. This is because the ultimate concern is not aggregate well-being, 
but individual well-being. In other words, rights act as constraints on purely 
consequentialist calculations.
Such a conclusion is important when we come to examine our actual obligations to 
non-human animals. Thus, in evaluating the permissibility of animal experimentation, it 
is not enough to point out that experiments on animals lead to more benefit than harm
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overall. Other factors -  such as concern for the well-being of the individual animal 
subjects -  come into play. In Chapter 5 then, I argued that we have a moral obligation 
not to undertake experiments on animals that cause them pain or that kill them, 
irrespective of the benefits such experiments might bring. However, the chapter also 
claimed that if experiments could be devised that caused no suffering and did not result 
in death, then such experiments would be permissible.
This notion that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with using animals for certain 
purposes was also borne out in Chapter 6. In that chapter, I defended the view that 
animal agriculture does not need to be completely abolished -  raising animals for their 
milk and eggs is perfectly permissible -  but it does need to be radically revised in order 
that animals are not killed and not made to suffer. Also in that chapter, I made an 
important claim regarding our obligations over the modifications of non-human animals, 
whether by traditional breeding techniques, or genetic engineering. I argued that we 
have an obligation not to modify animals when such modifications lead to them having 
insufficient opportunities for well-being, where insufficient is defined as falling below 
‘species-typical normal functioning’.
This latter claim obviously has implications for the breeding of pets, and this was 
discussed in Chapter 7 which concerned our use of animals in entertainment. Perhaps it 
is in this context that my conclusions were in sharpest contrast to those of other 
proponents of animal rights. For once again, I suggested that there is nothing wrong in 
itself with using animals to entertain us, making pet-keeping, using animals in circuses, 
displaying them in zoos and using them in sport all permissible in themselves. However, 
our obligations not to kill animals, not to make them suffer and not to modify them so that 
they have insufficient opportunities for well-being, all impose significant restrictions on 
just how we use animals to entertain us. Importantly, such restrictions are tougher than 
any states currently legislate for and would no doubt require such things as pet licensing, 
a huge downscale in the numbers of sporting events involving animals, an eradication of 
travelling circuses, and fewer but better zoos.
Finally, in Chapter 8 I argued that animals’ interests in not suffering and in not being 
killed are not trumped by the human interests in culture and religion. That is to say, 
religious believers and members of cultural groups are not exempt from the moral 
obligation not to make animals suffer and not to kill them. For although culture and 
religious freedom are important interests of human beings, they are not absolute goods 
that take priority over all other interests.
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As I mentioned above, these contexts are not the only times in which we use non­
humans, nor are they the only areas in which the question of our obligations to non­
humans arise. Given this, in the following and final section of the thesis I examine six 
possible extensions of the thesis.
9.2 Extending the Thesis and Future Avenues for Research
I believe that there are at least six interesting possibilities for extending the research of 
this thesis. Although each issue is interesting and important, they have not been fleshed 
out into separate thesis chapters for reasons of space. However, I am hoping that the 
theory that I have presented in this thesis is clear enough so that its implications for 
these topics can be made explicit. In this section, my aim is to introduce these other 
avenues for research and tentatively propose how my thesis would address them.
9.2.1 The Environment
In the first place, I wish to return to those non-human entities that I have not discussed at 
great length in the thesis: endangered species, ecosystems, tracts of wilderness and so 
on. As mentioned above, in Chapter 2 I denied that we have any obligations to such 
entities, on the basis that they do not possess the capacity for phenomenal 
consciousness, and thus do not have lives that can go well or badly for themselves. 
Despite this, however, I still believe that the theory proposed in this thesis has some 
interesting and novel implications for our obligations concerning such entities.273 For 
example, in a traditional ethical framework which denies moral status to animals, our 
environmental obligations are based solely on anthropocentric considerations. That is to 
say, when we decide what morally ought to be done in respect of this piece of land or 
that particular ecosystem, we simply examine how different actions will affect and impact 
upon human beings. Of course, this is not to say that anthropocentrism must 
necessarily lead to policies of development and destruction rather than protection and 
conservation. Human interests in biodiversity, beauty, reserves of natural resources and 
so on may well count in favour of protecting these non-human entities. Nevertheless, it 
is clear that it is human interests alone that possess significance in these deliberations.
273 This is in contrast to some philosophers who believe that obligations to the environment can never be 
explained by appealing to the rights of animals. For examples of those who endorse this schism between 
animal rights and environmental ethics, see James Baird Callicott, “Animal Liberation: A Triangular 
Affair”, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 2, Winter 1980: 311-328; and Mark Sagoff, “Animal Liberation and 
Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2,1984: 
297-307.
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In contrast to this, if the thesis defended here were used to outline a scheme of 
environmental obligations, animals’ interests would also need to be factored into our 
considerations. In particular, the prima facie animal rights not to be killed and not to be 
made to suffer would place important limits on the activities of humans. So, even if it 
were shown that the development of some piece of land would violate no human 
interests or rights, it might still be impermissible. For if that development were to have a 
deleterious impact upon the habitat of sentient animals such that it resulted in their 
suffering or death, then that development would ordinarily be impermissible.
9.2.2 Endangered Species
Of course, some of the ethical problems we have concerning the environment do not 
only relate to entities such as land and ecosystems, but also to animals themselves. For 
example, as a future avenue of research it would be useful to apply the claims of the 
thesis to the issue of endangered species. Indeed, for many this is a crucial issue within 
the wider question of our moral obligations to animals. While I concede that this issue is 
indeed of great importance, I did not feel that it merited prolonged discussion in this 
thesis. For once again, it is clear that I deny that we have any moral obligations to 
endangered species or, for that matter, to any species. For although it is undoubtedly 
true that species can flourish and be threatened, they are not entities whose lives can go 
well or badly for themselves. Quite simply, this is because a species is an entity that 
lacks the capacity to feel anything of the world itself. Nonetheless, it is abundantly clear 
that many species of animal are made up of entities with the capacity for phenomenal 
consciousness. Accordingly then, we may have substantial obligations regarding 
species on the basis of the obligations we have to individual sentient animals. For 
example, our obligation not to hunt rare species of animal can be quite straightforwardly 
explained by our obligation not to kill any animal. Similarly, our obligation not to destroy 
the habitats of rare species of animal can easily be explained by our obligation not to kill 
or cause suffering to any animal.
But at this stage it might be objected that such a conclusion fails to accommodate our 
intuition that it is worse to kill a member of an endangered species than it is to kill a 
member of an abundant species. For isn’t it worse to kill a rare orang-utan than it is an 
abundant rat? In response to this objection, I have three points. First, comparing an 
orang-utan and a rat is not to compare like with like. Given that orang-utans are 
mentally very complex, and are near to (if not over) the threshold of personhood that I
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have given in this thesis, they have greater psychological continuity with themselves 
over time than rats do. This means that their interest in continued life is stronger than 
that of rats, and that killing an orang-utan would ordinarily be worse than killing a rat. 
Secondly, if we were to compare two animals with equivalent mental abilities (black rats 
and brown rats, for example), it would surely be bizarre to claim that the rarer animal has 
a greater interest in continued life. After all, interests concern how life goes for the 
individual whose life it is. And surely, when we consider animals with similar mental 
capacities, they have an equivalent stake that their lives continue. It would seem then, 
that it cannot be morally worse to kill a rarer animal on the basis that that animal has a 
greater interest in continued life. Finally then, we must consider whether it is worse to 
kill a rarer animal on grounds other than the interests of the animals themselves. For 
example, perhaps it is worse to kill a rarer animal because of the harmful impact that 
such killing would have on other sentient creatures. As I mentioned in Chapter 6, 
animals are not isolated entities; instead, they depend on creatures of their own and 
other species to live well. Thus, when we kill an animal, the harm inflicted will not be 
isolated to that animal alone: the animal’s dependent kin may suffer, the animal’s social 
group may suffer, and if the numbers of that animal’s species are dwindling, other 
species in that animal’s ecosystem may suffer. To illustrate, it is widely assumed that 
the poisoning of prairie dogs in North America has led to the demise of their natural 
predators, the endangered black-footed ferret. These so-called ‘cascade effects’ alert us 
to the fact that destroying one species will often lead to harming others. Given all this, I 
believe that this thesis can endorse the view that it is sometimes worse to kill a rare 
animal than an abundant one. However, this conclusion is based on the potential 
harmful impacts of such killing on others, not on the strength of the interest of the rare 
animal.
9.2.3 Therapeutic Hunting
This discussion of our obligations regarding animal species brings up another interesting 
avenue of research: our obligations when a population of animal becomes so large that it 
threatens to wipe out other species and cause environmental degradation. Now I have 
claimed that this thesis can support the view that it is sometimes worse to kill a rarer 
animal than it is an abundant animal on the grounds of its impact on others. Given this, 
it might be thought that the thesis also supports the therapeutic hunting of over-abundant 
species. After all, such hunting might well lead to greater benefit for sentient animals
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overall. However, this assumption would be quite wrong. For just because it is 
sometimes worse to kill a rarer animal, that does not make killing an abundant animal 
permissible. These abundant animals still have a definite interest in continued life that 
cannot simply be overridden for the sake of aggregate well-being. To assess whether 
abundant animals have a moral right not to be killed in therapeutic hunting, we will once 
again need to consider and weigh the relevant interests involved. And when we do this, 
we must judge those interests on their own merits, which involves giving them equal 
consideration to equivalent interests. Accordingly, consider the fact that one of the most 
abundant and harmful species on Earth is Homo sapiens. Consider also that few of us 
condone killing human infants, who have an interest in continued life that is equivalent to 
sentient animals. This suggests that the therapeutic hunting of over-abundant animals is 
not permitted under the claims of this thesis.
Nevertheless, we are still left with the problem of what to do about these over-abundant 
populations, and the significant harm that they cause. Interestingly, the rights theory that 
I have proposed may well have the resources to deal with the problem: interference with 
animals’ freedom. For my thesis would see nothing wrong with interfering with the 
fertility of abundant animals. Thus, given that animals are not persons with an interest in 
governing their own lives, reducing these animals’ fertility through a policy of sterilisation 
would not be problematic provided that it did not cause animals to suffer. Of course, it 
might be argued that such policies would be tantamount to modifying the capacities of 
animals such that they would have insufficient opportunities for well-being. For it will be 
remembered that I argued in Chapter 6 that it is impermissible to reduce animals’ 
opportunities for well-being below the species norm. And yet, it will also be recalled that 
I argued in Chapter 7 during the discussion of neutering pets, that given the longer life 
expectancy and resistance from disease of animals who do not produce offspring, such 
modification may well actually increase animals’ opportunities for well-being. 
Accordingly, we can then see how this thesis can address the question of over-abundant 
populations and the harms that they cause.
9.2.4 Pests
Animals targeted in therapeutic hunting are often referred to as ‘pests’. This is no doubt 
due to the fact that a pest commonly refers to something that is a nuisance. However, 
when it comes to animals, a pest is also commonly considered to be a legitimate target 
for killing. Thus, for example, in the debate over fox-hunting in the UK, those who want
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hunting to resume often claim that foxes are pests, destroying valuable crops and 
livestock, thus needing to be killed. In fact, few question this claim: after all, although 
foxes cannot be hunted with hounds, they can still of course be shot and killed quite 
legally. Nuisance animals do not just interfere with farms, however, but also ordinary 
homes: rats, mice, squirrels, wasps and so on, all frequently take up residence in our 
homes. Indeed, most of us are likely to have had an experience involving nuisance 
animals in our homes. Given this, it would be useful to examine the implications of this 
thesis for our dealings with these animals.
It is certainly the case that the claims of this thesis challenge the common view that 
because an animal is a nuisance, then we can do what we like to that animal. Foxes 
may well eat farmers’ chickens, and mice may well take up residence in our lofts, but 
these facts alone do not make killing foxes and mice permissible. Foxes, mice and the 
like have a clear interest in continuing to live, and we cannot override that interest just for 
our own convenience. However, it should be pointed out that many want to kill nuisance 
animals not simply for their own convenience, but because they regard these animals as 
a threat to their own well-being. It is argued that the presence of animals such as rats in 
our homes threatens us because they spread disease. While this argument certainly 
has some force, we should be careful to avoid the trap of exaggerating the dangers from 
animals such as rats. For example, in England and Wales the reported cases of human 
diseases where rats were likely to be the source are as follows: fewer than 40 cases per 
year of leptospirosis; 16 cases of Streptobacillus moniliformis since 2000; just a handful 
of cases of such things as Hantaan virus and salmonella in recent years; and no cases 
of the plague and rabies.274 Of course, it might be pointed out that these figures are so 
low because of the fact that we are quick to exterminate rats once they enter our 
property; if we altered this policy, perhaps these incidents of disease would go up.
At this stage then, it is worth pointing out two implications of the rights theory defended 
in this thesis. First of all, if animals do invade our homes threatening us with serious 
diseases, and if killing them is the sole means by which to avoid this, then this thesis will 
support such killings. For you will recall from the discussion of killing animals in the field 
in Chapter 6, that the human interest in survival trumps animals’ interests in survival 
when they conflict. Secondly, however, nuisance animals cannot be killed when they do
274 These figures are taken from Health Protection Agency statistics. See, “Zoonoses that may be acquired 
from rats; England and Wales”,
<http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/topics_az/zoonoses/zoonoses_from_rats.htm>.
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not threaten our vital interests. For this reason, if we do not want these animals in our 
residences, much greater steps need to be taken to prevent their spread and to protect 
our homes. This means taking much greater care in how we store our rubbish, how 
clean we keep our streets and waterways, and how we maintain our homes. For surely 
taking more care in these areas is preferable to the current practice of unintentionally 
encouraging animals to enter our property through our own carelessness, and then 
killing them once they are in.
9.2.5 Working Animals
While the common regard for animals such as rats and mice is usually disgust, other 
animals in society are held in much higher regard: police dogs, police horses and guide 
dogs are all apt examples. For this reason, another possible avenue for future research 
is the permissibility of using these working animals. I think this question is particularly 
pertinent for other proponents of animal rights, because it poses a particular difficulty for 
them. For if these thinkers believe that sentient animals have a fundamental interest in 
liberty, as many do, then surely they should regard using working animals for particular 
human functions as morally impermissible. For in effect, these animals are our slaves, 
trained to function for our ends, and with no control over their own lives. However, no 
doubt because this conclusion jars so greatly with our considered judgements, I do not 
know of any proponents of animal rights who explicitly defend such a position.
In contrast, the implication of my thesis for this question is in accordance with our 
intuitions. Using animals for particular functions, as guide dogs, police dogs and police 
horses are used, is not inherently wrong. This is because animals are not persons and 
do not have an interest in leading self-chosen lives, pursuing their own ends. Thus 
training animals and using animals to work for us is permissible, so long as it does not 
result in their suffering or death.
9.2.6 Robots
So far in this section I have concentrated on our obligations to animals and non-human 
entities such as species, ecosystems and the land. However, non-humans include a 
wide range of entities, and discussing other types of non-human provides another 
possible application of this thesis. In particular, I mentioned in Chapter 2 that biological 
life is not necessary to have a life that can go well or badly for oneself. If a robot were 
constructed so that it had the capacity for phenomenal consciousness, it too could be
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said to have well-being. If that robot had a life that could go well or badly for itself, it 
would have moral status; and if it were sentient but not autonomous in the ways I have 
defined, then its well-being could be accounted for hedonistically. In other words then, 
all that I have said with regard to our obligations to sentient animals, would also apply to 
sentient robots. Of course, the reason I stick to sentient animals in the thesis and not 
sentient robots, is because the latter do not yet exist. However, unlike some 
philosophers I see no reason why sentient robots could not one day be produced. And if 
such robots were produced, this thesis could be applied to construct a scheme of robot 
rights.
9.3 Conclusion
The fact that this thesis can be used to outline our moral obligations to entities such as 
robots serves to underline one of its fundamental claims: the interests of entities should 
be judged on their own merits. For too long in Western moral philosophy have the 
interests of animals been subordinated and overridden simply because they belong to 
members of different species. The interests of animals should be considered on their 
own strengths, and equivalent interests should be treated with the same respect, 
irrespective of the kind of entities to which they belong. Thus far, I am in agreement with 
the majority of proponents of animal rights. However, it is my contention that many 
advocates of animal rights have misread what the interests of animals actually are. 
These philosophers have noted the importance of freedom to human well-being and 
claimed that the same holds for animals. This is a mistake: animals are not autonomous 
entities, and do not have a fundamental interest in liberty. For this simple reason, our 
moral obligations to non-humans do not ordinarily involve liberating them. Rather, they 
necessitate putting an end to the killing and suffering animals endure at our hands.
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